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University Studies No. 1.

HISTORY
OF THE
MEDIÆVAL SCHOOL OF
INDIAN LOGIC

BY
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1909.

TO
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE ASUTOSH MUKHOPADHYAYA,
SARASVATI MA, DL, DSc, FRAS, FRSE,
*Vice Chancellor of the Calcutta University,
President of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and Chairman of the Board
of Indigenous Sanskrit Education, Bengal,*
WHOSE LIFE IS AN UNBROKEN RECORD
OF LOFTY IDEALS
TRANSLATED INTO PRACTICE.
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED
IN TOKEN OF PROFOUND ESTEEM
BY
HIS HUMBLE ADMIRER,
THE AUTHOR

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PREFACE.

WITH the object of drawing the attention of scholars to the vast literature of the Mediæval school of Indian Logic, I have in the present thesis embodied the results of some of my researches into it¹. The Mediæval Logic of India is divided into two principal systems, *viz.*, the Jain and the Buddhist. The materials of the Jain portion of my thesis were derived from several rare Jain manuscripts procured from Western India and the Deccan. I have also used the Jain manuscripts of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and the numerous Jain works printed in Bombay, Benares and Calcutta. From the footnotes of my thesis it will be evident that I have frequently used Professor Peterson's Reports of Operations in Search of Sanskrit manuscripts in the Bombay Circle. Though the Professor has said nothing in particular about Logic and Logicians, he has given a general index of Jain authors which has been of the greatest use to me. I have not heard of any scholar who has yet written any special account of the Jain Logic. Dr Herman Jacobi's "*Eine Jain-Doctrin*" printed in Leipzig is an annotated translation of Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra*, an ancient Jain work on general philosophy and not a special treatise on Logic. A short time ago I sent a proof of my account of the Jain Logic to Dr Jacobi who very graciously returned it with a few marginal glosses which have been most thankfully accepted and embodied in the foot-notes of this thesis.

To show how generously that most eminent authority on Jainism condescended to help me, I quote here the

¹ Some of these researches were published in the "*Journal*" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal during the last two years.

letter which he wrote in communicating to me his suggestions

Bonn, 21st October, 1907

Niebuhrstrasse 59.

DEAR SIR,

I have received your kind letter and the proofs of the *Jaina Logic* and I heartily congratulate you on the work you have done. It will prove very useful, for you have brought together a mass of information which is not of easy access to many. In looking over the proofs I have made some marginal glosses to show you where I think you might alter your statement. Of course, everything is left to your decision.

I shall be glad to see your whole book, as I take great interest in Indian Logic and I have myself written an article on it principally for the information of our Logicians who as a rule know nothing about what has been done in this branch of Philosophy by Indian thinkers. I shall therefore feel obliged if you can spare me a copy of your work.

With kind regards,

I am,

Yours sincerely,

H. JACOB

A proof of the *Jaina Logic* was also sent to two oriental authorities on Jainism—Munī Dhamavijaya and his pupil Śrī Indravijaya at Benares. I owe them a great debt of gratitude for the kind assistance which they cheerfully rendered to me by going through the proof and offering certain suggestions and observations which have been incorporated in the foot-notes of this thesis.

As to the Buddhist Logic, no systematic information is available from Pāli texts as there is not a single regular treatise on Logic in the Pāli language, but references to ancient Brahmanic Logic can be gleaned from the publications of the Pāli Text Society of London and also from other Pāli works printed elsewhere. The Buddhist Sanskrit works on Logic of the Middle Age are now almost extinct in India. A few of them, which are available in Chinese versions, have been noticed by Dr. Sugiura in his "*Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan.*" But almost all the Buddhist Sanskrit works on Logic

are carefully preserved in faithful translations in Tibet. The materials of that portion of my thesis, which deals with Buddhist Logic, were chiefly derived from the Hodgson Collection of Tibetan xylographs deposited in the India Office, London, and the large number of Tibetan block-prints brought down to Calcutta from Gyantse during the British Mission to Tibet in 1904. I also consulted almost all the Tibetan manuscripts and block-prints bearing on Logic that lie hidden in the Tibetan monasteries of Labrang and Phodang in Sikkim which I visited during May and June 1907.¹ For the historical account of the Buddhist authors I have chiefly depended on Lama Tārānātha's Tibetan history of Indian Buddhism translated into German by A. Schiefner under the designation of "*Geschichte des Buddhismus*," and the Tibetan historical work called *Pag-sam-jon-zang* edited in the original Tibetan by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., in Calcutta. Some most important historical facts regarding the Buddhist Logicians and their works have been discovered from the colophons at the end of each of the Tibetan works which I have examined.

It was mainly through the influence of Mr. F. W. Thomas that I was enabled to borrow the Tibetan xylographs of the India Office, London, and I avail myself of this opportunity of acknowledging my humble appreciation of the generosity of that distinguished scholar. My respectful thanks are also due to the Government of India, who kindly lent me several block-prints out of the vast Tibetan collection brought down to Calcutta by the Tibet Mission of 1904. I should be guilty of great ingratitude if I were not to mention my obligations to Mr. A. Earle, I.C.S., Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, Mr. C. H. Bompas, I.C.S., Deputy Commissioner,

¹ Subsequently in October 1908 I visited Pönamgohi, which is another very old monastery in Sikkim, where all facilities were kindly afforded to me by their Highnesses the Maharaja and Maharani of Sikkim as well as by Mr. Crawford, I.C.S., the then Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling.—S. C. V.

Darjeeling, and Mr. Claude White, C.I.E., Political Resident, Sikkim, for the kind help they gave me in getting access to the Tibetan Monasteries of Labrang and Phodang in Sikkim.

For a time I was quite bewildered by the enormous store of material on Indian Logic which I had collected, and it took me many a month to select and classify a portion of it for the purpose of this thesis. When the compilation of the paper was finished, and the work was passing through the press, Mr. W. W. Hornell, B.A., of the Indian Educational Service, kindly undertook to revise it, but he was able to revise only the first chapter of the Jaina Logic before leaving India. Accordingly, the rest of the work was, at my request, revised by Mr. W. C. Wordsworth, M.A., of the Presidency College, Calcutta. I am deeply indebted to both these gentlemen for their kind courtesy and assistance.

Whatever the merits or the utility of the present contribution may be, it has had the rare good fortune and privilege of having been looked through by a savant with whom it would be an impertinence to name in the same breath any other living authorities, oriental or occidental, on Indian philosophy. This savant, whose learning is equalled by his modesty and willingness to assist beginners in their uphill work, is no other than our revered Dr G. Thibaut, M.A., Ph.D., D.Sc., C.I.E., now Registrar of the Calcutta University, which post may he fill long so that our countrymen may continue to derive benefit from his vast erudition.

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA.

INTRODUCTION.

Logic is generally designated in India as Nyāya-śāstra. It is also called Tarka-śāstra, Hetu-vidyā, Pramāna-śāstra, Ānvikṣikī and Phakkikū-śāstra.

Indian Logic may be divided into three principal schools, viz., the Ancient (600 B.C.—400 A.D.), the Mediæval (400 A.D.—1200 A.D.), and the Modern (1200 A.D.—1850 A.D.). The *Nyāya-sūtra* by Akṣapāda Gautama is the foremost, though by no means the first, work on Logic of the Ancient School; the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* by Dignāga is a representative work of the Mediæval School, while the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya is the main text-book of the Modern School. These three works have, since their composition, enjoyed a very wide popularity, as is evident from the numerous commentaries that have from time to time centred round them. A few of the commentaries are mentioned below —

The Ancient School of Logic

Text

1. *Nyāya-sūtra* by Akṣapāda Gautama

Commentaries.

2. *Nyāya bhāṣya* by Vātsyāyana.
3. *Nyāya-vārtika* by Udyotakara
4. *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-tikā* by Vācaspati Miśra.
5. *Nyāya vārtika-tātparyā-tikā-parisuddhi* by Udayanācārya.
6. *Nyāyālankāra* by Śrī Kantha
7. *Nyāya-vṛtti* by Abhayatilakopādhyāya
8. *Nyāya-vṛtti* by Viśvanātha

The Mediæval School of Logic.

Text.

1. *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* by Dignāga

Commentaries.

2. *Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti* by Dignāga.
3. *Pramāṇa-vārtika kārīkā* by Dharmakīrti
4. *Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti* by Dharmakīrti.
5. *Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā* by Devendrabodhi
6. *Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā-tikā* by Śākyabodhi
7. *Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti* by Ravi Gupta. [drabodhi.
8. *Pramāṇa-samuccaya-tikā* (Viśālāmalavati-nāma) by Jinena-

9. *Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra* by Prajñākara Gupta.
10. *Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra-tikā* by Jina.
11. *Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra* by Yamāri.
12. *Pramāṇa-vārtika-tikā* by Śaṅkarānanda.

The Modern School of Logic.

Tect.

1. *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya.

Commentaries

2. *Tattva-cintāmaṇi Prakāśa* by Rucidatta.
3. *Tattva Āloka* by Jayadeva Miśra
4. *Tattva Dīdhiti* by Raghunātha Śrīromani.
5. *Tattva Rahasya* by Mathurānātha
6. *Tattva Dīpani* by Kṛṣṇakānta
7. *Tattva Tikā* by Kaṇāda Tarkavāgiśu
8. *Tattva Āloka-sāra-mañjarī* by Bhavānanda
9. *Tattva Āloka-darpana* by Maheśa Thakura.
10. *Tattva Āloka-kāntakodhāra* by Madhu Sūdana Thakura.
11. *Tattva Āloka-rahasya* by Mathurānātha. [pati.]
12. *Tattva Dīdhiti-vyākhyā-vivecana* by Rudra Nyāyavācas-
13. *Tattva Dīdhiti-tippaṇi* by Jagadīśa.
14. *Tattva Dīdhiti-tikā* by Gadādhara.
15. *Tattva Dīdhiti-sāramañjarī* by Bhavānanda.
16. *Tattva Bhavānandī vyākhyā* by Mahādeva Pandita
17. *Tattva Kālīsankari-patrikā* by Kālīsankara.
18. *Tattva Cāndri-patrikā* by Candra Nārāyaṇa.
19. *Tattva Randri-patrikā* by Rudra Nārāyaṇa

etc.

etc

etc

Besides these there are numerous other texts and commentaries on Logic which belong to one or another of the three schools mentioned above

I shall say here nothing about the ancient and modern schools of Logic, my whole attention will be devoted to the mediæval school alone. It is perhaps known to very few scholars that the Mediæval Logic was almost entirely in the hands of the Jainas and Buddhists. For one thousand years, from 600 B.C. to 400 A.D., the Jainas and Buddhists were fully occupied in questions of metaphysics and religion though there are occasional references to Logic in their works of that period. At about 400 A.D. began an epoch when they seriously took up the problems of Logic, and all the text-books on the Jaina and Buddhist systems of Logic date at or after that time. Ujjain in Malwa and Valabhi in Guzerat were the scenes of activity of the Jaina Logicians of the Śvetāmbara sect. The Dīgambaras flourished principally in Pāṭaliputra and Drāviḍa

(including *Karṇāṭa*) about the 8th century A.D. The *Nyāya-vatāra* by Siddhasena Divākara, dated about 533 A.D., was the first systematic work on the Jaina Logic.

The real founders of the Mediæval Logic were the Buddhists.

The Buddhist system
of Mediæval Logic

The first batch of the Buddhist Logicians came principally from Gāndhāra (modern Peshwar) on the Punjab frontier.

Ayodhyā (Oudh) was the scene of their activity. Unfortunately we have not before us any of the original Sanskrit works on Logic produced by them. We may, however, form an approximate estimate of their Logic from the works on the *Yogācāra* philosophy by Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu recovered from the Chinese sources. About 500 A.D.¹ the Huns conquered Gāndhāra, and their leaders Mihirakula and others perpetrated terrible atrocities on the Buddhists to the great detriment of Buddhist studies there. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (and perhaps Maitreya too) passed the best days of their lives in Ayodhyā and wrote most of their works there. King Vikramāditya who reigned in Ayodhyā about 480 A.D.² was at first a patron of the Sāṃkhya philosophy but afterwards greatly supported Buddhism through the influence of Vasubandhu. Bālāditya, who succeeded Vikramāditya to the throne of Ayodhyā, was a pupil of Vasubandhu and a supporter of Buddhism. The Buddhist Logic of the *Yogācāra* school appears thus to have originated in Ayodhyā and flourished there during 400-500 A.D. under Kings Vikramāditya and Bālāditya.

The second batch of the Buddhist Logicians flourished in Drāvida (the Deccan) during 500-700 A.D. when the Buddhist kings of the Pallava dynasty were supreme there. Ācārya Dignāga, about 500 A.D., was the oldest logician of Drāvida whose works are still extant, in faithful translations. Another logician of eminence of the Drāvida school was Dharmakīrti who lived about 650 A.D. His *Nyāyabindu*, and a commentary on it by Dharmottara called *Nyāyabindu-tīkā*, are the only systematic works on Buddhist Logic which have come down to us in their Sanskrit originals. They would have certainly disappeared from India like a hundred other works of their kind, had it not been that a Jaina logician named Mallavādīn had written a gloss on them. Seeing that the gloss would be useless without the text and commentary, the Jainas preserved all three. The *Nyāyabindu*, together with the commentary, preserved

¹ Vide Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. I., pp. xv, 168.

² Vide TAKAKURA'S *Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu* published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, January 1905, p. 36.

among the palm-leaf manuscripts in the Jaina temple of Śāntinātha, Cambay, has been published by Professor Peterson in the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta. With the downfall of the Pallavas, Logic disappeared from Drāvida. Vinayāditya of the Western Chalukya dynasty about 696 A.D. put a check to the power of the Pallavas, while Vikramāditya II, of the same dynasty, about 733 A.D., seized Kāñci, their capital¹. The Chalukyas were Vaiṣṇavas, and their conquest of Kāñci was really a triumph of the Brahmanic religion over Buddhism. At about 788 A.D. the great Brāhmana preacher Śaṅkarācārya appeared, and Buddhism became gradually extinct in Drāvida.

The third and fourth batches of Buddhist Logicians flourished simultaneously in Kāśmīra and Bengal (including Behar). Ravi Gupta, 725 A.D., was the earliest logician of the Kāśmīra school. At this time Kāśmīra was governed by the illustrious King Laṭāditya or Muktāpīda (about 695—732 A.D.), who built a large vihāra with a stūpa at Huṣkapur². At the same time there was a great demand for Sanskrit Buddhist books in Tibet with the thorough opening of her intercourse with India in the 8th century A.D. King Khri-ral (otherwise known as Raḥ-pa-can) in the 9th century A.D. employed numerous Indian Pandits and Tibetan Lamas to translate Sanskrit books into Tibetan. The propaganda of translations went on in full force up to about 1101 A.D., when the glorious reign of Śrī Haṛṣa Deva (1089—1101 A.D.), who was a patron of learning, both Brāhmanic and Buddhist,³ came to a close. The Buddhist monasteries and Tibetan Lamas did not altogether disappear from Kāśmīra until the establishment of Mahomedan rule in that country in 1341 A.D., when her intercourse with Tibet ceased. Henceforth we hear no more of logicians flourishing in Kāśmīra.

In Bengal and Behar Logic flourished extensively during 700-1200 A.D., when the Buddhist kings of the Pāla dynasty reigned there. Candra Gomin, about 700 A.D., was the first logician of the Bengal school. With the downfall of the Pāla kings in 1139 A.D., Buddhist Logic disappeared from Bengal. The splendid monastery of Vikramaśīlā is said to have been destroyed in 1203 A.D. (*vide* Appendix C).

In the Middle Age there were several important universities or centres of Buddhist learning in India, such as Kāñcīpura, Nālandā, Odantapurī, Śrī Dhānyakataka, Kāśmīra and

¹ Vide Sewall's "Antiquities of Madras," vol. II, pp. 150-151.

² Vide Stein's translation of Rājataranginī IV—188.

³ Dharmottarācārya's Pāralokasiddhi was translated into Tibetan in Kāśmīra at the monastery of Ratnaraṃṃ during the reign of Śrī Haṛṣa (*vide* Tangyur, Mdo. Ze, folio 270).

Vikramaśilā. The Buddhist logicians belonged to one or another of these universities or centres of learning. On the extinction of these Buddhistic universities, the Brahmanic universities of Mithilā and Nadia grew up. These last, in their turn, are now declining, being unable to make headway against the more scientific methods of study which are developing under the influence of the Calcutta University, established by the Imperial British Government in 1857, with the object of encouraging Eastern and Western learning side by side. In spite of strenuous efforts made by the British Government to foster study and research in Indigenous Logic, it is still at its lowest ebb, as the degrees of a modern University are held in greater regard than those of the archaic Universities of Mithilā and Nadia; and as it is often alleged that in comparison with the Logic of Europe, Indian Logic though subtle is cumbrous in its method, forbidding in its language, and less profitable in its material results.

SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSANA.

CALCUTTA,
December, 1907

BOOK I.

The Jaina Logic.

CHAPTER I.

THE ERA OF TRADITION (*circa* 607 B.C.—453 A.D.).

THE JINAS AND MAHĀVĪRA

1 The Jains maintain that their religion is coeval with time. According to their traditions there appeared at various periods in the world's history sages whom they call *Jinas*, conquerors of their passions, or *Tīrthankaras*, that is, builders of a landing place in the sea of existence. These sages preached the religion of the Jains. The Jains hold that in every cycle of time (*utsarpinī* or *avatsarpinī-kāla*) 24 sages are born. The first sage of the last series was Rṣabhadeva, the 24th was Mahāvīra or Vardhamāna, who attained *nirvāṇa* at Pāvā in 527 B.C.¹ The scriptures which the Jains obey are founded on the teachings of Mahāvīra. No one disputes this, and scholars generally regard Mahāvīra as the founder of Jainism, and hold that the theory of the existence of *Jinas* previous to him, except Pārśvanātha the 23rd Tīrthankara, was a subsequent invention.

¹ पद्मस्य वस पद्मास कुंदं ममिव वीरचिबुद्धो सम्राजो । (Trilokasāra of the Digambara sect). "Mahāvīra attained *nirvāṇa* 605 years 5 months before the Śaka King (78 A.D.) came to the throne," that is, in 527 B.C. As he lived 72 years he must have been born in 599 B.C.

According to Vicāra-śeṇī of Merutunga, Tīrthakalpa of Jinaprabhā Sūri, Vicāra-sūtra-prakaraṇa, Tapāgaccha-pattāvalī, etc., of the Svetāmbara sect Mahāvīra attained *nirvāṇa* 470 years before Vikrama Samvat or in B.C. 527.

Dr. Jacobi of Bonn, in his letter dated the 21st October 1907, kindly writes to me as follows —

"There is however another tradition which makes this event [*viz.* the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra] come off 60 years later, in 467 B.C. (see *Parīkṣita Parvan*, Introduction, p. 4 f., also *Kalpasūtra*, Introduction, p. 8). The latter date cannot be far wrong because Mahāvīra died some years before the Buddha whose death is now placed between 470-480 B.C."

THE SVETĀMBARAS AND THE DIGAMBARAS.

2. The Jainas are divided into two sects, the *Svetāmbaras*, those who are clothed in white, and the *Digambaras*, those who are sky-clad or naked. The *Svetāmbaras* claim to be more ancient than the *Digambaras*, whose existence as a separate sect is said to date from A.D. 82,¹ i.e., 609 years after the attainment of *nirvāṇa* by Mahāvira.

INDRABHŪTI GAUTAMA (607 B.C.—515 B.C.)

3. The teachings of Mahāvira as represented in the scriptures are said to have been collected² by a disciple of his called Indrabhūti. This disciple is often known as Gautama or Gotama. He was a *Kevalin*³ and the first of the *Gaṇa-dhīras*⁴ or leaders of the assembly. His father's name was Brāhmaṇa Vasubhūti, and his mother's name was Brāhmaṇī Prthivī. He was born in

¹ The Svetāmbaras say.—*अस्मासु सद्यार्थं ननु नराद नदीया सिद्धिमयस्स वीरस्स सो बोद्धियाथ दिहो रत्तवीरपुरे समुत्पन्ना ।* 'The Digambara doctrine was preached in Rāthavīrapura 609 years after the attainment of *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira' (*Āvāsyaśāstra* muktā- 52). But the Digambaras deny this and say that the Svetāmbaras rose in Vikrama 136 or 79 A.D. Cf. Bhadrabāhucarita IV. 55.

अने विक्रमभूपासो षट्पिंशदधिके शते ।

गतेऽब्दानामधुनोके मते शेताम्बराभिधम् ॥

² अथ सत्यर्षिसम्पदं अताथ जिनभावितम् ।

द्वादशतन्तुं लब्धं सोपाङ्गं गौतमो व्यधात् ॥

(Jaina Harivamśa Purāṇa)

Indrabhūti Gautama and Sudharma Svāmi were the joint compilers of the Jaina scriptures. But Indrabhūti became a *Kevalin* or attained *kevalajñāna* (absolute knowledge) on the day on which Mahāvira attained *nirvāṇa*. He did not therefore occupy the chair of his teacher Mahāvira, but relinquished it to his spiritual brother Sudharma Svāmi. Cf. *रत्नभूति प्रभतीनां विपदी आचरत् प्रभुः* ॥ (Heṃanand's Mahāvīracarita, chap. v, MS. lent by Mum. Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya)

³ Possessor of absolute knowledge. For a further reference to this title see R. G. Bhattacharya's Report, 1883-84, p. 122.

⁴ यत्प्रज्ञाप्रसरेऽतिशयिणि तथा प्रज्ञेयज्ञेयोऽप्यसौ

कैवो गौरवरत्नपदपि यथा सद्यः पदेः कोटिशः ।

अतोपाङ्गमहोदया समभवज्ञेयोऽप्यसंचारिणो

वन्द्योऽसौ गण्डकजगज्जयन्तुर्नामोऽन्यभूतिः सताम् ॥ ३ ॥

(Siddhujayanti caṇṭha-ṭikā, noticed in Peterson's 3rd Report, App. I, p. 38.)

the village of Gorbara¹ in Magadha and died at Gunava in Rājagṛha (Rājgir) at the age of ninety-two, 12 years after the attainment of *nirvāṇa* by Mahāvīra. Assuming that Mahāvīra attained *nirvāṇa* in 527 B.C., Indrabhūti's birth must be assigned to 607 B.C. and his death to 515 B.C.

THE CANONICAL SCRIPTURES OF THE JAINAS

4 Those scriptures of the Jainas which are generally regarded as canonical are divided into 45 *siddhāntas* or *āgamas* classified as 11 *Angas*, 12 *Upāṅgas*, etc. "For the benefit of children, women, the old, and the illiterate," these were composed in the Ardha-Māgadhī or Prākṛita language. On the same principle the scriptures of the Buddhist canon were originally written in Māgadhī or Pālī. It is maintained that originally the *Angas* were 12 in number. The 12th *Anga*, which was called the *Dṛstivāda* or the presentation of views, was written in Sanskrit²

5. The *Dṛstivāda* is not extant. It consisted apparently of five parts, in the first of which logic is said to have been dealt with. The *Dṛstivāda* is reputed to have existed in its entirety at the time of Sthūlabhāṭṭa³ who, according to the *Tapāgachapattavali*, died in the year in which the 9th Nanda was killed by Candra Gupta (i.e., about 327 B.C.). By 474 A.D. the *Dṛstivāda*

१ श्रीमन्मन्त्रधेय गार्ग्य इति द्वाभ्यांऽभिरामः श्रिया
नवांश्चक्षुनश्चक्षितमनिशं श्रीवीरमवाविधौ ।
आतिःसुप्रद्योतितमन्त्रधन्यतृप्रद्योतनद्वयामिह
नापातौर्लोकसुखमेवयथेषुषं भक्ष्येन्नभूतिं क्षुत्र ॥

(Gotamastoua by Jinasrabha Suri, extracted in *Kāvya-mālā*, 7th Quechaka, p. 110)

² For particulars about Indrabhūti Gotama, vide Dr. J. Klatt's *Petrāvali* of the *Kharataragaccha* in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 216, and Weber's *Die Handschriftenverzeichnis der Koeniglichen Bibliothek zu Berlin*, pp. 983 and 1030, in which are noticed *Sauvarājagani's* *Vṛiti* on *Guṇadhara-sūdhya-śatakatam* of Jinadattasūri, and *Sripattavali vācanā* of the *Kharataragaccha*.

³ Haubhadra-sūri, in his *Daśa-vakāhika-vṛtti* (Chap. III), observes —

बालकौटिल्यसूत्राणां श्रयां चारिवकाङ्क्षिणाम् ।
अमुपहार्यं तज्ज्ञैः सिद्धान्तः प्राक्तनः कृतः ॥

⁴ Vardhamāna-sūri, in his *Ācāra-dharmakāra*, quotes the following passage from *Āgama* :—

सुखं विद्विषार्थं कालिन् उज्जालियं सिद्धिं ।
योवाक्यवाच्यत्वं पादय सुदयं जिनवर्द्धिं ॥

⁵ Vide *Cūṛika* of Nandī Sūtra, page 478, published by Dhanapati Sing, Calcutta, and Peterson's 4th Report on Sanskrit MSS., p. cxxxvi.

had disappeared altogether. Nothing is known as to the way in which logic was treated in the *Dṛṣṭivāda*.¹

6. The subject-matter of logic is touched upon in several of the 45 *Prākṛta* scriptures of the Jains. In the *Anuyoga-dvāra-sūtra*,² *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, *Nandī-sūtra*, etc., there is a description of *Naya*, or the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints. In the *Nandī-sūtra*, *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, *Bhagavati-sūtra*, etc.,³ there is a complete classification of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*).

7. The word "Hetu" is found in these *Prākṛta* scriptures, but its use in these works makes it clear that it had not at this period acquired a very definite significance. In the *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*⁴ it is used not only in the sense of reason, but also as a synonym for valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*) and inference (*Anumāna*). *Hetu* as identical with valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*) is stated to be of four kinds, viz:—

- (1) knowledge derived from perception (*Pratyakṣa*),
- (2) knowledge derived from inference (*Anumāna*),
- (3) knowledge derived through comparison (*Upamāna*), and
- (4) knowledge derived from verbal testimony or reliable authority (*Āgama*).

¹ For a full history of the *Dṛṣṭivāda* (called in *Prākṛta* *Ditthivāda*) see Weber's *Sacred Literature of the Jains*, translated by Wen Smith in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XX, May 1891, pp. 170-182.

² In the *Anuyoga-dvāra-sūtra* *Naya* is divided into seven kinds, viz., *naigama*, *saṃgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *jñāna-sūtra*, *śabda*, *saṃabharāṅga* and *evambluta*. For an explanation of these terms see Umāsvāti (in articles 21-26), who instead of dividing *Naya* into seven kinds, first divides it into five kinds, and then subdivides one of the five, viz., *śabda*, into three kinds.

³ In the *Sthānāṅga-sūtra* knowledge (*jñāna*) is divided into (1) *Pratyakṣa* (direct knowledge) and (2) *Parokṣa* (indirect knowledge). *Pratyakṣa* again is subdivided as *Kevala jñāna* (entire knowledge) and *Akevala jñāna* (defective knowledge). The *Akevala jñāna* is subdivided as *avadhi* and *manah-pariṇaya*. The *Parokṣa jñāna* is subdivided as *abhina-bodha* (*mati*) and *śruta*. Vide the *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, pp. 45-48, and the *Nandī-sūtra* pp. 120-134, both published by Dhanapati Sing and printed in Calcutta. See also what is said in the account of Umāsvāti *seq*.

⁴ अथवा ऐक एतन्निवे पश्यते तं जडा
पश्यते अनुमाने उच्यते नामने ।
अथवा ऐक एतन्निवे पश्यते तं जडा
अस्ति तं अस्ति सो ऐक अस्ति त ।
अस्ति सो ऐक अस्ति तं अस्ति सो
ऐक अस्ति तं अस्ति सो ऐक ॥

(*Sthānāṅga-sūtra*, pp. 304-310, published by Dhanapati Sing and printed in Calcutta.)

8. When *Hetu* is used in the sense of inference (*Anumāna*), it is classified according to the following types —

- (1) This *is*, because that *is* . There is a fire, because there is smoke.
- (2) This *is not*, because that *is* : It is not cold, because there is a fire.
- (3) This *is*, because that *is not* . It is cold here, because there is no fire.
- (4) This *is not*, because that *is not* . There is no *śimsapā* tree here, because there are no trees at all.¹

BHADRABĀHU (433—357 B.C.)

9. An elaborate discussion of certain principles of logic is found in a Prakṛta commentary on the Daśa-vaikāhika-sūtra called Daśavaikāhika-niryukti. This commentary was the work of one Bhadrabāhu² of the Pracina Gotra. For 45 years this sage lived the ordinary life of the world, 17 years he passed in the performance of religious vows (*Vratas*) and for 14 years he was acknowledged by the Jainas to be the foremost man of his age (*Yuga-pradhāna*)³. He was a *Srutakevalin*,⁴ that is, one versed in the 14 *Purvas* of the Dṛṣṭivāda.

10. The abovementioned incidents are generally accepted as facts in the life of the author of the commentary. There is some doubt, however, as to the time in which he lived.⁵ According to the records⁶ of the *Svetāmbaras* he was born in 433 B.C. and died in 357 B.C. The *Digambaras*, however, maintain there were two Bhadrabāhus — that the first lived to 162 years from the *nirvāṇa*

¹ Vide footnote 4 on page 4.

² For particulars vide Dr J. Klatz's *Kharatanagaccha-parivāṇi* in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XI Sept. 1842 p. 247; Weber II, p. 999, Peterson's 4th Report on Sanskrit MSS., p. lxxxiv, and Dr H. Jacobi's edition of the *Kalpasūtra*, Introduction, pp. 11-15.

³ In the *Vivāra-jatna-saṃgraha* by Jayasoma-sūri noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report on Sanskrit MSS., pp. 307-308, Bhadrabāhu is included among the *Yuga-pravaras* or *Yuga-pradhānas*.

⁴ For further particulars about this title see R. G. Bhandarkar's Report, 1883-84, p. 122.

⁵ In Weber II, p. 999, in which the *Gurvāvali-sūtra* of Mahopādhyāya Dharmasāgaragani is noticed, we read of *Sambhūti-vijaya* and Bhadrabāhu "Ubhaupi vāsthapattadharaṇa."

⁶ कल्पविमः पूर्वप्रज्ञां द्वितीयः
श्रीमद्भगवत् (१) गुरुः शिष्यः ।
कल्पोपसर्गादिहरणं यो
रक्तं सङ्गं धरणाचिन्ताभिः ॥ १२ ॥
निर्यङ्गं विद्यान्वयविधिराप
सर्वं यत्तु वीरायुः कल्पेऽन्वये ॥ १३ ॥

of Mahāvira, that is, up to 365 B.C., and that the second¹ to 515 years from the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira, that is, up to 12 B.C. They do not state definitely which of these Bhadrabāhus was the author of the *Daśavaikāhika-niryukti*, but they hold the view that the second was the author of several of the existing Jaina works. The *Svetāmbaras* records do not contain any mention of the second Bhadrabāhu, but in the *Reumandala-prakarana-vṛtti*,² a commentary of the *Svetāmbaras*, and in the *Caturvimsatī prabandha* it is stated that Bhadrabāhu lived in the south in *Pratiṣṭhāna* and was a brother of *Varāhamihira*. Now *Varāhamihira* is popularly believed to have lived in the first century B.C. It is possible therefore even according to the *Svetāmbaras*, that the *Daśavaikāhika-niryukti* was the work of a commentator who, to rely on popular belief, lived about the time of the opening of the Christian era.

11. Whenever he lived, the author of the *Daśavaikāhikaniryukti* also wrote commentaries (*niryukti*) on the following Jaina scriptures — *Āvaśyaka-sūtra*, *Uttarādhvayana-sūtra*, *Ācārāṅga-sūtra*, *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-sūtra*, *Daśārūta-skandha-sūtra*, *Kalpa-sūtra*, *Vyavahāra-sūtra*, *Sūrya-prajñapti-sūtra*, and *Rasbhūṣita-sūtra*.

12. Bhadrabāhu did not set himself to analyse knowledge with the object of evolving a system of logic. His object was to illustrate the truth of certain principles of the Jaina religion. To do this, he, in his *Daśavaikāhika-niryukti*,³ elaborated a syllogism consisting of ten parts (*daśāvayava-rākya*) and then demonstrated how the religious principles of Jainism satisfied the conditions of this formula.

तथाविधैः कृतविश्वभद्रः

श्रीशूलभद्रश्च ददातु शम्भो ॥ १४ ॥

Gurvāvali by *Munisundara-sūri* published in the *Jaina Yāśovijaya-granthamālā* of Benares, p. 4.

¹ Vide the *Sarasvatī-gaccha-paṭṭāvalī* in the *Indian Antiquary*, October 1891, and March 1892.

² Vide Dr R. G. Bhandarkar's Reports on Sanskrit MSS. during 1883-84, p. 138. Bhadrabāhu must have lived as late as the 6th century A.D., if he was really a brother of that *Varāhamihira* who was one of the nine Goms at the court of *Vikramāditya*. *Munis Dharmavijaya* and *Indravijaya* maintain that Bhadrabāhu's brother was not the same *Varāhamihira* that adorned the court of *Vikramāditya*.

³ ते च परस्मै विभक्तौ कृत्-विभक्तौ विवक्ष्यपठिष्येह ।

दिङ्प्रत्यये चासंका लप्यङ्किष्येह निगमकं च ॥ १४१ ॥

Daśavaikāhika-niryukti, p. 74, published under the patronage of *Dhanapat Singh* by the *Nirṇaya Sāgara Press*, Bombay; and Dr E. Leumann's edition of *Daśavaikāhika-niryukti*, p. 649.

13. The following is an example:—

(1) The proposition (*Pratijñā*),—"to refrain from taking life
The Syllogism is the greatest of virtues."

(2) The limitation of the proposition (*Pratijñā-vibhakti*)—"to refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues according to the Jaina scriptures"

(3) The reason (*Hetu*),—"to refrain from taking life is the greatest of virtues, because those who so refrain are loved by the gods and to do them honour is an act of merit for men."

(4) The limitation of the reason (*Hetu-vibhakti*),—"none but those who refrain from taking life are allowed to reside in the highest place of virtue"

(5) The counter-proposition (*Vipaksa*),—"but those who despise the Jaina scriptures and take life are said to be loved by the gods and men regard doing them honour as an act of merit. Again, those who take life in sacrifices are said to be residing in the highest place of virtue. Men, for instance, salute their fathers-in-law as an act of virtue, even though the latter despise the Jaina scriptures and habitually take life. Moreover, those who perform animal sacrifices are said to be beloved of the gods."

(6) The opposition to the counter-proposition (*Vipaksa-pratisedha*),—"those who take life as forbidden by the Jaina scriptures do not deserve honour, and they are certainly not loved by the gods. It is as likely that fire will be cold as that they are loved by the gods or that it is regarded by men as an act of merit to do them honour. Buddha, Kapila and others, really not fit to be worshipped, were honoured for their miraculous sayings, but the Jaina *Tirthankaras* are honoured because they speak absolute truth."

(7) An instance or example (*Dṛṣṭānta*),—"the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* do not even cook food, lest in so doing they should take life. They depend on householders for their meals."

(8) Questioning the validity of the instance or example (*Āśaṅkā*),—"the food which the householders cook is as much for the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* as for themselves. If, therefore, any insects are destroyed in the fire, the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* must share in the householders' sin. Thus the instance cited is not convincing."

(9) The meeting of the question (*Āśaṅkā-pratisedha*),—"the *Arhats* and *Sādhus* go to householders for their food without giving notice and not at fixed hours. How, therefore, can it be said that the householders cooked food for the *Arhats* and *Sādhus*? Thus the sin, if any, is not shared by the *Arhats* and *Sādhus*."

(10) Conclusion (*Nigamana*).—"to refrain from taking life is therefore the best of virtues, for those who so refrain are loved by the gods, and to do them honour is an act of merit for men."

14. Bhadrabāhu in his *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-niryukti*¹ mentions another principle of the Jaina logic called *Syādvāda* (*Syat* "may be" and *Vada* "assertion," or the assertion of possibilities) or *Sapta-bhaṅgi-naya* (the sevenfold parallogism).

15. The *Syādvāda*² is set forth as follows —(1) May be, it is, (2) may be, it is not, (3) may be, it is and it is not, (4) may be, it is indescribable, (5) may be, it is and yet is indescribable, (6) may be, it is not and it is also indescribable, (7) may be, it is and it is not and it is also indescribable.

UMĀSVĀTĪ (1—85 A D)

16. Jaina philosophy recognises seven categories, viz., (1) the soul (*Jīva*), (2) the soul-less (*Ajīva*), (3) action (*Āśrava*), (4) bondage (*Bandha*), (5) restraint (*Samvara*), (6) destruction of the consequences of action (*Nirjarā*), and (7) release or salvation (*Moksa*). According to the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* which with a *Bhāṣya* or commentary was composed by one Umāsvāti, these categories can only be comprehended by *Pramāṇa*, which in this *sūtra* fluctuates between the two meanings of valid knowledge and the sources of valid knowledge, and of *Naya*, the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints.

17. This Umāsvāti is better known as Vacaka-śramaṇa—he was also called Nāgaravācaka, this title being probably a reference to his Sākhā (spiritual genealogy). The Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya calls him Umāsvāti-vācakācārya.³ He lived for 48 years, 8 months, and 6 days and attained *nirvāṇa* in Samvat

१ असिप्तय किरियाणं

अकिरियाण च दोर वल्लोति ।

अभाविच सप्तद्वी

वेवदयार्थं च वलोसा ॥ ११ ॥

(*Sūtra-kṛtāṅga-niryukti*, skandha 1, adhyaya 12, p. 448, edited by Bhim Sing Manak and printed in the *Nir-naya Sāgara Press, Bombay*.)

Cf *Sthānāṅga Sūtra*, p. 316, published by Dhanapat Sing, Benares edition.

² Cf *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha* translated by Cowell and Gough, p. 55. For full particulars about *Syādvāda* or *Sapta-bhaṅgi-naya* vide *Septa-bhaṅgi-taraṅgi* by Vimala Dāsa printed in Bombay.

³ Vide *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, chapter on Jaina darśana.

142, i.e., in 85 A.D. In the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* Umāsvāti gives the following account¹ of himself—He was born in a village called Nyagrodhika, but he wrote the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* in Pāṭahputra or Kusumapura (modern Patna). He belonged to the Kaubhisānin-gotra. His father was Svāti and he was consequently sometimes called Svāti-tanaya. He was also known as Vātsi-sūta, because his mother was Umā of the Vatsa-gotra. In the *Tīrthakalpa* of Jinaprabhāsurī it is stated that Umāsvāti was the author of 500 Sanskrit prakaranas (treatises). He is said to have belonged to the *Śvetāmbara* sect though, as stated in article 2 above, it is probable that the distinction between that sect and the *Digambaras* had not yet come into existence.

18 It has been observed in article 16 above that in the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* *Pramāṇa* fluctuates between the meanings of valid knowledge and the sources of valid knowledge. In its former sense

Parokṣa, indirect knowledge, and *Pratyakṣa*, direct knowledge

न्यायधिकाप्रकृतेन विहरता पुरवः कुतुमनाम्नि ।

कोभौषधिना स्वातिनमयेन वानसौकुतेनार्थम् ॥ ३ ॥

अर्द्धद्वन्द्वेन सम्यग्वाचकमेवागतं सम्प्रधार्यम् ।

दुःखार्थं च दुरागमविद्वत्तमर्तिं लोकमवब्रजा ॥ ४ ॥

रदमुषेनगिरवाचकेन मन्त्रानुकम्पया हन्मम् ।

तन्त्रार्थाधिनाम्नां स्रष्टुमुसास्वातिना भासम् ॥ ५ ॥

(*Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, Chap. X, p. 233, edited by Mody Koshavlat Premchand in the Bibliotheca Indica Series, Calcutta.)

A similar account is found in the commentary on the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* by Śaṅkhasenagami. This account is mentioned by Peterson in his 4th Report on Sanskrit Manuscripts p. xvi.

For further particulars about Umāsvāti see Peterson's 4th Report on Sanskrit Manuscripts, p. xvi, where he observes that in the *Digambarā Pattāvali* published by Dr. Hoernle in the *Indian Antiquary*, XX, p. 341, Umāsvāmin (probably the same as Umāsvāti) is included as the sixth *Digambarā Sūti* of the *Sarasvatī-gaṇa*, between Kundakunda and Lobhācārya II. According to Dr. Hoernle (*note* "Two *Pattāvalis* of the *Sarasvatī-gaṇa*" by Dr. Hoernle in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XX, October 1891, p. 351) the date of Umāsvāmin's accession is 44 A.D., and he lived for 84 years, 8 months and 6 days. Dr. Hoernle adds, the *Kaṭhīsamūha* arose in the time of Umāsvāmin.

Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* with his *bhāṣya*, together with *Pūjā-prakaranas*, *Jambudvīpa-samāsa* and *Prasamaṣaṭi*, has been published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, in one volume which ends thus—

कतिः सिताम्बराचार्यस्य मराकवेवमास्वातिवाचकस्य रतिः ॥

(*Jambudvīpa-samāsa*, p. 38, published as Appendix C to the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* in the Bibliotheca Indica Series.)

Pramāṇa, according to this Sūtra, is of two kinds. (1) *Parokṣa*, indirect knowledge, which is acquired by the soul through external agencies such as the organs of sense, and (2) *Pratyakṣa*, direct knowledge which is acquired by the soul without the intervention of external agencies. *Parokṣa*, indirect knowledge, includes *matī*¹ and *śruta*, for these are acquired by the soul through the medium of the senses and the mind. Knowledge which is attained by *Yoga* (concentration) in its three stages of *avodhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala* is a species of *Pratyakṣa*, direct knowledge, because it is acquired by the soul not through the medium of the senses.

19. Umāsvāti contends² that inference (*Anumāna*), comparison (*Upamāna*), verbal testimony or reliable authority (*Āgama*), presumption (*Arthapatti*), probability (*Sambhava*), and non-existence (*Abhāva*) are not distinct sources of valid knowledge—he includes them under *Parokṣa* (indirect knowledge). According to his theory the majority of them are the result of the contact of the senses with the objects which they apprehend, and some of them are not sources of valid knowledge at all.

20. It is interesting to note that according to Umāsvāti and the earlier Jaina philosophers all sense-perceptions (visual perception, auditory perception, etc.) are indirect apprehensions in as much as the soul acquires them not of itself but through the medium of the senses. The words *Parokṣa* and *Pratyakṣa* are thus used by these authors in senses quite opposite to those which they bear both in Brāhmanic logic and in the later Jaina logic.

¹ *Matī* is knowledge of existing things acquired through the senses and the mind.

Śruta is knowledge of things (past, present and future) acquired through reasoning and study.

Avodhi is knowledge of things beyond the range of our perception.

Manahparyāya is knowledge derived from reading the thoughts of others.

Kevala is unobstructed, unconditional and absolute knowledge.

² In the *bhāṣya* on aphorism 12, of chapter I of the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* Umāsvāti observes—

अनमानोपमानाद्यर्थापत्तिमन्त्रवाभावादिषु च प्रमाणावैति केचिद्व्यत्यये
तत्त्वयमेतदिति अत्रोच्यते । सर्वान्तेतानि मनिष्ठतयोरन्तर्युक्तानि इन्द्रियाद्येऽपि निमित्त-
निमित्तत्वात् ॥

(*Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, p. 15)

In his *bhāṣya* on 1—6 of the *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* Umāsvāti observes—

चतुर्विधमित्येके ।

(*Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, p. 9)

In his *bhāṣya* on 1—35 he mentions the four *Pramāṇas* thus—

यथा वा प्रत्यक्षानमानोपमानाप्रवचनैः प्रमाणावैकोऽर्थः प्रमोदते स्वविषय-
नियमान् न च ता विप्रतिपत्तयो भवन्ति तद्वद्वयवादा इति ॥

(*Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*, p. 36)

21. *Naya*¹ is the method by which things are comprehended from particular standpoints. It is of five kinds — (1) *Naigama*, the non-distinguished (2) *Saṅgraha*, the general, (3) *Vyavahāra*, the practical, (4) *Rju-sūtra*, the straight expression, (5) *Śabda*, the verbal
- Naya*, the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints
22. *Naigama*, the non-distinguished, is the method by which an object is regarded as possessing both general and specific properties, no distinction being made between them. For instance when you use the word "bamboo," you are indicating a number of properties, some of which are peculiar to the bamboo, while others are possessed by it in common with other trees. You do not distinguish between these two classes of properties.
23. *Saṅgraha*, the collective, is the method which takes into consideration generic properties only, ignoring particular properties.
24. *Vyavahāra*, the practical, is the method which takes into consideration the particular only. The general without the particular is a nonentity. If you ask a person to bring you a plant, he must bring you a particular plant. He can not bring plant in general.
25. *Rju-sūtra*, the straight expression, is the method which considers a thing as it exists at the moment, without any reference to its past or its future. It is vain to ponder over a thing as it was in the past or as it will be in the future. All practical purposes are served by considering the thing itself as it exists at the present moment. For instance a man who in a previous birth was my son is now born as a prince, but he is of no practical use to me now. The method of *Rju-sūtra* recognises nothing but the entity itself (*bhāva*) and does not consider the name (*nāma*), the image (*sthāpana*), or the causes which constituted it (*dravya*). The fact that a cowherd is called *Indra* does not make him lord of the heavens. An image of a king can not perform the functions of a king. The causes which exist in me now and will necessitate my being born hereafter with a different body can not enable me to enjoy that body now.

These four kinds of *Pramāṇa* seem to refer to those in the Nyāya Sūtra of the Hindu logician Akṣapāda Gautama. But the same four kinds are also referred to as sub-divisions of *Hetu* in the Sthānāṅga Sūtra of the Jains, p. 309, published by Dharmapal Singh and printed in Calcutta.

¹ अंगमसंग्रहव्यवहाररजुवशब्दा अथाः ॥ १-२४ ॥

26. *Śabda*,¹ the verbal, is the method of correct nomenclature.

Śabda

It is of three kinds, viz., *Sāmprāta*, the suitable, *Samabhirudha*, the subtle, and *Evambhūta*, the such-like. In Sanskrit a jar is called *ghaṭa*, *kumbha* or *kalasa*, and these are synonymous terms. *Sāmprāta* consists in using a word in its conventional sense, even if that sense is not justified by its derivation. For example the word "*Satru*" according to its derivation means "destroyer," but its conventional meaning is "enemy." *Samabhirudha* consists in making nice distinctions between synonyms, selecting in each case the word which on etymological grounds is the most appropriate. *Evambhūta* consists in applying to things such names only as their actual condition justifies. Thus a man should not be called *Nakra* (strong), unless he actually possesses the *Śakti* (strength) which the name implies.

¹ Umāsvāti in his *bhāṣya* on I 35 observes —

यथार्थाभिधानं शब्दः । नानादिषु प्रसिद्धपूर्वाशब्दादु अर्थे प्रत्ययः सामानः
वापु अर्थेषु असम्भनः समभिहितः । अङ्गनार्थयोरेवभूत इति ॥

(Tattvārthadigama-sūtra p. 32)

CHAPTER II.

THE HISTORICAL PERIOD (COMMENCING FROM 453 A.D.).

THE WRITTEN RECORDS OF THE JAINAS.

27. The teachings of Mahāvira as contained in the Jaina *Āgas* are said to have been handed down by memory for several centuries until in Vira Samvat 980 or A D 453, they were codified in writing by Devardhi (Gani),¹ otherwise known as Kṣamāśramana, at a council held at Valabhi. According to this theory the authentic history of the Jaina literature commences from 453 A D, and all that preceded that period is to be regarded as merely traditional.

SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA (ABOUT 533 A.D.).

28. The first Jaina writer on systematic logic, during the historical period, appears to be Siddhasena Divākara. Before his time there had not perhaps existed any distinct treatise on Jaina logic, its principles having been included in the works on metaphysics and religion. It was he who for the first time laid the foundation of a science called Logic (*Nyaya*) among the Jainas by compiling a treatise called *Nyāyāvatāra*² in 32 short stanzas.

¹ Vide Dr Klatt's *Paṭiṭṭhā* of the *Kimataragacchut* in the *Indian Antiquary*, Sept 1882 Vol XI, p 247 and Dr Jacobi's *Kalpasūtra*, Introduction, p 16. See also Vmaya Vijaya Gani's commentary on the *Kalpasūtra* which quotes the following text :—

वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् ।
देवर्षिः पश्य सत्यसंघेहि ।
पुण्यं आरामं लिखित ।
नवमय वसो आमु वीरतः ॥ १ ॥

(Sukhaśodhukā Tikā to *Kalpasūtra*,
p 433, printed in Kathiwar by
Hira Lal Hamsarāja.)

In Devardhi Gani's redaction of the *Kalpasūtra* (vide Dr Jacobi's edition of the *Kalpasūtra*, p 67) we read —

Samapassa bhagavao Mahāvīrasa jāva savva-dukkha-ppahīssa
navavāsasayāma vikkantaṃ dasamassa ya vāsa-sayassa, ayam aśi me
sārīvaachare kāle gacchaṃ itī (148)

² Vide No 741 in the list of MSS. purchased for the Bombay Government as noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report, p 289. A manuscript of the *Nyāyāvatāra* with *Vivṛti* was procured for me from Bhavanagara, Bombay, by Munī Dharmavijaya and his pupil Śrī Indravijaya.

29. Siddhasena Divākara is also the famous author of the *Sammatitarka-sūtra* which is a work in Prākṛta on general philosophy containing an elaborate discussion on the principles of logic. This author, who belonged to the Svetāmbara sect, has been mentioned by Pradyumna Suri (*g.v*) in his *Vicāra-sāra-prakaraṇa*¹ and by Jina Sena Sūri in the *Adipurāṇa* dated 783 A.D.

30. Siddhasena Divākara, who was a pupil of Vṛddha-vādisūri, received the name of Kumuda-candra² at the time of ordination. He is said to have split, by the efficacy of his prayers, the *Linga*, the Brāhmaṇical symbol of Rudra in the temple of Mahākūla at Ujjayini, and to have called forth an image of Pārśvanātha by reciting his Kalyāṇi-mandana-stava. He is believed by Jains to have converted Vikramāditya to Jainism 470 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvira, that is, in 57 B.C.³

31. But Vikramāditya of Ujjaini does not seem to be so old as he has been identified by scholars with Yaśodharma Deva, king of Malwa who, on the authority of Alberuni defeated the Huns at Korur in 533 A.D. This view of scholars agrees well with the statement of the Chinese pilgrim Hwen-thsang who, coming to India in 629 A.D., says that a very powerful king, presumably Vikramāditya, reigned at Ujjain 60 years before his arrival there.⁴ Moreover, Varāhamihira, who was one of the nine Gems at the court of Vikramāditya, is known to have lived between 505 A.D. and 587 A.D.⁵ It is therefore very probable that

१ पंचेन य वरिससय सिद्धसेषदिवायरो य जयपयद्गो ।

वज्रसय वीरुदिय सङ्गयक वज्जरविषयक ॥ २१ ॥

(*Vicāra-sāra prakaraṇa*, noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, p. 272.)

² Cf. *Prabhāvakacandra* VIII V. 57.

³ For other particulars about Siddhasena Divākara see Dr. Klatt's *Pattāvali* of the *Kharasturagaccha* in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XI Nov. 1882, p. 247. *Vide* also Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's report on Sanskrit MSS., during 1883-84, pp. 118, 140. Also the *Prabandha-cintāmaṇi* translated by Mr. Tawney in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series of Calcutta, pp. 10-14.

⁴ *Vide* Beal's *Buddhist Records*, Vol. II, p. 261.

⁵ Varāhamihira chose *Naka* 427 or A.D. 505 as the initial year of his astronomical calculation, showing thereby that he lived about that time.

यज्ञादि वेदसंज्ञा मककालमपास्य चैवमृच्छादौ ।

अर्वाक्षमिति भानौ यवनपुरे सीम्य दिवसादौ ॥ ८ ॥

Pañcasaddhāntikā, chap. 1, edited by Dr. G. Thibaut and Sudhikara Dvivedi.

Vide also Dr. Thibaut's Introduction to the *Pañcasaddhāntikā*, p. xxx.

Vikramāditya and his contemporary Siddhasena Divākara lived at Ujjaini about 533 A.D. I am inclined to believe that Siddhasena was no other than *Kṣapanaka*¹ (a Jaina sage) who is traditionally known to the Hindus to have been one of the nine Gems that adorned the court of Vikramāditya.

32. The *Nyayāvātāra* written in Sanskrit verse gives an exposition of the doctrine of *Pramāṇa* (sources of valid knowledge) and *Naya* (the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints).

33. *Pramāṇa* is valid knowledge which illumines itself as well as other things without any obstruction. It is of two kinds (1) direct valid knowledge or perception (*Pratyakṣa*) and (2) indirect valid knowledge (*Parokṣa*). Direct valid knowledge (*Pratyakṣa*) is two-fold (1) practical (*Vyāvahārika*) which is the knowledge acquired by the soul through the five senses (the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch) and the mind (*Manas*), and (2) transcendental (*Pāramārthika*) which is the infinite knowledge that comes from the perfect enlightenment of the soul. It is called *Kevala* or absolute knowledge.

34. Indirect valid knowledge (*Parokṣa*) is also of two kinds (1) inference (*Anumāna*) and (2) verbal testimony (*Sābda*). Verbal testimony is the knowledge derived from the words of reliable persons including knowledge from scripture. Suppose a young man coming to the side of a river cannot ascertain whether the river is fordable or not, and immediately an old experienced man of the locality, who has no enmity against him, comes and tells him the river is easily fordable. The word of the old man

¹ The nine Gems are—

धन्वन्तरिः लघुचक्रोऽमरसिंहः बभ्रुः
वैतालभट्ट वटवर्धन कालिदासः ।
छातो वराहमिहिरो ज्योतिषः सभाषा
रत्नानि वै वररुचि नंद विजयस्य ॥

(*Jyotirvidyābhāṣana*)

In the *Pañcatantra* and other Brahmanic Sanskrit works as well as in the *Avadānakalpalatā* and other Buddhist Sanskrit works the Jaina ascetics are nicknamed as *Kṣapanaka*.

भगवद्भाषितं तस्य सुभद्रो न विवेदि तम् ।
अथा लघुचक्रः क्षिप्रममूढं देशविषाकुलः ॥ ८ ॥
तस्य सर्वज्ञतां वेत्ति सुभद्रो यदि मङ्गिरा ।
तदेष लघुचक्रस्य त्वत्कृतिं यमवाहरोत् ॥ १९ ॥

(*Avadānakalpalatā*, *Jyotiṣkāvadāna*)

is to be accepted as a source of valid knowledge called personal testimony or *Laukika Sābda*. Scripture is also a source of valid knowledge for it lays down injunctions on matters which baffle perception and inference : for instance, it teaches that misery is the consequence of vice. Knowledge derived from this source is called scriptural testimony or *Sāstraja Sābda*. *Scripture* is defined as that which was first cognised by a competent person, which is not such as to be passed over by others, which is not incompatible with the truths derived from perception, which imparts true instruction and which is profitable to all men and is preventive of the evil path.¹

35. Inference (*Anumāna*) is the correct knowledge of the major term (*Sādhya*) derived through the middle term (*Hetu*, reason, or *Liṅga*, sign) which is inseparably connected with it. It is of two kinds : (1) inference for one's own self (*Svārthanumāna*) and (2) inference for the sake of others (*Parārthanumāna*).

36. The first kind is the inference deduced in one's own mind after having made repeated observations. A man by repeated observations in the kitchen and elsewhere forms the conclusion in his mind that fire must always be an antecedent of smoke. Afterwards, he is not certain whether a hill which he sees has fire on it or not. But, noticing smoke, he at once brings to mind the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, and concludes that there must be fire on the hill. This is the inference for one's own self.

37. If the inference is communicated to others through words, it is called an inference for the sake of others. A type of this kind of inference is as follows —

- (1) The *hill* (minor term or *Pakṣa*) is full of *fire* (major term or *Sādhya*),
- (2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term or *Hetu*),
- (3) whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, as, e.g., a *kitchen* (example or *Dṛstanta*);
- (4) so is this hill full of smoke (application or *Upanaya*)
- (5) therefore this hill is full of fire (conclusion or *Nigamana*).

38. In a proposition the subject is the minor term (*Pakṣa*) and the predicate the major term (*Sādhya*). The minor term is that with which the connection of the major term is to be shown. In the proposition

¹ आश्रयप्रसङ्गानुसङ्गमददृष्टविरिधकम् ।

तज्ज्ञापदेवदत्तं सारं शास्त्रं कापयमद्वयम् ॥

(Verse 9, Nyāyīvātārā).

"the hill is full of fire," the *hill* is the minor term and *fire* major term. The middle term (*Hetu*) is defined as that which cannot occur otherwise than in connection with the major term. Thus in the proposition "the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke," *smoke* is the middle term which cannot arise from any other thing than fire which is the major term. The example (*Distanta*) is a familiar case which assures the connection between the major term and the middle term. It is of two kinds (1) homogeneous (*Sādharmya*), such as "the hill is full of fire because it is full of smoke, as a *kitchen*," and (2) heterogeneous (*Vaidharmya*) which assures the connection between the middle term and major term by contrariety, that is by showing that the absence of the major term is attended by the absence of the middle term, such as "where there is no fire there is no smoke as in a *lake*."

39 In an inference for the sake of others the minor term (*Pakṣa*) must be explicitly set forth, otherwise the reasoning might be misunderstood by the opponent, e.g. This hill has fire because it has smoke.

This instance, if the minor term is omitted, will assume the following form —

Having fire, | Because having smoke.

Here the opponent might not at once recollect any instance in which fire and smoke exist in union, and might mistake a lake for such an instance. In such a case the whole reasoning will be misunderstood.

40. If that of which the major term or predicate is affirmed is opposed by evidence, the public opinion, one's own statement, etc., we have that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term (*Pakṣābhāsa*) of which there are many varieties.

The semblance or fallacy of the minor term (*Pakṣābhāsa*)

Fallacy of the minor term arises when one attributes to it as a proved fact that which is yet to be proved, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with the public opinion or incongruous with one's own statement, thus —

(1) "The jar is animate (*pauṇyaka*)"—this is a conclusion which is yet to be proved to the opponent.

(2) "Every thing is momentary"—this is a Saugata conclusion which, according to the Jains, is incapable of being proved.

(3) "The general (*sāmānya*) and particular (*viśeṣa*) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone"—this is opposed to perception.

(4) "There is no omniscient being"—this is, according to the Jinas, opposed to inference.

(5) "The sister is to be taken as wife"—this is inconsistent with the public opinion.

(6) "All things are non-existent"—this is incongruous with one's own statement.

41. Inseparable connection (*Vyāpti*) is the invariable accompaniment of the middle term by the major term. In the inference "this hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke," the connection between fire and smoke, that is, the invariable presence of fire with smoke, is called *Vyāpti* or Inseparable Connection. It is of two kinds—(1) *Intrinsic* and (2) *Extrinsic*.

42. *Intrinsic* inseparable connection (*Antar-vyāpti*) occurs when the minor term (*pakṣa*) itself as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and major term (*sādhya*) shows the inseparable connection between them, thus—

(1) This hill (minor term) is full of *fire* (major term):

(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term).

Here the inseparable connection between fire and smoke is shown by the hill (minor term) in which both of them abide.

43. *Extrinsic* inseparable connection (*Bahir-vyāpti*) occurs when an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) from the outside is introduced as the common abode of the middle term (*hetu*) and major term (*sādhya*) to assure the inseparable connection between them, thus—

(1) This hill is full of *fire* (major term),

(2) because it is full of *smoke* (middle term),

(3) as a *kitchen* (example).

Here the reference to the kitchen is no essential part of the inference but is introduced from without as a common instance of a place in which fire and smoke exist together, and so it reaffirms the inseparable connection between them.

44. Some logicians hold that, that which is to be proved, that is, the major term (*sādhya*), can be established by *intrinsic* inseparable connection (*Antarvyāpti*) only—hence the *extrinsic* inseparable connection (*Bahir-vyāpti*) is superfluous.

45. The semblance of reason or fallacy of the middle term (*Hetvābhāsa*) arises from doubt, misconception or non-conception about it (the middle term). It is of three kinds—

(1) The unproved (*Asiddha*): This is fragrant because it is a sky-lotus.

Here the reason (middle term), viz., the sky-lotus, is unreal.

(2) The contradictory (*Viruddha*) "This is fiery because it is a body of water."

Here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established.

(3) The uncertain (*Anaikāntika*): "Sound is eternal because it is always audible."

Here the reason or middle term is uncertain because audibility may or may not be a proof of eternity.

46. The fallacy of example (*Drṣṭāntābhāsa*) may arise in the homogeneous or heterogeneous form from a defect in the middle term (*hetu*) or major term (*sādhya*) or both, or from doubt about them.

47 Fallacies of the homogeneous example (*Sādharmya-drṣṭāntābhāsa*) are as follows:—

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term), like *perception* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the major term (*sādhya*), for perception is not invalid.

(2) Perception is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of valid knowledge* (middle term), like a *dream* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in the middle term (*hetu*), for the dream is not a source of valid knowledge.

(3) The omniscient being is *not existent* (major term), because he is *not apprehended by the senses* (middle term), like a *jar* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves a defect in both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *hetu*), for the jar is both existent and apprehended by the senses.

(4) This person is *devoid of passions* (major term), because he is *mortal* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the major term, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(5) This person is *mortal* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, for it is doubtful, whether the man in the street is devoid of passions.

(6) This person is *non-omniscient* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term), like the *man in the street* (homogeneous example).

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, for it is doubtful whether the man in the street is full of passions and non-omniscient.

It is stated in the *Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti* that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the homogeneous example (*Sādharmya-drṣṭāntābhāsa*), viz. :—

(1) Unconnected (*Ananyatva*), such as: This person is *full of passions*

(major term), because he is a *speaker* (middle term), like a *certain man in Magadha* (example)

Here though a certain man in Magadha is both a speaker and full of passions, yet there is no inseparable connection between "being a speaker" and "being full of passions"

(2) Of connection unshown (*Apradarśitānaya*), such as —

Sound is *non-eternal* (major term), because it is *produced* (middle term), as a jar (example)

Here though there is an inseparable connection between "produced" and "non-eternal," yet it has not been shown in the proper form as —

"Whatever is produced is non-eternal as a jar"

(3) Of inverted connection (*Viparīṭānaya*), such as —

Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is *produced* (middle term)

Here if the inseparable connection (*vyāpti*) is shown thus—

"Whatever is non-eternal is produced as a jar," instead of—

"Whatever is produced is non-eternal as a jar," the example would involve the fallacy of inverted connection

48. Fallacies of the heterogeneous example (*Vaidharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*) are of six kinds, thus —

(1) Inference is *invalid* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term) whatever is not invalid is not a source of knowledge, as a *dream* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the major term (*sādhya*) for the dream is really invalid though it has been cited as not invalid

(2) Perception is *non-reflective* or *nirvikalpaka* (major term), because it is a *source of knowledge* (middle term) whatever is reflective or *savikalpaka*, is not a source of knowledge, as *inference* (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in the middle term (*sādhana*), for inference is really a source of knowledge though it has been cited as not such

(3) Sound is *eternal* and *non-eternal* (major term), because it is an *existence* (middle term) whatever is not eternal and non-eternal is not an existence, as a jar (heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a defect in both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *sādhana*), for the jar is both "eternal and non-eternal" and "an existence."

(4) Kapila is not *omniscient* (major term), because he is not a *propounder of the four noble truths* (middle term). whoever is omniscient is the propounder of the four noble truths, as *Buddha* (the heterogeneous example).

Here the example involves in the heterogeneous form a doubt as to the validity of the major term (*sādhya*), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was omniscient

(5) This person is *untrustworthy* (major term), because he is *full of passions* (middle term) whoever is trustworthy is not full of passions, as *Buddha* (heterogeneous example)

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of the

middle term (*hetu*), for it is doubtful whether Buddha is not full of passions.

(6) *Kapila* is not devoid of *passions* (major term), because he did not give his own flesh to the hungry (middle term) whoever is devoid of passions did give his own flesh to the hungry, as *Buddha* (heterogeneous example)

Here the example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms (*sādhya* and *sādhana*), for it is doubtful whether Buddha was devoid of passions and gave his own flesh to the hungry

It is stated in the *Nyāyāvartāna-vivṛti* that some unnecessarily lay down three other kinds of fallacy of the heterogeneous example (*Pañcābhāṣya dvaitānābhāṣa*), i.e. —

(1) Unseparated (*Aparit ekī*). This person is not devoid of passions (major term), because he is a speaker (middle term) whoever is devoid of passions is not a speaker, as a piece of stone (heterogeneous example).

Here though a piece of stone is both "devoid of passions" and "not a speaker," yet there is no invariable separation (*vyaatireka vyūpti*) between "devoid of passions" and "a speaker"

(2) Of separation unshown (*Apradarasavyatireka*)
Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term), as ether (example).

Here though there is an invariable separation between "produced" and "eternal," yet it has not been shown in the proper form, such as "Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g., ether"

(3) Of contrary separation (*Viparīta vyatireka*)
Sound is non-eternal (major term), because it is produced (middle term) whatever is not produced is non-non-eternal, e.g., ether (example)

Here the example has been put in a contrary way, for the proper form should have been "Whatever is non-non-eternal is not produced, e.g., ether"

49. Refutation (*Dūṣaṇa*) is the pointing out of defects or fallacies in the statements of the opponent in any of the forms enumerated above. The semblance of a refutation (*Dūṣanābhāṣa*) is the contrivance to allege defects where there are no defects at all

50. The immediate effect of *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is the removal of ignorance. The consequence of the transcendental perception (*Pāramārthika Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa*) is bliss and equanimity consisting in salvation (*Mokṣa* or final emancipation) while that of the other kinds of *Pramāṇa* (direct and indirect knowledge) is the faculty which they afford us to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable things

51. *Naya* is the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints. Thus we may conceive rose either as a flower possessing the attributes common to all flowers or as a thing possessing attributes which are peculiar to the rose as distinguished from other flowers. The *Naya* is of seven kinds *nāgama*, *saṃgraha*, *vyavahāra*, *rjūsūtra*, *śabda*, *śimśharudha*, and *evārūkhata*.

52. Knowledge which determines the full meaning of an object through the employment, in the scriptural method, of one-sided *nayas*, is called *Syādvāda-śruta*. It is the perfect knowledge of things taken from all possible standpoints. Thus a thing may be, may not be, both may or may not be, etc., according as we take it from one or other standpoint.

The soul (*Jīva*) is the knower, the illuminator of self and non-self, doer, enjoyer, undergoes changes of condition and is self-conscious, being different from the earth, water, etc.

This system of *Pramāṇa* and *Naya*, with which all of us are familiar, and which serves to perform all practical functions, has no beginning and no end.

SIDDHASENA GAṆĪ (600 A.D.).

53. Siddhasena Gaṇī, who belonged to the *Svetāmbara* sect, was the author of a commentary on UMBHVAṬI's *Tattvārthā-dhigama-sūtra* called *Tattvārthatīkā*,¹ in which the logical principles of *Pramāṇa* (the sources of knowledge), and *Naya* (the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints) have been fully discussed. He was a pupil of Bhaṣvāmin² who was a spiritual successor of Simhasūri, himself a disciple of Dinna Gaṇī. Siddhasena Gaṇī³ is generally believed to have been a contemporary of Devardhigaṇī Kṣamāśramana, who flourished 980 years after Mahāvira, or about 453 A.D. But as he has in his *Tattvārthatīkā* quoted Siddhasena Divākara and was posterior to Simhagiri or Simhasūri, a contemporary of Vikramāditya, I am inclined to suppose that he lived after 533 A.D., or about 600 A.D.

SAMANTABHADRA (600 A.D.).

54. Samantabhadra, who belonged to the *Digambara* sect of Southern India, was the famous author of a well-known com-

¹ A palm-leaf manuscript of the *Tattvārthatīkā* in the temple of Śāntinātha, Cambay, has been noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp 83-86

² तत्त्वार्थकीर्तयनः सुखारण्यमेतुषीकवडजायः ।

तत्त्वार्थशास्त्रकीर्तयनः अथात् त्रिहरीनरपिः ॥ ७

(*Tattvārthatīkā*, noticed in Peterson's 3rd Report, p 85)

³ Simhasūri is identified by Peterson with Simhagiri who was a contemporary of Vikramāditya.

(Peterson's 4th Report, pp cxxx and cxxviii.)

Muni Dharmavijaya and his pupil Indra-vijaya tell me that Siddhasena Gaṇī was a contemporary of Devardhigaṇī Kṣamāśramana,

mentary on Umāsvāti's Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra called *Gandha-hasti-mahābhāṣya*. The introductory part of this commentary is called *Devāgamastotra*¹ or *Āptamīmāṃsā*, and is replete with discussions of logical principles besides a review of the contemporary schools of philosophy including the Advaita Vāda.² The *Āptamīmāṃsā* has been cited by the Hindu philosopher Vācaspati Miśra³ in explaining Śaṅkarācārya's criticism of the Sādvāda doctrine in the Vedānta-sūtra.

55. Samantabhadra, who was styled a Kavi and whose works were commented on by Vidyānanda⁴ and Prabhācandra, was also the author of the *Yuktyanuśāsana*, the *Ratnakarandaka* (also called *Upāsakādhyayana*), the *Svayambhū-stotra*, and the *Caturvīm-*

who flourished 980 years after the nirvāṇa of Mahāvīra. Vide also *Uvā-sagadasā* edited by A. F. R. Hoernle, Appendix III, page 50.

¹ In the *Pāṇḍavapurāṇa* he is extolled as the author of the *Devāgamastotra* —

समन्तभद्रो भद्रार्थी सातु भारतभूषणः
देवानमेव येनाथ यत्तो देवानसः कृतः ॥

(*Pāṇḍavapurāṇa*, noticed in Peterson's
4th Report, p. 157.)

² अद्वैतैकान्तपक्षेऽपि इदोऽनेदो विषयते ।

कारकाणां त्रिधायाच नैव सत्तात् प्रजायते ॥ २४ ॥

(*Āptamīmāṃsā*, verse 24.)

³ Vācaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmati-tīkā* on Śaṅkara's exposition of the Vedānta Sūtra 2-2-33 quotes the following verse. —

आदादः सर्वेयैकान्त्यानात् सिद्धतत्तिदिधे ।

सप्तभङ्गनवापेक्षो देवादेव विशेषकः ॥

(*Bhāmatī*, Bibliotheca Indica, p. 458.)

The same verse occurs in the *Āptamīmāṃsā* as follows :—

आदादः सर्वेयैकान्त्यानात् किं दत्तचिदिधे ।

सप्तभङ्गनवापेक्ष देवादेव विशेषकः ॥ १०४ ॥

(MSS. of the *Āptamīmāṃsā*, verse 104,
borrowed from Mr. Jan Vaidya of
Jaipur.)

Vidyānanda at the closing part of his commentary on the *Āptamīmāṃsā* (called *Āptamīmāṃsā-lankṛta-tīkā astasahasri*) refers to Samantabhadra thus —

येनाथेवकुनीतिरितिपरितः प्रेक्षावतां शेषिताः

सदाथेऽप्यकलङ्कनीतिरचिरात्प्रायेषार्थेषुतः ।

स शेषितामि समन्तभद्रं यतिवत् वृथावृ विमुर्धनान्

विद्यानन्दपक्षप्रदोऽन्यथिषां सादादभार्गापयोः ॥

(Folio 218, *Āptamīmāṃsā-lankṛta-tīkā*,
Govt. Collection, in the Asiatic So-
ciety of Bengal, No 1525.)

śati-jina-stuti. He is mentioned by Jina Sena in the Ādipurāṇa composed about 838 A D., and is referred to by the Hindu philosopher Kumārila¹ Kumārila, a contemporary of the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti, is generally held to have lived in the 7th century A D. Samantabhadra is supposed to have flourished about 600 A D.

56. The *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* consists of 115 stanzas in Sanskrit, divided into ten chapters called *Parichekhas*, in the course of which a full exposition of the seven parts of the *Syād-nāda* or *Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya* has been given. The first and second parts of the doctrine, viz., *Syād-asti* ("may be, it is"), and *Syād-nāsti* ("may be, it is not"), have led to most interesting discussion of the relation between *asti*, that is, *bhāva* or existence, and *nāsti*, that is, *abhāva* or non-existence.

57. Non-existence (*Abhāva*) is divided into four kinds (1) antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*), e.g., a lump of clay becomes non-existent as soon as a jar is made out of it, so the jar is an antecedent non-existence with reference to the lump of clay, (2) subsequent non-existence (*pradhvamsābhāva*), e.g., the lump of clay is a subsequent non-existence with reference to the jar, (3) mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva* or *anyāpoha*), e.g., a jar and a post are mutually non-existent with reference to each other, and (4) absolute non-existence (*samavāyābhāva* or *atyantābhāva*), e.g., the inanimate is not a living object. It is observed² that on the supposition of mere existence to the entire exclusion of non-existence, things become all-pervading beginningless, endless, indistinguishable and inconceivable. For

Prabhācandra in his commentary on the *Ratnakarandhaka* (or *Upāsakādhyāyana*) observes —

मेवास्त्यन्तमो विनाशो निश्चितो भवत्यस्येतोमसं
सम्यग्ज्ञानमहायुभिः प्रकटितः साधारणबोधिचिह्नः ।
स बोधकस्त्वकासत्वरिः संवत्सरिच्छेषको
जीवादेव समस्तभद्रमुनिव बोधन्प्रभेदुज्जिनः ॥

(Upāsakādhyāyana with the commentary of Prabhācandra noticed in Peterson's 4th Report, pp 137-38.)

¹ Vide Dr R. G. Bhandarkar's Report on Sanskrit MSS. during 1883-84, p. 118, and J B B.R.A S., for 1892, p. 227

² भावैकाको पदार्थानामभावानामपञ्चवात् ।
सर्वात्मकमनाद्यन्तमसत्त्वपमभावकम् ॥ ८ ॥
कार्यद्वयमनादि ह्यान् प्रागभावस्त निश्चये ।
प्रत्यक्षस्तु च अकार्य प्रत्ययेऽस्त्यन्तां ज्ञेयम् ॥ १० ॥
सर्वात्मकं तदेकं ह्यादित्यापीदृशव्यतिरिक्ते ।
कस्यच समवायेन अपरेत्येत सर्वथा ॥ ११ ॥

instance, if the antecedent non-existence is denied, action and substance are to be supposed as beginningless, while on the denial of the subsequent non-existence, they become endless, and in the absence of mutual non-existence they become one and all-pervading, while on absolute non-existence being denied they are to be supposed as existing always and everywhere.

58 In the same way on the supposition of mere non-existence to the entire exclusion of existence, it becomes impossible to establish or reject anything (since it is non-existent). If on the other hand existence and non-existence, which are incompatible with each other, are simultaneously ascribed to a thing, it becomes indescribable. Therefore the truth is as follows —

- (1) A thing *is* existent — from a certain point of view
- (2) It *is* non-existent — from another point of view
- (3) It *is* both existent and non-existent *in turn* — from a third point of view
- (4) It *is* indescribable (that is, both existent and non-existent simultaneously) — from a fourth point of view
- (5) It *is* existent and indescribable — from a fifth point of view
- (6) It *is* non-existent and indescribable — from a sixth point of view
- (7) It *is* both existent and non-existent and indescribable — from a seventh point of view

AKALAṆKĀDEVA (ABOUT 750 A D)

59 Akalaṇka, otherwise known as Akalaṇkadeva or Akalaṇkacandra, was a famous logician who belonged to the Digambara sect. He was designated as a *Kavi*¹ (poet)—a title of special honour given to writers of repute. He wrote a commentary on Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā* called *Asta śatī*² which is a

अभावेकालपक्षेऽपि भावापन्धववादिनाम् ।

अवोधवाक्यप्रमाण न केव साधनदुषयम् ॥ १२ ॥

विराधाज्ञोभयैकाग्र्यं स्वादादस्याय विदिषाम् ।

अवाच्यतेकालेऽप्यन्तिर्वाच्यमिति युक्तये ॥ १३ ॥

कथंचित्ते सदेवेष्टं कथंचिदसदेव तत् ।

तथोभयस्यार्थं च उपबोधाच्च सर्वथा ॥ १४ ॥

(*Āptamīmāṃsā*, MSS., verses 9-14,
lent to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya
of Jaipur)

¹ For an explanation of the term "Kavi" *vide* R. G. Bhandarkar's Report on Sanskrit MSS. during 1883-84 page 122.

² A manuscript of the *Asta-śatī* was kindly supplied to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur early in 1907.

most precious work on the Jaina philosophy dealing mainly with logic. Mānikyanandi's *Parikṣāmukha-sūtra* (q.v.) was based on another work on logic, called *Nyāya-viniścaya*, written by Akalanka, to whom the following works are also attributed: *Laghiyastraya*, *Akalanka-stotra*, *Svarūpa-sambodhana* and *Prāyaścitta*. Laghusamantabhadra¹ in his *Asta-sāhasri-viśamapada-tātparya-ṭikā* calls Akalanka as *Sakala-tārkika-cakra-cūḍa-manḥ* or "the crest-gem of all logicians"

60 In the *Pāṇḍava-purāṇa*² reference is made to a legend according to which Akalanka was embarrassed in a controversy with a Buddhist antagonist. Finding that the antagonist was effectively prompted by Māyādevī concealed in a jar, Akalanka is said to have put an end to that prompting or inspiration by kicking the jar over with his foot.

61. Akalanka, though mentioned along with Dharmakīrti³ as a logician, flourished at a considerably later time. He is held to have been a contemporary of Rāṣṭrakūta king Subhatunga⁴ or Kṛṣṇarāja I. As Kṛṣṇa-rāja's son, Govind II, lived in Śaka 705⁵ or 783 A.D., Kṛṣṇa-rāja I, and consequently his contemporary Akalanka, must have flourished about 750 A.D.

VIDYĀNANDA (ABOUT 800 A.D.).

62. Vidyānanda, mentioned by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya,⁶ was a Digambara logician of Pāṭaliputra. He was the author of the *Āpta-mīmāṃsālaṅkāṛti*, otherwise called *Aṣṭasāhasri*, an exhaustive sub-commentary on the *Āpta*.

¹ Vide *Aṣṭasāhasri-viśamapada-tātparyatīkā* by Laghusamanta-bhadra, noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report, p. 217.

² **सकलज्ञोऽकलङ्कः स कलौ कलयतु कुतश्च ।**

पादेन ताडिता येन सायादेवौ वदन्तिता ॥

(*Pāṇḍavapurāṇa*, noticed by Peterson in his 4th Report, p. 157.)

³ **वाचकमुखाविरचितानि सकलशास्त्रचूडामणितानि तच्चाद्येषुवाचीनि यद्येवमकलङ्कधर्मकौर्वादिनः प्रकरणेन किं नारभ्यते किमनया क्वचकारवाचीपुत्र-विजया ।**

(*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, by Hemacandra, noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report, p. 148.)

⁴ Vide K. B. Pathak's article on "Bhartṛhari and Kumārila" in the *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. XVIII, 1892.

⁵ Vide R. G. Bhandarkar's "Early History of the Deccan," 2nd edition, p. 78.

⁶ Vide the chapter on the Jaina system in the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha* translated by Cowell and Gough, p. 56.

mimāṃsā, containing an elaborate exposition of various logical principles. Vidyānanda, in the opening and the closing lines of his *Astasāhasrī*,¹ makes an indirect reference to Samantabhadra and Akalanka respectively, while in chapter X of the work he distinctly says that he followed the *Astaśati* of Akalanka in explaining the *Āptamimāṃsā*. Another logical treatise called *Pramāṇa-parīkṣā* is also attributed to him. He was also the author of the *Sloka-vārtika* and *Āpta-parīkṣā*.

63. He has, in his *Astasāhasrī*, criticised the doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Advaita, Mimāṃsaka and Sāgata, Tāthāgata or Bauddha philosophy, and has also mentioned Dignāga, Udyotakara, Dharmakīrti,² Prajñākara,³ Bhartṛhari,⁴ Śabarasvāmī, Prabhākara and Kumārila. Vidyānanda was

¹ The opening lines of the *Asta-sāhasrī* are —

श्रीवद्वैमानमभिवन्द्य समस्तभद्रमुद्भूतबोधमहिमानमनिन्द्यायाम् ।
शाखावताररचितक्षुत्तिनीचरात्रनीमांशितं क्षुत्तिरक्षिपये मयाहम् ॥ १ ॥

The closing lines of the *Astasāhasrī* are —

श्रीमद्वैकल्यमश्वमेधकुलं विद्यानन्दसम्भवा भूयात् ।
महनीमांशक्षुत्तिरक्षिपये मयाहम् ॥

The lines in Chapter X referred to run thus —

श्रीमद्वैकल्यविहतां समस्तभद्रोक्तिमय संक्षेपात् ।
परमानन्दार्थविषयानुसङ्गाच्चो प्रकाशयति ॥

(*Astasāhasrī*, MSS., Asiatic Society of Bengal.)

² यदुक्तं धर्मकीर्तिनाः —

अतद्रूपं पराहन् वक्ष्यामि प्रवेदनात् ।
सामान्यविषयस्योक्तं सिद्धकेशप्रतिष्ठितैः ।

(Quoted in *Astasāhasrī*, chap. I.)

अर्थोपशोत्रेऽपि पुनः कर्तुं शब्दानुयोजनम् ।
अवधीर्यंयपिचेत सोऽर्थो व्यपदिशो भवेत् ।

(Quoted in *Astasāhasrī*, chap. I.)

प्रज्ञाकरस्यैवं वचः —

क्रमप्रतीतेरेवं स्यात् प्रथमव्यावृत्ता जनिः ।
तत्त्वामर्ष्यात् पुनः पश्चाद् यतः कर्ता प्रतीचये ॥

(Quoted in *Astasāhasrī*, chap. I.)

न सोऽस्मि प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुसमाहते ।

अनुविद्वन्निवाभानि सर्वे शब्दे प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥

(This verse of Vākyapadīya by Bhartṛhari is quoted in the *Astasāhasrī*, vide J.B.B.R.A.S. for 1892, p. 221.)

otherwise named Pātra Kesari or Pātra Kesari Svāmi who has been praised by Jina Sena in the Ādi Purāṇa¹ composed about Śaka 760 - or A D 838. He is believed to have lived early in the 9th century A D.² at Pātaliputra.³

MĀNIKYA NANDI (ABOUT 800 A.D.).

64. Mānikya Nandi was a Digambara author, whose *Parikṣā-mukha-śāstra*⁴ or *Parikṣā-mukha-sūtra* is a standard work on the Jaina logic. As his work is based on that of Akalanka,⁵ he must have lived after 750 A D. The earliest commentary on the *Parikṣā-mukha-śāstra* is the *Prameya-kamala-martanda* of Prabhācandra. Vidyānanda, Mānikya Nandi and Prabhācandra have been pronounced to be contemporaries.⁷ So Mānikya Nandi seems to have lived about 800 A D.

65. The *Parikṣā-mukha-sūtra* is divided into six chapters thus (1) the characteristic of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa-svarūpa*), (2) direct apprehension or perception (*Pratyakṣa*), (3) indirect apprehension (*Parokṣa*), (4) the object of valid knowledge (*Viśaya*), (5) the result of valid knowledge (*Phala*), (6) the semblances or fallacies (*Ābhāsa*).

¹ महाकवि श्रीपाल पात्रकेसरिचरितं नमः ।

विदुषां हृदयकटा हारायकोऽतिनिर्मलाः ॥ ५३ ॥

(Ādipurāṇa, quoted by Mr K. B. Pathak, J B B R A S, for 1892, p 222)

Mr Pathak has quoted *Samyaktva-prakāśa* to show that Vidyānanda and Pātrakasari were identical —

तथा श्रीकविके विद्यानन्दपरनाम पात्रकेसरिस्त्वामिना बहुलं तव लिख्यते
तच्चार्थं श्रुत्वा न सम्यग्भ्रमेनम् ।

(J B B R A S, for 1892, pp 222, 223)

^{2,3} Vide K. B. Pathak's article on Bhartṛhari and Kumārila in J B B R A S, for 1892, pp 227, 229.

⁴ Vide Brahma-nemidatta's *Kathākośa*, life of Pātrakasari alias Vidyānanda.

⁵ A manuscript of the *Parikṣā-mukha-śāstra* was kindly lent to me by Mr Jain Vaidya of Jaipur (Rajputana), and subsequently another manuscript of the work was procured from the Deccan College, Poona.

⁶ Peterson in his 4th Report, p 155, notices *Parikṣāmukhaṁ satikam*. The *Tikā* is the *Prameya-kamala-martanda* or *Parikṣāmukhapāñjika* of Ananta-vīrya, which opens, thus

सकलब्रह्मचोऽप्योभेदद्वये येन धीमता ।

न्यायविद्यायुतं तस्यैवमौ साधिकावन्दिने ॥ १ ॥

⁷ Vide K. B. Pathak's article on Bhartṛhari and Kumārila in J B B. R. A. S., for 1892, pp 219, 220, 221. Mr. Pathak says that Mānikya Nandi has mentioned Vidyānanda, but in the text of the *Parikṣā-mukha-śāstra* itself I have not come across any such mention.

66. *Pramāṇa*, valid knowledge, is defined as the knowledge

Valid knowledge. which ascertains the nature of what was uncertain to one's self. It generally arises in the form. "I know the jar by myself," which consists of a subject, an object, an act, and an instrument. Just as a lamp illumines itself as well as the surrounding objects, so the *Pramāṇa* sets forth the knower as well as the thing known.

67. *Pramāṇa* is of two kinds (1) direct knowledge (*Pratyakṣa*) which arises through the senses, etc., and (2) indirect knowledge (*Parokṣa*) consisting of recollection (*Smṛti*), recognition (*Pratyabhijñāna*), argumentation (*Tarka* or *Uha*), inference (*Anumāna*), and the scripture (*Āgama*). Recollection is a knowledge

Kinds of valid knowledge of the form "that" which arises through the awaking of impressions, thus "that Devadatta." Recognition is a knowledge which arises from perception through recollection in the forms, "this is that," "this is like that," "this is different from that," "this is the counterpart of that," etc., thus "this is that Devadatta," "the *śoṣaṇu* is like the cow," "the buffalo is different from the cow," "this is far from that," "this is a tree," etc. Argumentation is a knowledge of the connection between the middle term and the major term based on the presence or absence of the latter, in the form, "if this is, that is, if this is not, that is not," thus smoke arises only if there is fire, but it cannot arise if there is no fire. Inference¹ is the knowledge of the major term arising through the middle term: there is fire here because there is smoke.

68. Pervasion² or inseparable connection (*Vyāpti* or *Avinnā-*

Terms of a Syllogism. *bhāva*) is the universal attendance of the

middle term by the major term in simultaneity or succession: thus fire and smoke may abide simultaneously or the latter may follow the former.

If the middle term and the major term exist simultaneously, the former is called *vyāpya*, pervaded or contained, and the latter *vyāpaka*, pervader or container.

But if the middle term follows the major term, the former is called effect (*kārya*), and the latter cause (*kāraṇa* or *hetu*), thus fire is the cause of smoke. Ordinarily, however, the major term is called *sādhya* or that which is to be proved, and the middle term is called *sādhana* or that by which it is to be proved. Sometimes the major term is also called *dharma* or predicate, and the middle term *linga*, mark or sign.

The minor term is called *Pakṣa*, the place or locus in which the major term abides, or *Dharmīn*, the subject, thus: "this

¹ वाचनान् वाच्यविज्ञानमज्ञानम् ॥ ६ ॥ (*Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra*).

² वाच्यमभावरिषयोऽविनाभावः ॥ ११ ॥ (*Parīkṣā-mukha-sūtra*).

place is fiery"; "sound is mutable". here "this place" and "sound" are the minor terms. Some philosophers, who divide the middle term (reason) into three phases, dispense with the minor term in an inference.

The middle term (*Hetu*) is defined as that which is inseparably connected with the major term, or in other words, which cannot come into existence unless the major term exists. For instance, smoke could not come into existence unless the fire existed.

69. The middle term or reason (*Hetu*) is divided as (1) perceptible (*upalabdhi*), and (2) imperceptible (*anupalabdhi*). Each of these again may occur in the form of an affirmation (*Vidhi*) or negation (*pratiśedha*)

70. The perceptible reason in the affirmative form admits of six subdivisions according as it is —

- (i) the pervaded (*vyāpya*)—sound is mutable because it is factitious ;
- (ii) an effect (*kārya*)—this man has got intellect because there are (intellectual) functions in him ,
- (iii) a cause (*kāraṇa*)—there is a shadow here because there is an umbrella ,
- (iv) prior (*pūrva*)—the Rohiṇī stars will rise for the Kṛttikās have risen
- (v) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharāṇī stars certainly rose for the Kṛttikās have risen ,
- (vi) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—the man had a mother for he had a father , or this mango has a particular colour because it has a particular flavour.

71. The perceptible reason in the negative form admits of six subdivisions as follows .—

- (i) the pervaded (*vyāpya*)—there is no cold sensation because of heat ,
- (ii) an effect (*kārya*)—there is no cold sensation because of smoke ,
- (iii) a cause (*kāraṇa*)—there is no happiness in this man because of the shaft in his heart ;
- (iv) prior (*pūrva*)—the Rohiṇī stars will not rise at once for the Revatī [only] has risen.
- (v) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharāṇī did not rise a moment ago for the Puṣyā has risen.
- (vi) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—there is no doubt of the existence of the other side of this wall for this side of it is perceived.

72. The *imperceptible* reason in the *negative* form admits of seven subdivisions as follows —

- (i) identity (*svabhāva*)—there is no jar here because it is imperceptible ;
- (ii) the pervaded (*vyāpya*)—there is no Śimśapā here because there is no tree at all,
- (iii) an effect (*kārya*)—there is no smouldering fire here because there is no smoke ;
- (iv) a cause (*kāraṇa*)—there is no smoke here because there is no fire ;
- (v) prior (*pūrva*)—the Rohiṇi stars will not rise in a moment for the Kṛttikās are not perceptible .
- (vi) posterior (*uttara*)—the Bharanī did not rise a moment ago for the Kṛttikās are not perceptible ;
- (vii) simultaneous (*sahacara*)—in this even balance there is no bending upwards because it is not perceptible.

73 The *imperceptible* reason in the *affirmative* form admits of three subdivisions thus :—

- (i) an effect (*kārya*)—in this man there is some disease because there is no healthy movement in him ;
- (ii) a cause (*kāraṇa*)—this man is sorrowful because he has no union with his beloved ones ,
- (iii) identity (*svabhāva*)—there is uncertainty here because certainty is not discernible ;

73. The middle term and the major term are the parts of an inference, but the example (*udāharaṇa*)

Example

is not. Nevertheless for the sake of explaining matters to men of small intellect, the example (*udāharaṇa* or *dṛṣṭānta*), nay, even the application (*upanaya*) and the conclusion (*nigamana*) are admitted as parts of an inference. The example is of two kinds (1) the affirmative or homogeneous (*anvaya* or *sādharmya*) which shows the middle term as covered by the major term, such as : wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen ; and (2) the negative or heterogeneous (*vyatireki* or *vaidharmya*) by which the absence of the middle term is indicated by the absence of the major term, e.g., wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in a lake.

74. Inference is of two kinds, viz., (1) inference for one's own self (*svārthānumāna*), and (2) inference for the sake of others (*parārthānumāna*).

Inference.

An instance of the latter kind of inference is given below :—

- (1) Sound (minor term) is mutable (major term)—proposition ,
- (2) because it is factitious (reason or middle term) ;

- (3) whatever is factitious is mutable, as a jar (affirmative or homogeneous example) ,
 (4) sound is factitious (application) ,
 (5) therefore sound is mutable (conclusion).

Or

- (3) whatever is not mutable is not factitious, as the milk of a barren woman's breast (negative or heterogeneous example) ,
 (4) but sound is factitious (application) ,
 (5) therefore sound is mutable (conclusion)

75. Testimony (*Īgama*) is a knowledge of objects derived from the words of reliable persons or scripture in virtue of their natural fitness

Verbal Testimony or suggestiveness—*e.g.*, the north pole exists

76. Objects of valid knowledge are either general (*sāmānya*) or particular (*viśeṣa*). The general is of two kinds—(1) homogeneous (*tiryak*), including many individuals of like nature

as, the "cow" is a general notion which signifies many individual cows as Sabalā, Khambha, Mumbha, etc., and (2) heterogeneous (*ūrdhvatā*), including many individuals of dissimilar nature, as, "gold" is a general notion comprising a bracelet, necklace, ear-ring, etc. The particular is also of two kinds—(1) relating to things (*vyatireka*), *e.g.*, cow, buffalo, elephant, dog, are four particular things distinguished from one another, and (2) relating to action such as pleasure, pain, etc., experienced by the soul

77. The result or consequence of valid knowledge is the cessation of ignorance enabling one to choose the desirable and reject the undesirable

78 Fallacy or semblance consists of the knowledge of that which is different from the real thing
 Various kinds of Fallacy—It is of many kinds, such as the fallacy—

- (1) of perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*), *e.g.*—to mistake a post for a man ;
 (2) of recollection (*smaranābhāsa*)—in trying to recollect Jinadatta to say, "O, that Devadatta" ;
 (3) of recognition (*pratyabhijñānābhāsa*)—on seeing a greyhound, to say "this is a tiger" ,
 (4) of argumentation (*tarkābhāsa*)—"whoever is his son must be black" ,
 (5) of the minor term (*pakṣābhāsa*)—"sound is impermanent". This is a fallacy of the minor term according to the Mīmāṃsakas, for they do not attribute

impermanency to sound ; or fire is not hot because it is a substance as water ;

- (6) of the middle term or reason (*hetvābhāsa*)—sound is eternal because it is factitious ,
- (7) of example (*dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*)—sound is eternal because it is corporeal, like a jar,
- (8) of verbal testimony (*āgamābhāsa*)—"there is a heap of sweetmeats on the side of the river, run you boys", "there are a hundred elephants on his finger", "the Jainas are allowed to eat in the night" [as a fact they are not so allowed according to their scripture]

79. Māṇikya Nandi in the Parikṣāmukha-sūtra (chapter vi, aph.

References to contemporary systems of philosophy. 56-57) has mentioned the Laukāyatika, Sāugata, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pīṣbhākara, Jaiminiya, etc. In the 3rd chapter of the work he has alluded to—"a certain philosopher who maintaining three phases of the reason or middle term (*hetu*) dispenses with the minor term (*pakṣa*)"¹

80. He concludes his work by referring to it as a mirror through which a man can see what is to be accepted and what rejected.²

PRABHĀ CANDRA (ABOUT 825 A.D.)

81. Prabhā Candra styled a *Kavi*, a member of the Digambara sect, was the author of the famous logical treatise called the *Prameya-kamala mārtanda*, the earliest commentary on the Parikṣāmukha-sūtra of Māṇikya Nandi. He was also the author of the *Nyāya-kumuda-candrodaya* (or briefly *Candrodaya*), a commentary on the *Laghiyastraya* of Akalanka. He has in his *Prameya-kamala-mārtanda* mentioned Bhagavān Upavarṣa,

¹ साध्याविनाभावित्वेन निश्चितो हेतुः ॥ १० ॥

को वा विधा हेतुमुक्त्वा समर्थयमानो न प्रयच्छति ॥ ११ ॥

(Parikṣāmukha-sūtra, MSS. lent to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur)

² परीक्षामुक्तादर्थं हेतोपादेयतत्त्वैः ।

संविदे मादयो वाक्सा परीक्षादसद्वत्त्वमाम् ॥

(Parikṣāmukha-sūtra, chap. VI, MSS. lent to me by Mr. Jain Vaidya of Jaipur)

Sābarasvāmi, **Bhartrhari**, **Bāṇa**,¹ **Kumārila**,² **Prabhākara**, **Dignāga**, **Udyotakara** **Dharmakīrti**, **Vidyānanda** and others. He himself has been mentioned by **Jina Sena** in the **Ādi Purāṇa**³ composed about Saka 760 or A D 838. **Prabhā Candra**, as a contemporary of **Maṅikya Nandi** and **Vidyānanda**, is believed to have lived in the first half of the 9th century A.D.

MALLAVĀDIN (ABOUT 827 A.D.).

82 He belonged to the **Svetāmbara** sect and was the famous author of a commentary on the Buddhist logical treatise **Nyāya-bindutikā** called **Dharmottara-tiṣṭhanaka**. According to a **Jaina** legend,* **Malla** was the son of **King Śilāditya's** sister. He was called **vādin** or logician, because, having vanquished the **Buddhists** in a dispute, he re-established the **Jaina** faith and brought to its former glory the great figure of **Adinātha** on **Mount Satruñjaya** (in **Kaṭhwar**)

83 A palm-leaf manuscript[†] of the **Dharmottara-tiṣṭhanaka**

¹ **Prabhā Candra** has quoted the following verse from **Bāṇa's Kādambarī** :—

रञ्जीकृते जन्मनि सत्त्वहृत्तये
स्थितौ प्रकाशं प्रकृते तमःसुखे ।
अजाय स्रज्स्थिति-नाश-हेतवे
अदीनवाच निजवाक्ये नमः ॥

(*Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, Deccan College, MSS, p. 21a, quoted by Mr. K. B. Pathak in *J B B R A S.*, for 1892, p. 221)

² **Prabhā Candra** refers to **Kumārila** otherwise called **Bhatta** thus :—

तथा अर्थापत्तिरपि प्रमाणाकार नञ्चतुर्थं अर्थापत्तिरपि इह दुतो वा अर्थोऽन्यथा
नीयपक्षे इत्येवार्थकस्याना, कुमारीतोऽपि एतदेव भाष्यकारवचो व्याचष्टे ।

(*Prameya-kamala-mārtanda*, quoted by Mr. K. B. Pathak in the *J B. B R A S.*, for 1892, p. 227)

³ In the **Ādi Purāṇa** **Prabhā Candra** is thus mentioned :—

चन्द्रादियुधयशसं प्रभाचन्द्र कश्चि सुखे ।
हस्ता चन्द्रोदयं वेग स्रज्वाक्यादिर्न जगत् ॥ ४० ॥

(Quoted by Mr. K. B. Pathak in *J B B R A S.*, for 1892, p. 222)

On p. 227 of the same journal the date of the **Ādi Purāṇa** is fixed at Saka 760 or 838 A.D.

* Peterson 4, pp. 3-4, in which is mentioned the legend from the *Prabandhacintāmaṇi* (*Rāmacandra's* edition, Bombay, p. 273).

[†] इति चर्कोत्तरदिप्यनके दीनजवायावाक्येनैव इतीक परिच्छेदः समाप्तः नञ्चतुर्थं अर्थापत्तिः ॥

is preserved at Anhilwad Patan and is said to be dated Samvat 1231 or 1174 A.D. According to the Prabhāvaka-caritra¹ Mallavādin was also the author of a Padmacaritra and lived in Vira Samvat 884 or 357 A.D. But this is impossible as Dharmottara (q.v.), on whose Nyayabindutikā Mallavādin wrote Tippanaka, lived about 837 A.D. On the other hand Mallavādin is mentioned² by Hem Candra Sūri who lived during 1088—1172 A.D. It seems therefore probable that the year 884 in which Mallavādin lived does not refer to Vira Samvat, but to Vikrama Samvat. On that supposition Mallavādin lived in 827 A.D. and was a contemporary of Dharmottara.

PRADYUMNA SŪRI (ABOUT 980 A.D.).

84. He belonged to the Rājagaccha of the Svetāmbara sect. In Mānikyacandra's Pārśvanātha-caritra,⁴ his prowess in logical discussions is referred to in the following terms.—

“There was born the preceptor Pradyumna Sūri—the first healer of disease of the world—who entirely removed all corruptions from the body of men (or detected all defects in disputation committed by men) and who, using sharp logical expressions, made his irrelevant opponents to sweat and thereby to be cured of the fever of pride.”

संवत् ११२१ वर्षे भाद्रपद शुद्ध १९ रवौ अद्यश्च जन्मवारिधाम बाह्यश्च यः
दाहकुसुमश्च० चावदेन धर्माय धर्मात्तरं दिव्यमकं लिखापितम् ॥

(Noticed in Peterson's 6. App. p. 3.)

¹ Vide Klatt, Vienna Oriental Journal, Vol. IV, p. 67.

² अनु मल्लवादिनं तार्किका ।

तस्मादन्त्ये चीना इत्यर्थः ॥

(Siddha Hema Sabdānuśāsana Brhat
Tīkā, 2-2-39).

³ For further particulars about Pradyumna Sūri see Peterson's 6th Report, p. lxix.

⁴ पुंसां विषयार्थं विकारमच्छिन्नं निवृत्तमुक्तस्य-
क्षयायः समभूद् भवामयमिषकं प्रत्यक्षस्वरिमुद्य ।
येन खेदयता प्रयुज्य तरुणां तर्कोन्मिता भारती
बादौन्नाः प्रविष्ठापितो वनतरं दर्पणं त्याजिताः ॥ ॥
दिग्दर्शनमात्राणां वैकुण्ठं समाददे ।
यः प्रत्यक्षं नान्दस्य जगतस्तपसः पुनः ॥ ॥
जीरामतानिधो राजमन्त्रभूमेः चवारिधिः ।
स्वरिः प्रयुक्तस्वर्यायाः पूर्वं यः पूर्वजोऽभवत् ॥ १८ ॥

85. In the same work reference is made to his victory over the Digambaras of Veṅkaṭa in the presence of the king of that province. He delighted the kings of various countries by no fewer than eighty-four triumphs in discussion. He was eleventh in ascent from Māṅkyacandra Sūri, who wrote his *Pārśvanātha-caritra* in Samvat 1276 or 1219 A.D. Pradyumna must have flourished about 980 A.D., for he was the preceptor of Abhayadeva Sūri (q.v.) who lived a little before 1039 A.D.

ABHAYADEVA SŪRI (ABOUT 1000 A.D.).

86. Abhayadeva Sūri belonged to the Svetāmbara sect¹ and was the pupil and successor of Pradyumna Sūri of the Rājagaccha. He was an eminent logician and author of *Vādama-hārṇava*, a treatise on logic called the Ocean of Discussions, and of a commentary on the *Sammata-tarka-sūtra* called *Tattvārtha-bodha-vidhāyini*.² "He is described as a lion that roamed at ease in the wild forest of books on logic. That the rivers of various conflicting opinions might not sweep away the path of

यथादल्लस्योपासकविभवमिषादिदेशोपासनाम् ।
यद्युत्तराधिकारीत्या वादजयैरजयामास ॥ १८ ॥
श्रीशमभयदेवस्वरिक्तविश्वसर्गधूरधूत् ।
अज्ञासनालितमुलाद्भीर्यदास्त्रममिषियत् ॥ १९ ॥

(*Pārśvanātha-caritra* as noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp. 57-164.)

१ तर्कान्वयविचारदुर्ममवनीषहारपद्मानन-
क्षयहेमपदैवस्वरिरजनि सेताम्बरपामयोः ।
सहाय्यश्रुतिसालसा मधुकरी कोलाहलामङ्गिनी
दित्वा विहरपङ्कजं वितवती प्राप्नो यदौयाममम् ॥ १ ॥
हृत्किङ्कगाः सत्यभेदेनेता
भुवं करिष्यन्ति जयैः समेतः ।
रतीव रोभाय चकार तासां
पथं मयं वादमहार्थं यः ॥ ७ ॥
विद्वन्मयस्योक्तिमन्त्रमणिः प्रेक्ष्यसपीडयमिषि-
मिर्दन्तोऽपि किनेचरः समजानि श्रीमन्त्रितः सङ्गुहः ।
यः सूर्योद्गुहपुष्पमुल्लङ्घनीजिह्वोः पुरा प्रशिक्षितः ।
वादे वादिवराम् विजित्य विजयवीर्यपथं च यथात् ॥ ८ ॥

(*Pārśvanātha-caritra* by Māṅkyacandra noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp. 158-59.)

² See R. Mitra's Catalogue, X, pp. 39-40.

the good, Abhayadeva¹ wrote his *Vāda-mahārṇava*." He was succeeded by Jineśvara Sūri, a contemporary of King Muṇja.² He was the ninth predecessor of Siddhasena Sūri, who wrote *Pravacana sāroddhāra-vṛtti* in Samvat 1242 or 1185 A.D. It was probably this Abhayadeva Sūri, who was "world-renowned" and a teacher of Sānti Sūri³ who died in Samvat 1096 or 1039 A.D.

LAGHUSAMANTABHADRA (ABOUT 1000 A.D.)

87 He⁴ wrote a commentary on the *Astasāhasri* of Vidyānanda called the *Aṣṭasāhasri-viśamapada-tātparya-ṭīkā*⁵ and seems to have belonged to the Digambara sect and lived about 1000 A.D.

ANANTA-VIRYA (ABOUT 1039 A.D.)

88. Ananta-virya was the Digambara author of a commentary on the *Parikṣamukha* of Maṅkya Nandi called *Parikṣā-mukha-pañjikā* or *Prameya ratnamāla*, as also a commentary on Akalaṅka's *Nyāya-vimścaya* called the *Nyāya-vimścaya-vṛtti*. He wrote the former for Sānti-sena at the request of Hiraṇya, son of Vijaya and Nānambā⁶. Now Sāntisena, supposed to be identical with Sānti Sūri, died in Samvat 1096 or A.D. 1039. His contemporary Ananta-virya must, therefore, have flourished

¹ For particulars about Abhayadeva Sūri see Peterson's 4th Report, p. iii.

² Weber's *Die Handschriften-verzeichnisse*, etc., p. 851 vv. 1, 2, and pp. 121 vv. 15. Jine-vara Sūri was probably a spiritual brother of Dhaneśvara Sūri.

यस्याभुङ्क्षुरागमे मुष्मनिधिः श्रीसर्वदेवाङ्गयः

छरौशोभयदेव छरिरचितस्त्वानुप्रसाद्येति च ।

तस्यैवं सुगुहयदादिमत (?) दत्त्वास्तु विद्यागुण (?)

प्रत्याख्याय चिर भुवि प्रचरतु श्रीशान्तिः कतिः ॥

(*Uttarādhyayana-bṛhadvṛtti* by Sāntyācārya noticed by Dr R. G. Bhandarkar in his Report on Sanskrit MSS for 1843-84, p. 44.)

³ See also Weber's *Die Handschriften-verzeichnisse der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Berlin* p. 827.

⁴ Vide Peterson's Sixth Report, p. xxiii.

⁵ The *Astasāhasri-viśamapada-tātparya-ṭīkā* has been noticed in Peterson's Fifth Report, pp. 216-219 where we read

देवं स्वामिजममर्षं विद्यानन्दं प्रथम्य निजभक्त्या ।

विष्टयोऽयम्यथाहर्षो निवसपदं जलुसमन्तभद्रोऽहम् ॥

⁶ वैजयप्रियपुत्रस्य चौरपक्षोपरोधतः ।

शान्तिवेद्यार्हमारब्धा परीक्षामुष्मपञ्जिका ॥ ४ ॥

(*Parikṣā-mukhaṁ saṅgikam*, noticed in Peterson's Fourth Report, p. 155.)

about that time.¹ Ananta-vīrya must have lived before the 14th century, for he is mentioned by Madhavācārya in the chapter on Jaina darśana in the Sarvadātāna-saṃgraha

DEVA SŪRI (1086-1169 A.D.)

89 Deva Sūri, called Vāḍipravara or the foremost of disputants, belonged to the Svetāmbara sect and was a pupil of Muncandra Sūri. He was the author of the well-known treatise on logic called *Pramāṇa-naya tattvālokāṅkāra* on which he himself wrote an elaborate commentary named *Syādvāda-ratnākara*.² He totally vanquished the Digambara Kumudacandrācārya in a dispute over the salvation of women [at the court of Jaya-simha-deva at Anahillapurapattana in N. Guzerat] and thereby practically stopped the entrance of the Digambaras into that town. The dispute took place in Samvat 1181 or 1124 A.D.

90 Ratnaprabha Sūri, a pupil of Deva Sūri, in his *Upadeśamālā-tīkā*,³ composed in Samvat 1238 or A.D. 1181, writes —

“ Lord Sūri Deva Sūri, who was the crest-gein of the pupils of the esteemed Muncandra Sūri and succeeded him in his patia (sacred chair), conquered the Digambaras in the council-room of

¹ Vide the Indian Antiquary, Vol. XI, p. 253; and Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report on Sanskrit MSS. during 1881-84, p. 129.

² छायाद्वारकाकर इत्यस्मिन् ग्रन्थो लघुतमः ।

वादिदम्भारकश्रीमद्वैवर्धनरिविनिर्मितः ॥ ३ ॥

Malladhāri Rājasekhara Sūri's *Pañjikā* on *Syādvāda-ratnākara* vātā-
1 k

³ अन्दाहशिववर्षेण वैशाखे पूर्णिमादिने ।

आह्वतो वादिशालायां तो वादिप्रतिवादिनौ ॥

(*Prabhāvākara*, XXI, v. 95, quoted by Dr. Kiatt in his article on “ Historical Records of the Jains ” in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XI, Sent 1882 p. 254.)

⁴ Ratnaprabha Sūri observes —

शिष्यः श्रीमन्निबन्धसूत्रिगदभिर्गौ तार्थचन्द्रामणिः

पदे स विनिवेशितस्तदम् स श्रीदेवसूत्रिप्रभुः ।

आख्याने अयसिद्देवसूत्रपतेर्दत्तास्तद्विवासा

क्रीनिर्यायसमर्थनेन विजयलक्ष्मः समुत्तमिन्तः ॥

तत्पुत्रप्रभो भवन्त्यस्य दत्तामभिरामोदयः

श्रीभट्टेश्वरसूत्रयः शुचिभिधस्तत्त्वमस्यप्रोतये ।

श्रीरत्नप्रभसूत्रिभिः शुभकृते श्रीदेवसूत्रिप्रभोः

शिष्येः शेषमकारि सप्तद्वन्द्वे हतिविशेषार्थिनाम् ॥

(*Upadeśamālā-tīkā* noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, p. 167.)

King Jaya-simha-deva and raised a pillar of victory by maintaining the nirvana or salvation of women [that is, holding that even women are capable of attaining nirvāna].”

91. In Samvat 1204 or 1147 A.D. Deva Sūri founded a caitya, raised a bimba at Phalavardhigrama, and established an image of Neminātha at Arāsana.¹ He was born in Samvat 1143 or 1086 A.D., attained the rank of Sūri in 1174 Samvat or 1117 A.D., and ascended to heaven in Samvat 1226 or 1169 A.D.²

92. The *Pramāna-naya-tattvālokāṅkārā* ³ consists of eight chapters (paricchēdas), viz —

Subjects of the *Pramāna-naya-tattvālokāṅkārā*.

(1) Determination of the nature of valid knowledge (*pramāna-svarūpa-naya*); (2) determination of the

Munisundara Sūri in his *Gurvāvalī* composed in Samvat 1466 gives a similar account —

वेनादितचतुरशोति सुरादिलोका-
लम्बाक्षमच्छरसामदक्षलिशाला ।
वादादवे कुमुदचन्द्रादगम्बरम्भः
ओसिहभूमिपतिमसिद्धि पञ्चनेऽस्मिन् ॥ ७४ ॥
छादादरत्नाकरतकेवेधा
सुदे स केषा नहि देवसूरिः ।
यत्तच्चतुर्विंशतिस्त्रिंशत्
यस्यैव न त्वा विदितं बभूव ॥ ७५ ॥
वेदमुलाश्रितेऽप्ये
देवगुह्यमदमुनोऽभूदितः ।
ओमुनिचन्द्रगुटोरिति
मिथ्या बहवोऽभवन् विदिताः ॥ ७६ ॥

(*Gurvāvalī* published in the *Jaina Yasovijaya-granthamālā* of Benares, pp. 18-19)

¹ Vide Peterson's 4th Report, p. lv., also Klatt *Ind. Ant.* XI p. 254.

² ग्रिच्छिवेदमिवे जन्म दोषा युग्यमरेचरे ।
वेदाश्चमकरे वर्षं सूरिजन्ममथन् प्रभोः ॥
रसयुग्यदौ वर्षं आश्वे मासि संगते ।
छादपल्लव सप्तम्यामपराके गुटोर्दिने ॥
मन्त्रलाकाराख्यत लाकं प्रतिपाद्य पुरन्दर-
बाधका इव त जगद्दिवं श्रीदेवसूरिणः ॥

(*Prabhāvakaṇṭh*, XXI, vv. 287 seq., quoted by Dr. Klatt in his article on "Historical Records of the Jains" in the *Indian Antiquary*, Sept. 1882, Vol. XI, p. 254.) According to some authorities Deva Sūri was born in Samvat 1134 or 1077 A.D.

³ The *Pramāna-naya-tattvālokāṅkārā* has been printed and published in Benares in the *Jaina Yasovijaya* series.

nature of perception (*pratyakṣa-svarūpa-nirṇaya*), (3) determination of the nature of recollection, recognition, argumentation and inference (*smarana-pratyabhijñāna-tarkānumāna-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); (4) determination of the nature of valid knowledge derived from verbal testimony or scripture (*āgamākhyā-pramāṇa-svarūpa-nirṇaya*); (5) determination of the nature of objects of knowledge (*viśaya-svarūpa-nirṇaya*), (6) determination of the consequences and semblances or fallacies of knowledge (*phala-pramāṇa-svarūpādyābhāsa-nirṇaya*); (7) determination of the nature of one-sided knowledge (*nayātma-svarūpa-nirṇaya*), and (8) determination of the right procedure of a disputant and his opponent (*vādi-prativādi-nyāya-nirṇaya*).

As this work is written on the same plan as Māṅkya Nandi's *Parikṣānukha-sūtra* or Akalanika's *Nyāya-vimścaya* as well as Siddhasena Divākara's *Nvāyāvatāra*, I shall pass over the common points, mentioning only the special features.

93. *Pramāṇa* or valid knowledge is defined here as the know-

ledge which ascertains the nature of itself and all other things. The intercourse between the sense-organs and the objects of sense is not *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) for though it can ascertain the nature of objects outside itself it cannot ascertain its own nature, since it has no consciousness. *Pramāṇa* must certainly be knowledge, for it is capable of choosing what is desirable and rejecting what is undesirable. It must also be definite in character, for it is opposed to superimposition (*samāropa*). Superimposition is of three kinds: (1) inversion (*viparyaya*)—such as to look upon a pearl-oyster as a piece of silver, (2) doubt (*sandāha*)—such as 'is this a post or a man?' and (3) uncertainty (*anadhyavasāya*) consisting in a mere cogitation in the mind as to what the thing might be.

94. *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge) is of two kinds: (1) direct

Direct knowledge. (*pratyakṣa*) perception, and (2) indirect
Perception. (*parokṣa*)

The direct knowledge or perception is of two kinds: practical (*sāmvyavahārika*) and transcendental (*pāramārthika*). The practical direct knowledge again is subdivided as that which arises through the sense-organs (*indriya-nibandhana*) and that which does not arise through the sense-organs (*anindriya-nibandhana*) but through the mind (*manas*). Each of these passes through four stages,¹ viz. (1) *avagraha*, distinguishing the type whether it be, e.g., horse or man, but not discerning the characteristics;

¹ The explanation of *avagraha*, etc., as given here is taken from Col. Jarrett's translation of the *Amṛta-Akṣara*, published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. III, p. 190, as the portion related to *pramāṇa* in the *Jaina*

(2) *śhā*, inquiring, *e.g.*, whence came the man and from what country came the horse, (3) *avāya*, arriving at a correct identification of the above, and (4) *dhāranā*, recollecting the thing particularised and keeping it in mind.

The transcendental direct knowledge (*pāramārthika*) is that which comes exclusively from the illumination of the soul and is profitable to emancipation. It is two-fold: (1) *vikala* (defective) including *avadhi-jñāna* (limited knowledge), *i.e.*, knowledge of special objects which, near or remote, are not differentiated, and *manah-paryāya*, *i.e.*, definite knowledge of another's thoughts and the laying bare of the secrets of the heart, and (2) *sakala*, *i.e.*, perfect, which is the unobstructed intuition of the entire aspects of a thing. One who possesses that perfect transcendental knowledge is called an *arhat*, *i.e.*, one freed from all faults or obstructions.

95 Indirect knowledge (*parokṣa*) is of five kinds *viz.*, (1) recollection (*smarana*), (2) recognition (*pratyakhyjñāna*) (3) argumentation (*tarka*), (4) inference (*anumāna*) (5) verbal testimony or the knowledge derived from the words of a reliable person or scripture (*āgama*).

96 Inference is of two kinds: (1) *svārtha*, for one's own self, and (2) *parārtha* for the sake of others. Inference (*Hetu* (reason or the middle term) is defined as that which cannot happen except in connection with the major term. The definition that the *hetu* (middle term) is that which possesses three characteristics, is to be rejected as involving fallacies. Some maintain the threefold characteristic or division of the *hetu* (reason or middle term), but do not admit the necessity of using the minor term (*pakṣa*) in an

chapter of *Ami Akbari* very closely resembles that in the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokānkhāra*. Dr R. G. Bhandarkar's explanation of these terms given on p. 93, footnote, of his Report on Sanskrit MSS., for 1883-84, is, however, different.

निश्चितान्यथापपक्षकलक्षणो हेतुः न तु विलक्षणः ।

तस्य हेतुभाषस्यापि सत्त्वात् ॥ ११ ॥

(*Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokānkhāra*,
Chap. III.)

This is an attack on Dharmakīrti and other Buddhist logicians who define the three characteristics of *hetu* as follows —

हेतव्यं पुनर्निर्दिष्टं अनन्तरे सत्त्वमेव ।

सपक्ष एव सत्त्वम् । असपक्षे सत्त्वमेव निश्चितम् ।

(*Nyāyabindu*, Chapter II.)

inference.¹ Again, according to others, as the connection or absence of connection between the middle and the major terms can be shown by internal inseparable connection (*antar-vyāpti*), the example forming the external inseparable connection (*bahir-vyāpti*) is useless.² For instance —

The hull (minor term) is fiery (major term), because it is smoky (middle term) as a kitchen (example).

Here the hull is an integral part of the inference, and in it may be found the necessary connection between fire and smoke. Why then should we burden our inference with an example from without? The kitchen certainly shows the same connection. fire and smoke are found together there but the kitchen is not an essential part of the inference, and so for the purpose in hand, the connection which it proves may be described as the external inseparable connection. We must look to logical neatness, and the economy of mental labour, since the mind is liable to be confused when the unessential is brought across its track.

97. The application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*niṣamāna*) as parts of the syllogism are also useless, but these together with the example are to be employed to convince men of small intellect.³

Parts of a syllogism *Avayava* or parts of a syllogism are stated to be the following —

- 1 *Pakṣa-prayoga* (use of the minor term, otherwise called proposition, *pratijñā*)—the hull is fiery
- 2 *Hetu-prayoga* (use of the middle term)—because it is smoky
- 3 *Dṛṣṭānta* (example)—whatever is fiery is smoky just as a kitchen
- 4 *Upanaya* (application)—this hull is smoky
- 5 *Niṣamāna* (conclusion)—therefore this hull is fiery.

98. Non-existence (*abhāva* or *anupalabdhi*) is subdivided as (1) antecedent (*prāyabhāva*), (2) subsequent (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*), (3) mutual (*śaṅketarābhāva*) and (4) absolute (*atyantābhāva*). Various kinds of *ābhāsa* or fallacy are also enumerated. Under the verbal

¹ विविधं साधनमभिधायैव तन्मसर्जनं विदधानः कः अङ्गुलं पञ्चप्रयोगम् अङ्गोक्तुश्चेत् ॥ ९६ ॥

(Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka-lankāra,
Chap. III)

² अन्वयान्तरा जेतोः साध्यप्रत्यायने शब्दावशङ्को अ हिद्व्याग्नेयद्वान्नं व्यर्थम् ॥ ९७ ॥

(Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka-lankāra,
Chap. III)

³ तन्मसर्जोक्तुः कथादयितुं दृष्टान्तापनयनिसमस्यापि पयोज्यानि ॥ ९८ ॥

(Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka-lankāra,
Chap. III)

testimony (i.e., *āgama*) as also under the method of one-sided interpretation (*naya*) there is given an elaborate exposition of the *Ṣaptabhaṅginaya* (sevenfold paralogism). The mediate and immediate results of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) have been clearly laid down

99. The results of knowledge and the practical use made of them are stated to be not illusory (*samvṛti*), but real (*pāramārthika*).

100. Under *naya* (the method of comprehending a thing from one particular point of view), the fallacies of it (*nayābhāsa*) are also enumerated thus —

- (1) *Naigamābhāsa* (the fallacy of the *naigama*)—e.g., in estimating a soul we make a distinction between its "existence" (generic property) and its 'consciousness' (specific property)
- (2) *Samgralābhāsa* (the fallacy of the collective)—occurs when we call a thing real if it possesses the generic property alone, altogether losing sight of its specific properties, as when we say a bamboo is real so far as it is a tree, but it has no specific properties
- (3) *Vyavahārābhāsa* (the fallacy of the practical)—e.g., the Cārvāka philosophy which makes a wrong distinction of substance, quality, etc.
- (4) *Rjusūtrābhāsa* (the fallacy of the straight expression)—as the Tathāgata philosophy which altogether denies the reality of things
- (5) *Śabdābhāsa* (the verbal fallacy)—occurs when we recognise the distinction of times into past, present and future, but go on attaching one and the same meaning to a word in all the three times, e.g., if we now use the word 'kratu' (sacrifice) in the sense of "strength" which it signified a thousand years ago
- (6) *Samabhirūdhābhāsa* (the fallacy of the subtle)—occurs when we interpret synonymous words such as Indra, Śakra, Purandara, etc., signifying altogether different things
- (7) *Evambhūtābhāsa* (the fallacy of the such-like)—occurs when a thing is discarded simply because it does not, at the moment, possess the properties implied by the name, e.g., Rāma is not a man (a thinking animal) because he is not at present thinking

101. The soul (*ātma*) which is the doer and enjoyer, and an embodiment of consciousness, is of the same size as its body.

In every person there is a separate soul which, having got rid of the bondage of its *karma* (act-fruits), attains emancipation.

102. The last chapter expounds the method of debate.

Discussion (*Vāda*) consists in assertion
and counter-assertion for the estab-
lishment of a certain proposition by rejecting its opposite.

Rules of Debate

The disputant or the person who opens the discussion may be eager either to gain a victory or to ascertain a truth. The truth may be sought either for one's own self as a disciple seeks it, or for others as a teacher seeks it. The same remarks apply to the opponent or respondent. There are four constituents of a council of discussion, viz, (1) the disputant (*vādī*); (2) the opponent (*prativādī*), (3) the members (*sabha*); and (4) the president (*sabhāpati*). The duty of the disputant and his opponent consists in establishing his own side and opposing the other side by means of proof. The members must be acceptable to both the parties in respect of the skill in grasping their dogmas, they must have a good memory, be very learned, and possess genius, patience and impartiality. Their duties consist in stating the assertions and replies of the disputant and his opponent with reference to the particular subject of discussion, in estimating the merits and demerits of their arguments and counter-arguments, in occasionally interrupting them for setting forth some established conclusions, and in, as far as possible, declaring the result of the discussion. The President must be endowed with wisdom, authority, forbearance and impartiality. His duty consists in judging the speeches of the parties and the members, as also in preventing quarrels, etc., among them. In the event of the parties being desirous of victory alone, they may continue the discussion with vigour as long as the members wish, but if they are eager to ascertain the truth alone they may continue the discussion so long as the truth is not ascertained and so long as they retain their vigour.

HEMACANDRA SŪRI (1088-1172 A.D.)

103. Hemacandra Sūri¹ (surnamed Kalikāla-sarvajña), born at Dhandhuka in Ahmedabad, was a pupil of Devacandra of the Vajrasūkha. He was a contemporary of King Jaya Simha and is said to have been the preceptor of Māhārāja Kumāra Pāla of Guzerat about Samvat 1199-1229. He was the author of a large number of works such as *Kāvyañuśāsana-vṛtti*, Chan-

¹ For details about Hemacandra, see Bühler's "Ueber das Lebens des Jaina Monches Hemacandra", Peterson's 4th Report, p. cxli, and p. 82; and also Peterson's lecture on the story of Hema Candra published in the *Bombay Gazette*, August 29, 1895.

donuśāsanavṛtti, Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi or Nāmamālā, Anekārtha-saṅgraha, Dvācāraya-mahā-kāvya, Triṣaṣṭisalākāpurusa-caritra (a part of which is called Mahāvīracaritra and the appendix called Paṇisistaparyā), Yogaśāstra, Nighantucēṣa, etc.

104 He was also the author of a most important work on logic called *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*,¹ on which he himself wrote a commentary. This work, which is divided into five chapters, is written in the *Sūtra* or aphoristic style, and not in the form of a *prakaraṇa* (commentary).

105. He was a spiritual brother of Pradyumna Sūri,² was born in Samvat 1145 or 1088 A.D., took the vow (*vratā*) in 1150 Samvat or 1093 A.D., attained the rank of Sūri in 1166 Samvat or 1109 A.D., and ascended to heaven (died) in 1229 Samvat or 1172 A.D.³

CANDRAPRABHA SŪRI (1102 A.D.).

106. Candraprabha Sūri (born in Guzerat), who founded the Pūrṇimāgaccha⁴ in Samvat 1159 or 1102 A.D., was a pupil of

¹ A manuscript of the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* with the commentary by the author himself has been noticed by Peterson in his 5th Report on Sanskrit MSS., pp. 147-148. In explaining why the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* was written in the form of aphorisms, Hemacandra in the first chapter of the commentary says —

वाचकमुद्यत्तिरचितानि सकलशास्त्रज्ञानविभूतानि तज्ज्ञार्थसूत्राद्यैति यद्येव-
मकलङ्घनमौर्त्वादिषत् प्रकरणेनैव किं नारयते किमनया सूत्रकारत्वाद्योपवृत्तिकाया
मैवं बोधः । भिन्नवस्तुस्थितं जनकतां नास्ति स्वेच्छाप्रतिषेधो लौकिकराजकीयं वा
प्राचनमस्तीति यत्किञ्चिदेतत् तत्र वर्तयन्सूत्रादिकैः पञ्चभिरध्यायैः शास्त्रमेतद्व्यवहा-
रार्थः । तथा च प्रेषावत्प्रवृत्त्यंशमभिधातुमिदमादिश्वचम् । अथ प्रमाचमौर्त्वा
अथ इत्येव अधिकारार्थमाह ।

(Quoted in Peterson's 5th Report, p. 148.)

² श्रीमोक्षानन्दकुलेभ्यश्च वनिधिः प्रद्युम्नसूरिप्रभु-
र्भूयस्त्वस्य च विद्वत्कर्मविधये श्रीदेवसूरिविधिः ॥

(Candraśena's commentary on Utpadaśuddhiprakaraṇa, a manuscript of which is noticed in Peterson's 3rd Report, p. 209.)

³ शरदेदेवरे वर्षे शार्ङ्गिके पूर्वमिति ।

जन्माभवत् प्रभोज्योन्मवाचमधो व्रतं तथा ॥

पञ्चपञ्चोदरे सूरिप्रतिष्ठा समजायत ।

मन्दहृत्परवो वर्षेऽवसानमभवत् प्रभोः ॥

(Prabhāvakacar., XXII, v. 851 seq., quoted by Klatt in Ind. Ant., Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 254.)

⁴ For the origin of the Pūrṇimāgaccha see Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report, 1883-84, p. 147.

Jayasimha Sūri and preceptor of Dharmaghosa. He¹ was the author of Darśanasuddhi, otherwise called Samyaktva-prakarana, and possibly also of the two logical treatises called the Prameyaratnakosa and Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti.² He was a great logician, and in debate appeared as a lion before the opponents who resembled elephants.³

107. The Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti is an excellent commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra of Siddhasena Divākara. In it mention is made of the Buddhist logicians Dharmottara, Arcata⁴ and others, and there is also a criticism of the views of Saṅgata, Naiyāyika, Mimāṃsaka, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Cārvāka, Bauddha, Śaṁdhodani, Kaṇabhakṣa, Akṣapāda, Brahama-vādi, etc.

NEMICANDRA KAVI (ABOUT 1150 A.D.).

108. Nemicandra, born in Guzerat, who combatted the views of the Hindu philosopher Kaṇāda, was a great teacher of

¹ For Candraprabha Sūri see also Peterson's 4th Report p. xxvii.

² The manuscript of Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti, which I consulted, was obtained from Bhavanagar, Bombay, through Munis Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya. In the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti itself there is no mention of Candraprabha Sūri. Elsewhere I have seen it stated that it was the work of that author. The authorship must, however, for the present, remain an open question. In the colophon of the Nyāyāvatāra vivṛti it is stated that it was the work of Siddhasena-Divākara-vyākhyānaka or simply Siddha-vyākhyānaka which was evidently a surname. Munis Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya relying on the line **आख्यातं चूडामवि-
शिष्टनाम्नः** (quoted from Candraprabha Sūri's Upadeśamālā-vivṛti in Peterson's 3rd Report, p. 168) are inclined to identify Siddha-vyākhyānaka with Siddharṣi who lived in Samvat 962 or 905 A.D. (as is evident from Peterson's 4th Report, p. cxxix). There is another commentary on the Nyāyāvatāra by Haribhadra Sūri. For Darśana-suddhi, vide Peterson 3, App. p. 91, for Prameya-ratna-kośa, vide the Jaināgama List, published in Bombay, p. 77, and for the Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti vide Peterson 3, p. xvi.

³ तीर्थे वीरविभोः सुधर्मगणहृत्सन्मानलब्धोद्धतिः
चारिषोऽन्वयलक्ष्मणश्च जलधिप्रीतिप्रसन्नोत्पत्तिः ।
चारित्यागमनर्कलक्ष्मणसहचरिणापनासामरः
चौचन्द्रप्रभूरिरुद्धतमनिर्वादीमिंसिचोऽभवत् ॥ १ ॥

(Daśavakṣahkatikā by Tilakācārya, noticed in Peterson's 5th Report, p. 65.)

⁴ प्रमाशेत्यादि जनेन च तादात्म्यमनुवर्तितलक्षणासंबन्धविकलतया ध्वनेरचिरर्थं प्रति प्रामाण्ययोगाद् अभिव्यक्तिरूपमहारीत्यन्वयसंशयमुक्तं योनामः अथर्त्तं प्रति प्रेक्षाद्यन्ते रति धर्माशयो मन्ते अथैतत्तु आह न चापकोत्याहकनेतत् प्रामाण्याभावात् तेषां चाप्रमाणादप्रवृत्तेः ।

(Nyāyāvatāra-vivṛti, on verse 1.)

logic.¹ He was a pupil of Vairasvāmi and preceptor of Śāgarendu (Śāgaracandra) Muni, as is mentioned by Māṇikyacandra, Śāgarendu Muni's pupil, in his Pārśvanātha-caritra written in Samvat 1276 or 1219 A.D. As Māṇikyacandra flourished about 1219 A.D., his preceptor's preceptor Nemicaṇdra² must have lived about 1150 A.D. Nemicaṇdra was styled a *Kavi*.³

ĀNANDA SŪRI AND AMARACANDRA SŪRI, NICKNAMED TIGER-CUB AND LION-CUB (1093-1150 A.D.).

109 These two, born in Guzerat, were great logicians who, even in their boyhood having overcome their elephant-like opponents in dispute, were nicknamed, respectively, *Vyāghra-śiśuka* (Tiger-cub) and *Simha-śiśuka* (Lion-cub).⁴ They⁵ were the twin pupils and successors of Mahendra-Sūri in the Nāgendra-gaccha, and were succeeded by Haribhadra Sūri. As Siddharāja from whom they received their nicknames ascended the throne in Samvat 1150 or 1093 A.D., they must have flourished at the beginning of the 12th century A.D. It is probably these two

१ वक्तुर्कोसलनाविज्ञासवसतिश्चक्षुषोऽवर्षति
क्षमदोदयचन्द्रनाः समजनि योनेनिचन्द्रप्रभुः ।
निःसामान्यगुणैर्भूति प्रसन्नरैः प्राक्षेयशोकोत्पलैः
वक्ष्यते कश्चभीजिनो मुनिपतेर्बन्धुं मतं सचेतः ॥ १६ ॥

(Pārśvanātha caritra noticed in Peterson 3, p. 160.)

¹ The same verse is quoted almost verbatim in the Kāvya-prakāśa-saṁhita by Māṇikyacandra Sūri, noticed in Peterson 3, p. 321.

² For Nemicaṇdra, see also Peterson 4, p. lxxi.

³ See Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report, 1883-84, p. 122.

⁴ Udayaprabha Sūri, who was the successor of Haribhadra Sūri through Vijayasena Sūri, in his Dharmābhyudaya-mahākāvya, noticed by Peterson in his 3rd Report, pp. 16-19, writes:—

आनन्दसूरिरिति [तस्य बभूव] शिष्यः
पूर्वोऽपरा जलधरोऽमरचन्द्रसूरिः ।
धर्मद्विपक्ष दशनाविध पापदह-
शोदकसौ जगति यो विशदो विधातः ॥ १ ॥
अस्माकवाङ्मयपथोनिधिमन्दरादि-
मुद्राङ्गणैः किमनयोः क्षमदो मण्डितः
बाह्येऽपि निर्दक्षितवादिनसौ जगद्
यो व्याघ्रशिखशिख्याविति सिद्धराजः ॥ २ ॥

⁵ For further particulars of Ānanda Sūri and Amaracandra Sūri see Peterson 4, p. vii. 8

logicians who are referred to by the Hindu logician Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya in his *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* under *Siṃha-vyāghri-lakṣaṇa* of Vyāpti

HARIBHADRA SŪRI (ABOUT 1168 A.D.)

110. We find mention of at least two Śvetāmbara Jaina authors bearing the name Haribhadra Sūri. One died¹ in Samvat 535 or 478 A.D., while the other, who was a pupil of Ānanda Sūri and Amaracandra Sūri of the Nāgendra-gaccha, lived about Samvat 1225 or 1168 A.D.² It is this second Haribhadra Sūri who was called "Kalikāla-Gautama"³. He must have been an eminent logician if we suppose him to be the author⁴ of the *Saddarśana-samuccaya*, the *Daśavaikālika-niryukti-tikā*, the *Nyāya-praveśaka-sūtra* and the *Nyāyāvatāra-vṛtti*. There are

१ पंचमस्य पञ्चमोऽयं विद्वन्महाकाशो भूति चतुर्भिः ।

हरिभद्ररिखतो निरुक्तो दिवस सिवसुरस्य ॥ १०० ॥

(Gacchoṭpatti-prakiraṇa quoted in the *Gāthā-sāhasrī* noticed in Peterson 3, p. 284.)

² Klati refers to Buhler's *Sukṛtasamkīrtana*, pp. 24-25, see Peterson 4, pp. cxxvix, cxi.

३ विद्वान्मोक्षनिर्णयकश्चन्द्रदत्तो भोजनभूमिस्थः

पट्टे श्रीहरिभद्ररिखतवर्षादिनिर्णयमयः ।

ज्ञाना शून्यमनाद्येतिचिरादक्षिप्रव्ययानतः

समुद्यैः कलिकालोत्तम इति स्मृतियतिने गौतमैः ॥ ५ ॥

(*Dharmābhyaṅga-mahākāvya* by Udayaprabhā Sūri noticed in Peterson 3, Appendix I, p. 18.)

⁴ In the concluding lines of the *Daśavaikālika-niryukti-tikā* it is stated that the author of that work was one Haribhadra Sūri who was a *dharma-putra* of *Yākaśi*. A similar description of Haribhadra the author of *Saddarśana-samuccaya* is found in the opening sentences of Gunaratna's commentary on that work (dated about 1409 A.D.). The *Caturvīṃśati-prabandha* by Rāja-ekkhara Sūri composed in Samvat 1405 or 1348 A.D. makes a like reference to Haribhadra, the author of *Nyāyāvatāra-vṛtti*. Now the *dharma-putra* of *Yākaśi* is generally held to be a surname of the first Haribhadra Sūri whose disciples were Harma and Paramaharma, as is evident from Prabhācandra Sūri's *Prabhāvaka-caritra* dated about 1277 A.D.

In the *Gacchoṭpatti-prakarana*, *Gāthā-sāhasrī*, *Vicāra-sāra-prakarana*, *Vicārāmṛta-saṅgraha*, *Tapāgacchoṭpattāvalī*, *Kharataragaccha-pattāvalī*, etc., Haribhadra Sūri I is stated to have flourished in Samvat 535 or 478 A.D.

Now the *Nyāyāvatāra* which is alleged to have been commented on by Haribhadra Sūri I was itself composed about 533 A.D. (that is, after 478 A.D.), and *Dharmakīrti*, whose logical doctrines have been referred to in the *Saddarśana-samuccaya*, lived about 650 A.D. These facts prove that Haribhadra the author of *Nyāyāvatāra-vṛtti* and *Saddarśana-samuccaya* lived after 650 A.D.

strong grounds for supposing that the *Saddarśana-samuccaya* was not the work of the first Haribhadra Sūri, as it refers in the chapter on the *Bauddhadarśana* to the views of such authors as Dignāga, Dharmakīrti,¹ and others who flourished long after the 5th century A D. The six systems (*saddarśana*) treated by him are (1) *Bauddha*, (2) *Naiyāyika*, (3) *Sāṃkhya*, (4) *Jaina*, (5) *Vaiśeṣika* and (6) *Jaiminiya*.

111 Haribhadra Sūri is often described² as having protected the word of the Arhats like a mother by his 1,400 works. He is said to have used the word *viraha* (separation or sorrow) as his mark in the last verse of each of his works. He was by birth a Brāhmaṇa and was chaplain to king Jitāri whose capital was

Dr Jacobin in his letter, dated the 21st October 1907, writes to me that "Haribhadra used the word *viraha* in the *Samarasecakahā*, which is alluded to by Siddharṣi who wrote in 405 A D."

Regarding the dates of the *Saddarśana-samuccaya*, etc., he observes:—These are "unanimously ascribed to the first Haribhadra," "whose date I believe, with Prof. Leumann, to have been wrongly referred to the Samvat era instead of the Valabhi or Gupta era, which commenced in 319 A D."

According to Dr. Jacobin, therefore, the *Saddarśana-samuccaya* etc., were written by the first Haribhadra Sūri, who died in 535 Gupta Samvat or 854 A D.

Dr. Jacobin's theory removes many of our difficulties, yet it is far from being conclusive, as the Jaina authors very seldom used the Gupta era. Moreover, it is inexplicable why Vācaspati Miśra and Udayanācārya did not refer to such an excellent compendium of Indian philosophy as the *Saddarśana-samuccaya* if it existed as early as the 9th or 10th century A D. I am therefore inclined to believe that Haribhadra Sūri II was the author of the *Saddarśana-samuccaya*, *Nyāyāvatāra-vitti*, etc., while the *Samarasecakahā* and other treatises might be the works of the first Haribhadra Sūri.

But I must confess that the modern Jaina Paṇḍitas such as Munis Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya firmly believe that the author of all these works was the first Haribhadra Sūri who, according to them, flourished in 535 Vikrama Samvat, or 478 A D.

प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापीडनार्थं तत्र बुध्यताम् ।

विरुपाक्षिहृतो सिद्धिज्ञानं जनमानसश्चितम् ॥

(*Saddarśana-samuccaya*, chapter on
Bauddha-darśana, p. 38, edited by
Dr. Sushil)

This verse refers without doubt to the definition of *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* given by Dharmakīrti who lived about 650 A D.

¹ Klatt in his "Pattavali of the Kruṣṭaragaccha" in the *Ind. Ant.*, Vol. XI, Sept. 1882, p. 247, also Peterson 3, p. 35. Also:

स्वोमि जीवन्मिदं तं वेनार्हकीर्तिवपरा ।

चतुर्दशपरपरमार्थोद्यत साहसम् ॥ १९ ॥

Amaravimśacarita by Muniratna Sati noticed in Peterson 3, p. 91.

Chittore near the Citrakūta hill.¹ He was instructed in the Jaina doctrine by Jinabhaṭa. Two of his pupils, named Hamsa and Paramahamsa, are said to have left him as missionaries of the Jaina faith, and to have been slain in the Bhota country (Tibet) by the fanatical Buddhists whom they sought to convert. The sorrow caused by the death of these two pupils is said to have been symbolised in the word *viraha*.

112. It is generally supposed that Haribhadra Sūri, whose pupils were killed in Tibet, was the first author of that name. But there will be no inconsistency if we suppose him to be the second Haribhadra Sūri, for the religious intercourse between India and Tibet was more frequent in the 12th century A.D. than in the 5th century, when Tibet had scarcely emerged into the ken of history.

RATNAPRABHA SŪRI (1181 A.D.).

113. Ratnaprabha Sūri, who belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect, was a logician of repute, being the author of a light commentary (*laghu-tīkā*) on the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra* called *Syādvāda-ratnāvatārikā*² in which are quoted the views of the Buddhist logicians Arcata (q. v.) and Dharmottara (q. v.).

114. While in Broach in the Aśvabodhatīrtha in Śaṁvat 1238 or 1181 A.D., he wrote another work called *Upadeśamālā-vṛtti*³ to please Bhadrēśvara Sūri and in payment of the debt he owed to Vijayasena Sūri, the brother of Bhadrēśvara. There he gives his spiritual descent in the Vṛhadgaccha as follows: (1) Muncandra Sūri, (2) Deva Sūri; (3) Bhadrēśvara Sūri and (4) Ratnaprabha Sūri.⁴

¹ Vide Introduction to *Saddarśanasamuccaya* published in the Chowkhamba series, Benares.

प्रभाते च प्रमेये च बालानां बुद्धिचिद्वदे ।
किञ्चिद् वचनचानुर्यसापलायेयमादधे ॥
प्रमेयस्त्वकीदीभिः पूर्वोत्पन्नो मदान्
तथावतारमावेव हभेरन्नाः कृतार्थता ॥

² (*Syādvāda ratnāvatārikā*, Muni Dharmavijaya's MSS., p. 99). A part of the *Syādvāda-ratnāvatārikā* has been printed and published in the Benares Jaina Yāśovijaya series.

नौरत्नप्रभकरिभिः शुभकले कीर्तयन्तिप्रभो ।
शिशोः शेषमकारि सन्नादकते हतिर्विशेषार्थिनाम् ॥
विज्ञानादुल्लोकात् (१११८) वर्षे माघे समर्थिता ।
एकादशसप्तमिणि सार्धं पञ्चमत्तं तथा ॥

(*Upadeśamālā-vṛtti*, noticed in Peterson 5, p. 124)

⁴ For other particulars of Ratnaprabha Sūri, vide Peterson 4, p. cii. Compare also Weber II, p. 922, note 7.

MALLISENA SŪRI (1292 A.D.)

115. He belonged to the Nagendra Gaccha of the Śvetāmbara sect, and was the author of the *Syādvādamaujari*, a commentary on Hemacandra's *Vītauāga-stuti* or *Dvātrimśikā*. The *Syādvādamaujari* contains an exposition of the *Pramāṇa*, *Saptakhaṇḍinaya*, etc., and criticises Akṣapada's theories of *Pramāṇa*, *Chala*, *Jala*, *Nigrahasthāna*, etc. The doctrines of the Sāṃkhya, Aulūkyā Jaiminiya, Bhaṭṭapāda, Vedānta, Yogācāra, Madhyamika, Cārvāka, etc., have also been his favourite subjects of attack. At the close of his work Malliṣeṇa describes himself as a pupil of Udayaprabhā Sūri and as having composed the work in Śaka 1214 or A.D. 1292¹.

RĀJASEKHARA SŪRI (1348 A.D.).

116. Rājasekhara Sūri, or Malladhāri Śrī Rājasekhara Sūri, belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the author of the *Ratnavatārikā-pañjika*,² a sub-commentary on the *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvalokaśaṅkara*, as also of two other works called *Syādvāda kaḥkḥ* and *Caturvīṃśatiprabandha*.³ He is also the author of a *Pañjikā* (commentary) on the *Nyāya-kandali* of the Hindu philosopher Śrīdhara. He studied the *Nyāya-kandali* under teacher Jinaprabhā,⁴ and is said to have lived in Samvat 1405 or 1348 A.D.⁵

JÑĀNA CANDRA (1350 A.D.).

117. He belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the author of a gloss on the *Ratnavatārikā* called the *Ratnāvātārikā-tippaṇa*, which discusses many abstruse points of logic and criticises the

¹ श्रीमक्षिषेवखुरिभिरकारि तस्यद्वयमदिनमक्षिभिः ।

इतिरियं मन्त्रविनिर्गमकान्द्रोपमहसि मन्त्रौ ॥ १ ॥

(*Syādvādamaujari*, p. 220, printed in the Benares Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, and edited by Dāmodara Lal Goswāmi.)

² A part of the *Ratnavatārikā-pañjika* has been printed and published in the Benares Jaina Yashovijaya series.

³ This work has been published by Hira Lal Hamsarāja at Jāmanagara in Kathiwar.

⁴ श्रीमज्जिमप्रभविभोरधिमत्त न्यायकदली किञ्चित् ।

तस्यां विदितलवमह करे स्वपीपकाराय ॥

(*Nyāyakandali* of Śrīdhara with the *Pañjikā* of Rājasekhara noticed in Peterson 3, p. 273, cf. also Peterson 3, pp. 28-29.)

⁵ Vide Weber II, p. 1207.

views of Dignāga¹ and others. He composed this work² under orders from his preceptor Rājaśekhara Sūri, who flourished in 1348 A.D. Jñāna Candra's date may approximately be fixed at about 1350 A.D.

GUNARATNA (1409 A.D.).

118 Gunaratna belonged to the Tapāgaccha of the Svetāmbara sect, and was the distinguished author of a commentary on the Śaṅkarāśana-samuccaya³ called Śaṅkarāśana-samuccaya-vṛtti or Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā in which the Nyaya (logic) along with other systems has been lucidly explained. He also wrote the Kriyā-ratna-samuccaya.

119 He is mentioned by Ratna-sekhara Sūri in the Śrāddha-pratikramana-sūtra-vṛtti composed in Samvat 1496 or A.D. 1439.⁴ In that work Gunaratna is mentioned as a pupil

तेनान्यापोहविषयाः प्रोक्ताः सामान्यबोधराः ।

मन्वाद्य बुद्धयर्थेन बहुन्येवासम्भवान् ॥

अस्य व्याख्या तेनाचार्यं दिग्भानेन

अन्यापोहविषयाः .. प्रोक्ताः ॥

Jñānacandra's Ratnāvatārikā-tīpanaka, chap I, p 7, published in Ya-ovijaya-granthamālā of Benares.

² रत्नाकरावतारिका वरद्विषयं तत्

ज्ञानेन्दुरस्यतरङ्गोः समन्तिः प्रहस्यै ।

तत्त्विको रचितवान् मन्वाधारिपूज्य-

श्रीराजेश्वरगुरुः निरुद्धमाद्य

Quoted from the MSS. of Ratnākaravatārikā-tīpanaka, lent to me by Muni Dharmavijaya. A part of this work has been printed and published in the Benares Jaina Ya-ovijaya series.

³ Śaṅkarāśana-samuccaya with Vṛtti, edited by Dr. Sual, is being published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. There is another commentary on Śaṅkarāśana-samuccaya called Laghuvṛtti by Manbhadrā. It has been published in the Chowkhamba series.

⁴ The Śrāddha-pratikramana-sūtra-vṛtti by Ratnaśekhara Sūri, has been noticed in Peterson 3, pp 226-227, whence the following lines are quoted :—

विद्यामतपेक्षायां जगति अत्रचन्द्ररयोऽश्वम् ।

श्रीशैवसुन्दरगुरुमया तदनुसमाहिदिता ॥ १ ॥

पद्य च तेषां शिष्यालोकायां ज्ञानपात्रा मुराः । २

कुलमप्यवा दितोषा श्रीशैवसुन्दरगुरुः ॥ ३ ॥

of Devasundara, who attained the exalted position of Sūri at Anahillapattana in Samvat 1420 or A.D. 1363.¹ Gunaratna must, therefore, have lived between A.D. 1363 and A.D. 1439. Devasundara Sūri, teacher of Gunaratna, was a contemporary of Muni-sundara Sūri, the famous author of the *Gurvāvalī*² composed in Samvat 1466 or A.D. 1409. Gunaratna himself says that his *Kriyāratna-samuccaya*³ was composed in Samvat 1466 or A.D. 1409.

120. Gunaratna, in his elaborate commentary (*Vṛtti*) on the *Ṣaddarśana-samuccaya*, has mentioned *Ṣauddhodani*, *Dharmot-tarācārya*, *Arcata*, *Dharmakīrti*, *Prajñākara*, *Kamalaśīla*, *Dig-nāga*, and other Buddhist authors, as well as *Tarkabhāṣā*, *Hetubindu*, *Arcata-tarkatikā*, *Prañāna-vārtika*, *Tattvasam-graha*, *Nyāyabindu*, *Nyayapraveśaka*, and other Buddhist works on logic, etc., in the chapter on the Bauddha system. Mention has also been made in the chapter on the Nyāya, of such Hindu logicians as *Akṣapāda*, *Vātsyayana*, *Udyotakara*, *Vācas-pati*, *Udayana*, *Srikantha*, *Abhavatūlakopādhyāya*, *Jayanta*, and of such works as *Nyāya-sūtra*, *Nyāyabhāṣya*, *Nyāya-vārtika*, *Tātparyatikā*, *Tātparyapariśuddhi*, *Nyāyāloka-kāra*, *Nyāyālokaniravṛtti*, etc. The *Nyāya-sūtra* of *Bhā-varvajña* and the eighteen commentaries on it such as *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, *Nyāya-kalikā*, *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, etc., have also been mentioned.

बद्धार्थनिरूपितप्रकारसमुच्चयविचारनिबन्धनः ।

यथा श्रीसुमुखा प्रसादोऽयं बद्धविश्वमिव ।

श्रीरत्नचरित्रविरचितमिमानकृतकनितुष्टे ॥ १

¹ Vide Dr. Klatt on the *Pattāvalī* of the *Kharataragaccha* in the *Ind. Ant.*, Vol. XI, September 1882, pp. 255-256, cf. also Weber II, p. 884; and Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's Report, 1883-84, p. 157.

२ रघुरघनमिति वर्षे १४६६ मुनिद्वन्द्वरचरिते कृता पूर्वम् ।

मध्यम्यैरवधार्या मुर्वालोयं जयश्रीका ॥ ८२ ॥

(*Gurvāvalī*, *Jama-Yaśovijaya grantha-mālā* series, p. 109).

३ काके बद्धरघुपूर्वे १४६६ वत्सरमिवे श्रीविक्रमाकाङ्क्षे

मुर्वादेशवशाद्विद्वत् स सदा सान्धोपकारं परम् ।

यस्य श्रीमुचरत्नचरितनोत् प्रकाविशीनोऽयम्

निर्दूतपुक्तिप्रधानजननेः शोधस्वयं धीधनेः ॥ ६३ ॥

(*Kriyāratna-samuccaya*, *Jaina Yaśovijaya granthamālā* series, p. 309).

DHARMA-BHŪSANA (ABOUT 1600 A.D.).

121. A Digambara author who wrote the *Nyāya-dīpikā* about 300 years ago. He has been mentioned in the *Tarkabhāṣā*¹ by Yaśovijaya Gaṇi.²

122. The *Nyāya-dīpikā* begins with a salutation³ to Arhat Vardhamāna. It is divided into three chapters (*Prakāśa* viz., (1) general characteristics of valid knowledge, *pramāṇa-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, (2) perception, *pratyakṣa*, and (3) indirect knowledge, *parokṣa*, including recollection, *smṛti*, recognition *pratyabhijñāna*, argumentation, *tarka*, inference, *anumāna*, tradition, *āgama*, and the method of comprehending things from particular standpoints, *naya*.

123. The technical terms of logic have been defined and minutely examined and the views of other logicians, specially of the Buddhists, have been severely criticised. There are references to Sugata, Saugata, Bauddha, Tāthāgata, Mimāṃsaka, Yauga, Naiyāyika, Bhāṭṭa, Prābhākara, Dignāga, Samānta Bhadra, Akalanka Deva, Nālikā Nātha, Jainendra, Syād vāda-vidyāpati, Mānikya Nandi Bhattāraka, Kumāra Nandi Bhattāraka, Udayana and others. The following works are also mentioned — *Prameya-kamala-māritanda*, *Rājavārtika*, *Sloka-vārtika*, *Slokavārtika-bhāṣya*, *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, *Tattvārtha-bhāṣya*, *Tattvārtha-sloka-vārtika*, *Āptanīmāṃsā-vivaraṇa*, *Nyāyavinīścaya*, *Pramāṇa-mūlāyā*, *Pramāṇa-parikṣā*, *Parikṣā-mukha*, *Nyāyabindu*, etc.

YAŚOVIJAYA GANI (1680 A.D.).

124. Yaśovijaya⁴ belonged to the Śvetāmbara sect and was the famous author of *Nyāya-pradīpa*, *Tarkabhāṣā*, *Nyāya rahasya*, *Nyāyāmṛta-taraṅgiṇī*, *Nyāya-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, *Anekānta Jaina-mata-vyavasthā*, *Jñānabindu-prakarana*, etc. He also wrote a commentary on the Digambara work *Astasāhasri*

¹ This work has been printed in Kolhāpura.

² दत्तं वा ज्ञाननिवर्तकत्वेन तर्कस्य प्रामाण्यं धर्मभूषणोक्तं सत्येन तच्च मिथ्याज्ञानरूपे व्यपक्ष्येद्ये संगच्छते ।

Yaśovijaya's *Tarkabhāṣā*, leaf 10, MSS. lent to me by Munis Dharmavijaya and Indravijaya.

³ श्रीवर्धमानमहर्षेण नमो वाक्यप्रवृत्तये ।

विरच्यते दिव्यसूत्र सन्दर्भस्यापदीपिका ॥ १ ॥

(*Nyāyadīpikā*, chap. I).

⁴ For other particulars about Yaśovijaya see Peterson 6, p. xiv. For his works see the Janāgama List published in Bombay.

called *Astasāhasrī-vṛtti*. The *Tarkabhāṣā* begins with a salutation to Jina.¹ It consists of three chapters, viz (1) Valid knowledge, *pramāṇa*, (2) Knowledge from particular stand-points, *naya*, and (3) Imposition, *nikkṣepa*. He occasionally discusses *vyāptigraha*, or the means of establishing the universal connection between the middle term and the major term.

125 He is descended from Hiravijaya, the well-known Sūri of Akbar's time (no. 58 of the *Tapāgaccha pattāvali*). He ascended heaven in Samvat 1745 or A.D. 1688 at Dabhoi, in modern Baroda State. To perpetuate his memory there has been established at Benares a college called *Jaina Yaśovijaya-pāthasālā* under the auspices of which the sacred Jaina works are being published in a series called *Jaina Yaśovijaya-granthamālā*.

१ ऐक्यव्यवस्थं जना जिनं तत्कार्यदेशिनम्

प्रसादनयनिशेधैकभाषां ततोम्यदम्

(*Tarkabhāṣā*, chap. I).

BOOK II.

The Buddhist Logic.

CHAPTER I.

THE OLD BUDDHIST REFERENCES TO LOGIC.

BUDDHA GAUTAMA (623 B C —543 B C.).

1 The Buddhists maintain that their religion is eternal. It was taught at different cycles by sages called Buddhas (the Enlightened Ones) or Tathāgatas (those who have realised the truth). In the present cycle, called *Mahā-bhadra-kalpa* (the very blessed cycle), four Buddhas are said to have already appeared, viz., Krakucchanda, Kanaka Mum, Kāśyapa and Gautama, while the fifth, viz., Maitreya, is yet to be born.¹

2 Of the past Buddhas the last, viz., Buddha Gautama, otherwise called Sākya Mum, was born at Kapilavastu (modern Nigihva in the Nepal Terai) in 623 B C., and attained *nirvāṇa* at Kuśinagara (modern Kuśinārā near Gorakhpur) in 543 B C.² He passed almost his whole life in Magadha (modern Behar). He is regarded by modern scholars as the real founder of Buddhism, while his predecessors are considered as purely mythical.

ORIGIN OF THE PĀLI BUDDHIST LITERATURE (543 B C —76 B C.)

3 Buddha Gautama is said to have delivered his teachings in the Māgadhī or Pāli language. On his death these teachings were rehearsed by the Buddhist monks in three councils³ held

¹ Vide Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism*, second edition, pp. 88—91.

² The exact date of Buddha is unknown. The date given here is according to the *Mahāvamsa*, the Pāli chronicle of Ceylon. The date of Buddha's *nirvāṇa* is placed by European scholars between 470—480 B C. Cf. Dr. Fleet's article on "The Date of Buddha's Death" in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, January, 1904.

³ For an account of the first and second councils, vide *Vinaya Pitaka*, *Culla Vagga*, 11th and 12th *Khandhakas*, translated by Rhys Davids and

at Rājagṛha, Vaiśālī and Pāṭaliputra under the patronage of kings Ajātaśatru, Kālāśoka and Aśoka about the year 543 B.C., 443 B.C. and 255 B.C.¹ respectively. The texts of the teachings as discussed and settled in these councils form the sacred scripture of the Buddhists. This scripture is called in Pāli *Teṭṭaka* or *Pitakattaya* and in Sanskrit *Tripitaka* or *Pitakatraya* which signifies 'Three Baskets'. It consists of the Sermon Basket (*Sutta Pitaka*), Discipline Basket (*Vinaya Pitaka*) and the Metaphysical Basket (*Abhidhamma Pitaka*), each of which embodies a large number of distinct works.

4. The monks assembled in the First Council, that is in the Council of Kāśyapa in 543 B.C., were called (1) Theras, and the scripture canonised by them was called Theravāda. Subsequently ten thousand monks of Vaiśālī having violated certain rules of the Theravāda were, by the decision of the Second Council in 443 B.C., expelled from the community of the Theras. These excluded priests were called (2) Mahāsāṅghikas who were the first heretical sect of the Buddhists. They made certain additions and alterations in the Theravāda. Afterwards within two hundred years from the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha 14 other heretical sects² arose, viz. (3) Gōḷuhika, (4) Ekabhoḥārika, (5) Paññatti, (6) Bāhulika, (7) Cetiva, (8) Sabhatthi, (9) Dhammaguttika, (10) Kassapiya, (11) Sankantika, (12) Sutta, (13) Himavata, (14) Rājagṛhiya, (15) Siddhattika, (16) Pubbāseliya, (17) Aparāseliya and (18) Vapiya.

5. Just at the close of the Third Council about 255 B.C., the teachings of Buddha as canonised by the Theras in the form of the *Teṭṭaka* were carried³ by Mahinda, son of Emperor Aśoka, to the island of Ceylon where they were perpetuated by priests in oral tradition. They are said to have been committed to writing⁴ for the first time in Ceylon in the reign of Vaṭṭagāmanī during 104-76 B.C. Besides the *Teṭṭaka* there

Oldenberg, S.B.E. series, vol. XX, pp. 370, 386. For an account of the third council as also of the first and second, vide Wijesinha's translation of the Mahāvamsa, chapter V, pp. 25-29, as also chapters III and IV.

¹ As to the dates of the 1st and 2nd Councils I follow the Pāli Mahāvamsa. The date of the 3rd Council is in accordance with modern researches. Aśoka ascended the throne in 272 B.C. (Vide Vincent A. Smith's Aśoka, p. 63), and it was in the 17th year of his reign that the third Council took place (vide Wijesinha's Mahāvamsa, p. 29).

² For a discussion about the variant names and subdivisions of these sects, vide Wijesinha's Mahāvamsa, part I, chapter V, p. 15; and Dr. Rhys Davids' "Schools of Buddhist Belief" in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1892, pp. 1-37.

³ Vide the Mahāvamsa, chapter XII.

⁴ Vide the Mahāvamsa, chapter XXXIII. Cf. also Dr. Alwis's Lecture on the Pāli Language in the Journal of the Pāli Text Society, London, 1883, p. 42.

were numerous other works written in Pāli which have immensely added to the bulk of the Pāli literature

LOGIC TOUCHED ON IN THE PĀLI LITERATURE.

6 In the *Tēpitaka*—nay in the whole Pāli literature—there is not a single treatise on Logic. This is not at all a matter of surprise, for, according to the Pāli works, our knowledge (called in Pāli *Vijñāna* and in Sanskrit *Vijñāna*) has arisen from *Avidyā*¹ or cosmic blindness, and is therefore a mere illusion. Such being the character of our knowledge, it cannot form the subject-matter of Logic, the sole function of which consists in laying down criteria for determining real or valid knowledge.

7 The only topic bearing upon Logic which has been touched on in the Pāli works, is the division of knowledge into six kinds. In the *Tēpitaka*² knowledge (*Vijñāna*) has been classified as (1) ocular (*cakkhu-vijñānam*), (2) auditory (*śota-vijñānam*), (3) olfactory (*ghāna-vijñānam*), (4) gustatory (*ivhā-māṇānam*), (5) tactile (*kāya-vijñānam*) and (6) mental (*mano-vijñānam*). But this classification has not been carried far enough to lay the foundation of a Logic that deserved the name of science.

8 In the *Tēpitaka* there are, however, occasional references to a class of men who were called *Takkā* (in Sanskrit *Tarkin* or *Takkika* (in Sanskrit *Turkika*))—that is, those versed in reasoning. It is not known whether these men were Buddhists, Jainas or Brāhmaṇas, perhaps they were recruited from all communities. They were not logicians in the proper sense of the term but they appear to me to have been sophists who indulged in quibble and casuistry.

THE BRAHMA-JĀLA-SUTTA (543 B C —255 B C).

9 In the *Brahma-jāla-sutta*, which forms a part of the *Dīgha Nikāya* of the *Sutta Pitaka* and was rehearsed in the three Buddhist Councils during 543 B C —255 B C,³ mention

¹ *Avidyā* (cosmic blindness) forms the first link in the chain of *Paṭicca samuppāda* explained in the *Vimaya Pitaka*, *Mahāvagga*, *Pathama Khandhaka*, translated by Rhys Davids and Oldenberg, S B E series, vol III, pp 73—75.

² *Vide* the *Anguttara Nikāya* III, 61.8, edited by Dr Morris in the Pāli Text Society series of London. *Vide* also the *Dhammasaṅgī*, and compare Pariccheda IV of the *Abhidhammatthasāṅgaha* which, though not included in the *Tēpitaka*, sums up the topics of the *Abhidhamma Pitaka*.

³ *Vijñāna* is translated as knowledge or consciousness, such as *cakkhu-vijñāna* signifies ocular knowledge or eye-consciousness.

⁴ “ Hofrath Dr. Buhler, in the last work he published, expressed the

is made of those Śramanas and Brāhmaṇas who were *Takkī* and *Vimāṃsi* and indulged in *Takka* and *Vimāṃsā*. Buddha speaks of them thus:—

“In this case, brethren, some recluse or Brāhmaṇa is addicted to *logic* [sophism] and *reasoning* [casuistry].” He gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own, beaten out by his *argumentations* and based on his *sophistry*. “The soul and the world arose without a cause.”¹

This passage refers, in my opinion, to a sophist rather than to a teacher of Logic.

THE Udāna (543 B.C.—255 B.C.).

10. Again, in the *Udāna*, which is included in the *Khuddaka Nikāya* of the *Sutta Pitaka* and is supposed to have been rehearsed in the three Buddhist Councils during 543 B.C.—255 B.C., we read—

“As long as the perfect Buddhas do not appear, the *Takkikas* [sophists] are not corrected nor are the *Sāvakas* owing to their evil views they are not released from misery.”²

This passage leaves no doubt that the *Takkikas* were sophists.

THE Kathāvatthupparakaraṇa (ABOUT 255 B.C.).

11. The *Kathāvatthupparakaraṇa*, a work of the Abhidhamma-*maṇipitaka*, composed by Moggaḍiputta Tissa at the Third Bud-

opinion that these books, as we have them in the Pāli, are good evidence, certainly for the fifth, probably for the sixth, century B.C.”

—Rhys Davids' Preface to the *Dialogues of the Buddha*, p. XX.

¹ The *Brahma jāla-sutta* 1—32 included in *Dialogues of the Buddha* translated by Rhys Davids, London, p. 42.

Dr. Rhys Davids translates *Takkī* (*Takkī*) and *Vimāṃsī* (*Mīmāṃsī*) as “addicted to *logic* and *reasoning*.” But the expression may also be rendered as “addicted to *sophism* and *casuistry*.”

The original Pāli runs thus:—

Idha, bhikkhave, ekacco samāno vā bhāṇmano vā *takkī* hoti *vimāṃsī*. So *takka*-pariyāhatam *vimāṃsūnucariṇam* sayam-patibhānam evam āha: “Adhucca sammappanno attū ca loko cūti.”

—The *Brahma jāla-sutta* 1—32 included in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, p. 29, edited by T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, London.

² The original of this passage runs as follows:—

Yāva sammā sambuddhā loka n'uppiyaṇṭi, na *takkī* s'ujhanti na c'āja sāvaka, dadditthi na dukkhā parinuccaṇṭi.

—*Udāna*, vi, 10, edited by Paul Stenhal in the *Pāli Text Society series*, London.

dhist Council during the reign of Aśoka about 255 B.C.,¹ mentions *patinñā* (in Sanskrit *pratiñā*, proposition), *upanāya* (in Sanskrit, too, *upanaya*, application of reason), *niggaha* (in Sanskrit *nigraha* humiliation or defeat), etc.,² which are the technical terms of Logic. Though Moggalliputta Tissa has not made any actual reference to Logic, his mention of some of its technical terms warrants us to suppose that that science in some shape existed in India in his time about 255 B.C.

THE Milinda-pañha *alias* THE Bhikṣu-sūtra
(ABOUT 100 A.D.).

12 The only Pāli work in which an explicit reference to Logic called *Niti* (or *Nyāya*) occurs is the *Milinda-pañha* otherwise known as the *Bhikṣu-sūtra*, which was composed about 100 A.D.³ It was translated into Chinese under the Eastern Tsin dynasty A.D. 317—420.⁴ In the Chinese collection of the Indian books it is designated as the *Nāgāśena-Bhikṣu-sūtra*. This work contains questions of Milinda (the Greek King Menander of Bactria) and replies of Bhikṣu Nāgāśena on various abstruse matters. In it Milinda who was versed in Logic (*Niti* or *Nyāya*) is thus described —

¹ Aśoka ascended the throne of Magadha in 272 B.C. (vide Vincent A. Smith's *Aśoka*, p. 63). In the seventeenth year of his reign the Third Buddhist Council took place (*Wiśeṣaḥ* = *Mahāvamsa*, p. 29).

² *Niggaha-utukkama* is the name of a section of the first chapter of the *Kathāvatthupparakama*. *Upanaya-utukkama* is the name of another section of that work. A passage, in which the terms *patinñā* and *niggaha* occur, is quoted below —

No ca mayam layā tattiya hetāya patinñāya hevaṃ patinñantā hevaṃ niggahetabbā (*Kathāvatthupparakama*, Siamese edition p. 3, kindly lent to me by Anagārika H. Dharmapāla.)

In the commentary on the above passage even *chala* (fraud), which is another technical term of Logic, has been used. Cf.

Evam tena, chalen niggaho āropito idāṃ tassova patinñāya dhammena samena attavāde javam dassetum anudomanye pi chā suttavādissa attano missāya patinñāṃ paravādissa baddhaya. *Kāśān adatvā*.

(*Kathāvatthupparakama-aṭṭhakathā*, published by the Pali Text Society of London, p. 13).

It is evident from the opening passages of the *Kathāvatthupparakama-aṭṭhakathā* that Moggalliputta Tissa discussed in the *Kathāvatthupparakama* only those doctrines—Buddhist and heretic—which had originated after the First and Second Buddhist Councils. From this statement may we not draw the conclusion that the technical terms of Logic which he has used were unknown before the Second Buddhist Council?

³ For discussions about date vide Rhys Davids' Introduction to "The Questions of King Milinda" in the S. B. E. series, vol. xxxv.

⁴ Vide Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, No. 1358.

“Many were the arts and sciences he knew—holy tradition and secular law, the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems of philosophy, arithmetic, music, medicine, the four Vedas, the Purāṇas, and the Itihāsas, astronomy, magic, *causation* and spells, the art of war; poetry, conveyancing—in a word, the whole nineteen

As a disputant he was hard to equal, harder still to overcome, the acknowledged superior of all the founders of the various schools of thought. And as in wisdom so in strength of body, swiftness, and valour there was found none equal to Mīlinda in all India. He was rich, too, mighty in wealth and prosperity, and the number of his armed hosts knew no end. The king, who was fond of wordy disputation, and eager for discussion with *casuists*, *sophists*, and gentry of that sort, looked at the sun (to ascertain the time), and then said to his ministers “1

13. The following dialogue “ between Mīlinda and Nāga Sena is quoted to show what was thought to be the proper mode of carrying on debate in the days of those notable persons —

“The King said: ‘Reverend Sir, will you discuss with me again?’

‘If your Majesty will discuss as a scholar (Pandita), well, but if you will discuss as a king, no.’

‘How is it then that scholars discuss?’

‘When scholars talk a matter over with one another then is there a winding up, an unravelling, one or other is convicted of error, and he then acknowledges his mistake, distinctions are drawn, and contradictions, and yet thereby they are not angered. Thus do scholars, O King, discuss.’

‘And how do kings discuss?’

‘When a king, Your Majesty, discusses a matter, and he advances a point, if any one differ from him on that point, he is apt to fine him, saying: “Inflict such and such a punishment upon that fellow!” Thus, Your Majesty, do kings discuss.’

‘Very well. It is as a scholar, not as a king, that I will discuss. Let Your Reverence talk unrestrainedly, as you would with a brother, or a novice, or a lay disciple, or even with a servant. Be not afraid!’

ORIGIN OF THE MAHĀYĀNA (ABOUT 78 A.D.).

14. At the opening of the Christian era the north-western part of India was invaded by the Turuṣkas or Scythians. Kaniṣka,³ who was one of their chiefs, conquered Kāśmīra,

¹ Taken from Rhys Davids’ translation of the Mīlinda pañha called “the Questions of King Mīlinda” in S B. E. series, vol. xxxv, pp. 6-7. Nyāya is an equivalent for the original Nīti, *causation* for Hetu, *casuists* for Lokāyata and *sophists* for Vistāra.

Nīti may mean “policy,” but placed between Yoga and Vaiśeṣika it cannot but signify *Nyaya*.

² Vide Rhys Davids’ Questions of King Mīlinda in the S B. E. series, vol. xxxv, p. 46.

³ In the Tanqiyur, Mdo, vol. G1, there is *Mahārāja-Kaniṣka-lekha*, which is a letter addressed by Mañicitra to King Kaniṣka. Hwen-thsang in the 7th Century A.D. records a prophecy of Buddha that 400 years after his nirvāṇa Kaniṣka would be born: vide Beal’s Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, p. 99. The same prophecy is mentioned by Fa-hian about 399 A.D., showing thereby that Kaniṣka was regarded as historical even at that time. According to Tibetan books such as the

Palhava and Delhi, and is said to have founded the era called *Sakabda* in 78 A.D. He accepted the Buddhist faith and established a new system of Buddhism called *Mahāyāna*,¹ the Great Vehicle. The old system of Buddhism as promulgated in the Pāli *Tēpitaka* was henceforth nicknamed *Hinayāna*, the Little Vehicle. The *Mahāyāna* gradually spread to Nepal, Tibet, Mongolia, China, Japan, Corea, etc., while the *Hinayāna* continued in Ceylon and thence spread to Burmah, Siam, etc. In India both the systems prevailed.

ORIGIN OF THE SANSKRIT BUDDHIST LITERATURE (ABOUT 78 A.D.)

15. Under the patronage of Kaniska a council² was held at Jālandhara under the superintendence of Pārśva (or Pūrṇaka) and Vasu Mitra. It consisted of 500 monks who composed in Sanskrit three works explanatory of the Pāli *Tēpitaka*, viz., *Sūtra Upadeśa* of the *Sutta Pitaka*, *Vinaya Vibhāṣā* of the *Vinaya Pitaka* and *Abhidharma Vibhāṣā* of the *Abhidharma Pitaka*. These three works written in Sanskrit were the earliest canonical books of the *Mahāyāna* School.

16. It must not, however, be supposed that there had been no Buddhist books written in Sanskrit before Kaniska held his council. As a fact Kaniska thought it expedient to introduce Sanskrit as the medium of Buddhist communication seeing that there had already existed many valuable Buddhist books in that language. For instance, the *Abhidharma-vibhāṣā*, or rather the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-sāstra*, which was compiled

Sum-paḥi-choḥ-byun, Kan 'ta flourished in 33 B.C., that is, 400 years after the nirvāṇa of Buddha which is said to have taken place in 433 B.C. Dr. J. F. Fleet holds that Kaniska founded the Vikrama era in 58 B.C. (*vide* Traditional Date of Kaniska in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, October 1906). Dr. R. (J. Bhandarker places Kaniska at the last quarter of the 3rd century A.D., as appears from "A peep into the early history of India" in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1897-98, p. 396. Vincent A. Smith places Kaniska in 125 A.D., while Sylvain Lévi assigns him an earlier date of 60 A.D. (*vide* J.R.A.S., January 1905, pp. 52-53). But Mr. Beal, Mr. Lassen, Professor Kern and others adopt the view that the Saka era dates from Kaniska in 78 A.D.

¹ *Vide* Takakusu's *I-tang*, p. XXV, also Satish Chandra Vidyābhūṣana's *Mahāyāna and Hinayāna* in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1900.

² An account of this council is given by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, C.I.E., in an article named "Some Historical facts connected with the rise and progress of Mahāyāna School of Buddhism, translated from the *Sum-paḥi-choḥ-byun*" in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, vol. I, part III, p. 18. *Vide* also Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. I, p. 275; and also Monier Williams' *Buddhism*, pp. 68-69.

at the council of Kaniska was a mere commentary on Kātyāyana-putra's Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-sāstra.¹ This last is a Sanskrit work explanatory of the Pāli Abhidhamma Pitaka. It was composed 300 years after the nirvāṇa of Buddha or 100 years before the time of Kaniska. Though Kaniska was not thus the first founder of the Sanskrit Buddhist literature, it cannot but be acknowledged that it was he, who for the first time proclaimed Sanskrit as the language of the Buddhist Canon. Since his time there have been composed innumerable Buddhist works in Sanskrit of which nine called the *Nava Dharmas*² are specially worshipped by the Mahāyāna Buddhists.

LOGIC MENTIONED IN THE SANSKRIT BUDDHIST LITERATURE.

17. None³ of the works composed during or before the time of Kaniska has come down to us in its Sanskrit original, and I have had no opportunity of examining the Chinese or Tibetan version of the same. I cannot, therefore, say whether there is any mention of Logic in those works. But we have before us a very large collection of Sanskrit Buddhist works composed after the time of Kaniska. Many of these works, such as some of the *Nava Dharmas*, contain references to Logic, and several works are even replete with logical discussions.

THE Lalitavistara (BEFORE 250 A D)

18. The *Lalitavistara*, which is one of the *Nava Dharmas*, was translated into Chinese in 221-263 A D⁴. The Sanskrit original of it must have been prepared in India before that

¹ Vide Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, nos. 1263, 1273 and 1275. Regarding the authorship of Abhidharma mahāvibhāṣā, or simply Mahāvibhāṣā, vide Takakusu in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1905, p. 159.

² The *Nava Dharmas* or Nine Sacred Works are:—

(1) Asta-sāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, (2) Gaṇḍa-vyūha, (3) Daśa-bhūmī-āra, (4) Samādhi rāja, (5) Lankāvatāra, (6) Saddharma pūdarika, (7) Tathāgata-guhyaka, (8) Lalitavistara and (9) Suvarṇa-prabhāsa.

Vide Hodgson's Illustrations of the Literature and Religion of the Buddhists, p. 19.

³ Dr Rhys Davids in his Buddhist India, p. 316, observes that the three works composed at the Council of Kaniska are extant in European libraries.

⁴ The *Lalitavistara* was translated into Chinese four times. The first and third translations were lost by 730 A.D. The first was prepared under the Han dynasty A.D. 221-263, the second under the Western Tsin dynasty A.D. 265-316, the third under the earlier Sun dynasty A.D. 420-479, and the fourth under the Thān dynasty A.D. 683. Vide Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, nos. 159 and 160.

time. In this work Logic, under the name of *Hetu-vidyā*,¹ is mentioned along with the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, etc., in all of which the Bodhisattva (Buddha Gautama) is said to have acquired distinction.

EIGHTEEN SECTS OF THE BUDDHISTS.

19. In article 4 we have found that within 200 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha there arose in India 17 heretical sects besides the orthodox priesthood called the Theras. In course of time some of these sects disappeared while new ones grew up, the result being that at the time of Kaniska, about 78 A.D., the Buddhists had already been divided into 18 sects² grouped into four classes as follows —

- | | | |
|------------------------|---|---|
| I. Ārya Sarvāstivāda | } | Belonging to the
<i>Vaiśbhāṣika</i> School
of Philosophy. |
| (1) Mūla Sarvāstivāda | | |
| (2) Kāśyapiya | | |
| (3) Mahiśāsaka | | |
| (4) Dharma-guptya | | |
| (5) Bahuśrutiya | | |
| (6) Tāmraśātiya | | |
| (7) Vibhajjavādin | } | Belonging to the
<i>Sautrāntika</i> School
of Philosophy. |
| II. Ārya Sammitiya | | |
| (8) Kurukullaka | | |
| (9) Āvantika | | |
| (10) Vātsīputriya | } | |
| III. Ārya Mahāśāṃghika | | |
| (11) Pūrva-śāila | | |
| (12) Aparā-śāila | | |
| (13) Haimavata | | |
| (14) Lokottaravādin | } | |
| (15) Prajñaptivādin | | |
| IV. Ārya Śthavira | | |
| (16) Mahāvihāra | | |
| (17) Jetavanīya, and | } | |
| (18) Abhayagiriyaśin. | | |

All the sects mentioned above belonged to the *Hīnayāna* though later on they joined the *Mahāyāna* too.

१ निर्वच्यो निगमे पुराणे इतिहासे वेदे आकरणे निबन्धे शिष्यायां इन्द्रसि यज्ञकणे ज्योतिषि सांख्ये योगे त्रिषाकण्ये वैशेषिके वैशिके अर्थविद्यायां चार्थसूत्रे आचार्ये आचारे स्वमपचित्ते हेतुविद्यायां जतुयन्त्रे सर्वत्र बोधिसत्त्व एव विनिश्चये स्य ॥

Lahtavistara, edited by Dr. Rājendra Lal Mitra in the Bibliotheca Indica series, Calcutta, Chapter XII, p. 179.

² Vide the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, vol. I,

FOUR SCHOOLS OF THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY.

20. The philosophical views of the sects mentioned above were gradually formulated into two schools, viz., the (1) *Vaiśhāṣika* and (2) *Sautrāntika*. The Mahāyāna sect of the Buddhists founded by Kaniśka established two other schools of philosophy, viz., the (3) *Mādhyamika* and *Yogācāra*. So there were altogether four schools of philosophy, two of the *Hīnayāna* and two of the *Mahāyāna*.¹

21. *Vaiśhāṣika* was a later appellation of the philosophy of the Sarvāstivāda (Palī · Sabbatthivāda) sect² who, as their name implies, admitted the reality of the world—internal and external. The fundamental philosophical work of this sect is Kātyāyana-putra's *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra*,³ or simply *Jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra*, composed 300 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha. The next work of this sect is the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra*⁴ or simply *Vibhāṣā*, compiled at the council of Kaniśka about 78 A.D. It is from this *Vibhāṣā* that the name *Vaiśhāṣika*⁵ was derived. *Vibhāṣā* means "commentary" and the *Vaiśhāṣika* philosophy seems to have been so called because it was based on the commentaries rather than on the original texts of the teachings of Buddha. Sangha-bhadra's *Nyāyānusāra-śāstra*,⁶ otherwise called *Kośa-kāraka-śāstra*, composed about 489 A.D.,⁷ is a most learned work of the *Vaiśhāṣika* philosophy.

part III, p. 18. Takakusu's I-tsing, pp. xxiii, xxiv and xxv; Rhys Davids' article in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1891, p. 411, and 1892, pp. 1-37, Rockhill's Buddha, p. 181 f; Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 270-274; and Wijesinha's Mahāvamsa, part I, Chapter V, p. 15.

¹ Vide Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, pp. 121, 139 n, and Takakusu's I-tsing, p. xxii.

² Vide Takakusu's I-tsing, p. xxi. The Ārya Sammitīyas, at any rate their subclass called the Vātsīputriyas, were also followers of the *Vaiśhāṣika* philosophy. The Hindu philosopher Vācaspati Miśra in his *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyatīkā* 3-1-1 quotes the opinions of the *Vaiśhāṣikas* who were called Vātsīputras.

³ This work exists in Chinese and Tibetan: vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, nos. 1273, 1275.

⁴ This work, too, exists in Chinese and Tibetan: vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, nos. 1263, 1264.

⁵ Compare the explanation of *Vaiśhāṣika* given by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in his *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, chapter on *Baud-dha-darsana*, translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p. 24. Vide also Satya Chandra Vidyābhūṣana's "Mādhyamika School" in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta for 1895, part II, p. 4.

⁶ This work exists in Chinese and Tibetan; vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, no. 1265.

⁷ Vide Bunyiu Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix II, no. 95. For Sangha-bhadra, vide also Hwen-thsang's Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, pp. 193-194.

22. The name *Sautrāntika*¹ was derived from *Sūtrānta*, called in Pāli *Suttanta*, meaning "original text." The *Sautrāntika* philosophy seems to have been so called because it was based on the original text of the teachings of Buddha rather than on the commentaries thereon. The text on which the *Sautrāntika* philosophy was based belonged to the sect of Ārya Sthavira, called in Pāli Theras, who held the First Council in 543 B.C., and possibly also to the sect of the Mahāsāṃghikas² who were the first dissenters in 443 B.C. The philosophical principles of this school are said to have been formulated in Kāśmīra³ during the reign of Kaniska about 78 A.D. by a sage named Dharmotara or Uttara-dharma⁴. But the Chinese pilgrim Hwen-thsang, who visited India early in the 7th century A.D., states that the renowned teacher Kumāralabdha⁵ of Takṣaśilā (Taxila in the Punjab) was the founder of the *Sautrāntika* school and wrote several very valuable treatises on it. He is supposed to have lived about 300 A.D. as he was a contemporary of Nāgārjuna (q.v.), Ārya Deva (q.v.) and Aśvaghoṣa. There was another very famous teacher named Śrīlabdha⁶ who wrote *Vibhāṣā-sāstra* (or commentary on a work) of the *Sautrāntika* school. Hwen-thsang saw in Ayodhyā the ruins of a Saṅghātsāma where Śrīlabdha resided.

MENTION OF LOGIC IN THE WORKS OF THESE SCHOOLS.

23. As none of the old works belonging to the *Vaiśbhāṣika* or *Sautrāntika* school has yet become accessible to us, I cannot state whether there is any mention of Logic in those works. But there are ample references to Logic in the works of the *Mādhyamika* and *Yogācāra* schools, short accounts of which are given below.

¹ Compare the explanation of the term *Sautrāntika* given by the Hindu philosopher Mādhyācārya in the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, chapter on Bauddha-darśana, translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p. 26. Vide also Satish Chandra Vidyābhūṣana's "Mādhyamika School" in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta* for 1896, part II, p. 4.

Vide Rhys Davids' *Buddhist India*, p. 168, and Beal's *Fahian and Sungyun*, p. 143.

² Vide Watters "On Yuan Chwang," vol. II, p. 161.

³ Vide the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta*, vol. I, part III, pp. 18, 19, and Tarānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 59.

⁴ For the Dhammuttariya sect, vide Wasmuth's *Buddhism*, p. 233; and Mahāvamsa, part I, chapter V, p. 15. Wiggan's foot-note.

⁵ Vide Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. II, p. 302, and Tarānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 78, where Kumāralabdha stands for Kumāra-labdha.

⁶ Vide Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. I, pp. 225, 226; and Tarānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 67.

ĀRYA NĀGĀRJUNA (ABOUT 300 A.D.).

24. The name *Mādhyamika* was derived from *madhyama*, meaning the middle. The *Mādhyamika* philosophy was so called because it avoided two extremes, i.e., advocated neither the theory of absolute reality, nor that of total unreality, of the world, but chose a *middle path*,¹ inculcating that the world had only a conditional existence. The founder of this school was Nāgārjuna or rather Ārya Nāgārjuna, who was born at Vidarbha (modern Berar) in Mahākośala,² during the reign of King Sadvāha or Sātavāha³ [of the Andhra dynasty].⁴ He passed many of his days in meditation in a cave-dwelling of the Sri-parvata,⁵ that bordered on the river Krishnā. He was a pupil of Śaraha and is said to have converted a powerful king, named Bhoja Deva,⁶ to Buddhism.

1 Compare—

सती भावाभावात्तद्वयवृत्तिनाम् सर्वसंभावानुसृतिसंज्ञया द्रव्यता सध्वसा प्रतिपक्षध्वसो मार्ग इत्युच्यते ॥

—*Mādhyamikā Vṛtti* published by the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, chapter XXIV, p. 185

Compare the explanation of the term *Mādhyamika* given by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya, in the *Sarvadarāna-saṁgraha*, chapter on *Bauddha darśana*, translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p. 24; and also Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana's *History of the Mādhyamika Philosophy of Nāgārjuna* in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta*, 1887, part IV, pp. 7-20

² *Vide* Hwen-thsang's *Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. II, Book VIII, p. 97, and Book X, p. 210; Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. II, pp. 201-202, and Wassiljew quoted by Schiefner in the *Geschichte des Buddhismus*, p. 301

³ Sadvāha is the same as Sātavāha, which is a general name of the kings of the Andhra dynasty.—*Vide* Dr R. G. Bhandarkar's *Early History of the Dekkan*, second edition, pp. 25-37.

Nāgārjuna wrote an instructive letter to Sātavāha[na], whose private name in Chinese was Sh'-yen-toh-cia. This letter is called Ārya Nāgārjuna Bodhisattva Sūtralekha. It was translated into Chinese in 434 A.D. An English translation of this letter has appeared in the *Journal of the Pali Text Society of London*, 1883, pp. 71-75

⁴ The Andhra kings ruled the northern portion of the Madras Presidency and the whole of Kalinga, and overthrew the Kanva dynasty in northern India about 31 B.C. They remained powerful up to 436 A.D. They were Buddhists, and it was by them that the magnificent marble stūpa at Amarāvati was erected.—*Vide* Sewell's *Lists of Antiquities in Madras*, vol. II, p. 141-146.

⁵ For an account of Sri-parvata or Sri-śaila see Hwen-thsang's *Life*, Introduction, p. xi, by Beal; Tirānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 84; Wilson's *Mālatī-Mādhava*, act I; and Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana's *Notes on Ratnāvālī*, pp. 27-29.

⁶ *Vide* Tirānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 66, 69-73.

25. Nāgārjuna is said to have lived four hundred years¹ after the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha, that is, in 33 B.C. But he does not appear to me to have so early a date as he was one of the early patrons or founders of the university of Nālandā,² which had not, perhaps, come into existence in the 1st century B.C., and was insignificant³ even at 399 A.D., when the Chinese pilgrim Fa-hian came to visit India. Nāgārjuna is stated by Lama Tārānātha to have been a contemporary of King Nemi Candra, who is supposed to have reigned about 300 A.D.⁴ The

¹ It is prophesied in the Mañju-śrī-mūla-tantra (called in Tibetan *Ujām-ḍpal-rtsa-rgyu*;) that —

དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་ང་འདས་ནས།

ལོ་ནི་བཞི་བརྒྱ་ལོ་ན་པ་ན།

དག་སྤོང་ཁྲུ་ཞིས་དེ་འབོད་འབྱུང་།

བསྟན་པ་ལ་ནི་དད་ཅིང་པ་ན།

(Quoted in the Introduction to *Ses-rab-ḍdon-bu* published in Calcutta).

"Four hundred years after Buddha's departure from the world there will appear a Bhikṣu, named Nāgārjuna, who will do good to the believers in the doctrine."

It should be noted that according to some books of Tibet, Buddha was born in 514 B.C., lived 81 years and attained *nirvāṇa* in 433 B.C. Nāgārjuna, who was born 400 years after the *nirvāṇa*, must, at this calculation, be placed in 33 B.C.

² Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 66, 69-73.

³ Fa-hian describes Nālandā as a mere village *Nā-lo*: vide Beal's *Travels of Fa-hian and Sungyun*, p. 111.

⁴ According to Lama Tārānātha, Nāgārjuna was a contemporary of King Nemi Candra, whose genealogy is thus traced:—

Akṣa Candra	}	Ruled in Aparāntaka.
Jaya Candra		
Nemi Candra		
Phaṇi Candra	}	Ruled in Magadha.
Bhāmṣa Candra		
Sīla Candra		
Candra Gupta		

The six kings, beginning with Akṣa Candra to Sīla Candra, are stated to have been weak and insignificant, while Candra Gupta, the seventh king,

latest date that can be assigned to Nāgārjuna is 401 A.D.,¹ when his biography was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva.

26. Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamika-kārikā* is the first work of the *Mādhyamika* philosophy. In it he has occasionally referred to certain technicalities of Logic, such as the fallacy of *Sādhya-sama*² (*petitio principii*) in chapter IV. He was the author of several other works on the *Mādhyamika* philosophy, such as the (1) *Yukti-śaṣṭikā-kārikā* or sixty memorial verses on argumentation, (2) *Vigraha-vyavartani kārikā*, or memorial verses on conquering disputes and (3) *Vigraha-vyavartani vṛtti* or a commentary on the *Vigraha-vyavartani kārikā*.³ In these works he has, as the titles indicate largely employed the methods of Logic⁴ to establish the abstruse conclusions of the *Mādhyamika* philosophy.

ĀRYA DEVA (ABOUT 320 A.D.).

27. Deva⁵ or rather Ārya Deva was the next writer on the *Mādhyamika* philosophy. He is otherwise known as Karṇapīpa, is described as having been very powerful. This Candrar Gupta, who "did not take refuge in Buddha," may be the same who founded the Gupta era in 319 A.D. The reigns of his predecessors were very short. Nemi Candrar may be assigned to about 300 A.D. — Cf. Taranatha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schueiner*, pp. 80-83.

¹ Vide Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 3.

² The *Mādhyamika-kārikā* with the *vṛtti* of Candrar Kīrti has been published by the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, the work is being republished in the St. Petersburg Buddhist Text series under the editorship of Professor De La Vallée Poussin. The following verse refers to the fallacy of *Sādhya-sama* —

विषये यः परोक्षार्थं कृते शून्यतया वदेत् ।

सर्वं तस्यापरिहृतं सम साधेन जायते ।

(*Mādhyamika-kārikā*, chapter IV)

³ For an account of some of the works on the Tantra by Nāgārjuna, vide Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana's Introduction to the *Śraddhārā-stotra* in the "Bibliotheca Indica" series. For the latest researches in the medical works of Nāgārjuna, see Dr. Pahnur Corber's "Introduction A L'Etude des Traités Médicaux Samskritas" printed in Hanoi, 1903, and for his hymns such as *धर्मधातुस्तव, निरुपमस्तव* etc., vide Tangyur, B-stodpa, vol. Ka.

⁴ For an account of these works, vide the article "Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet, No. 3." by Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal new series, vol. III, No. 7, 1907. For the philosophical works of Nāgārjuna, see Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, no. 3.

⁵ The *Nyāya-dvaya tarka-astra*, as noticed in Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Nos. 1223, 1224, is not a work of Nāgārjuna but of Dignāga.

⁶ Vide Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix

Kāna Deva, Nīla-netra and Pīṅgala-netra. He was born in Southern India and was an eminent disciple of Nāgārjuna. According to Hwen-thsang,¹ he visited the countries of Mahā-kośala, Śrughna, Prayāga, Cola and Vaśālī, in all of which he won great renown by defeating the Tirthikas and preaching the true doctrine of Buddha. According to Lama Tārānātha,² Deva resided for a long time in Nālandā, where he was a Paṇḍita. He flourished during the reign of Candragupta, whose date is supposed to be about 320 A.D.³ The latest date that can be assigned to Deva is 401 A.D.,⁴ when his biography was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva. He wrote numerous works on the Mādhyamika philosophy, such as the Śataka-śāstra, Bhramma-pramathana-yukti-hotu-siddhi,⁵ etc., all of which bear evidences of his knowledge of Logic.

LOGIC OF THE YOGĀCĀRA SCHOOL (ABOUT 300-500 A.D.).

28 The word *Yogācāra* is compounded of *yoga* meaning 'meditation' and *ācāra* meaning 'practice.' The *Yogācāra*⁶ or the contemplative system was so called because it emphasised the practice of meditation as means of attaining *Bhūmis*⁷ or the seventeen stages of Buddhistic Perfection. The chief dogma established in it is *ālaya-vijñāna*,⁸ the basis of conscious states,

1, No. 4, and Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. I, p. 321, vol. II, pp. 225-226.

¹ Vide Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, vol. I, Book IV, pp. 186-190, Book V, p. 231, vol. II, Book X, pp. 210, 227, Book XII, p. 302, Book VIII, pp. 98-102.

² Vide Lama Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp. 83-86 and 93.

³ Vide foot-note 4, p. 69.

⁴ Vide Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Appendix I, No. 4.

⁵ Vide Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet No. 3" in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, new series, vol. III, No. 7, 1907.

⁶ The *Yogācāra* philosophy is generally known in China, Tibet and Nepal as *Yogācārya*. For an account of this system, vide Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. I, p. 356, Dr. Schlagintweit's Buddhism quoted in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta for 1895, part II, Appendix IV.

Compare explanation of the word *Yogācāra* given by the Hindu Philosopher Mādhavācārya in the Sarvadarāna-saṃgraha, chapter on Bauddha darśana, translated by Cowell and Gough, second edition, p. 24. Vide also Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's "The Mādhyamika School" in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, 1895, part II, p. 4.

⁷ Vide Dharma-saṃgraha, LXIV and LXV, edited by Max Muller and Wenzel.

⁸ For an explanation of *ālaya-vijñāna*, see Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's note on p. 2 of the Lankāvatāra Sūtra, Calcutta Buddhist Text Society's edition, and also see p. 45 of the same work.

which is the same as our 'ego' or 'soul.' It is not known who was the founder of the *Yogācāra* school, but in the Tibetan and Chinese books the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, *Mahāsamaya Sūtra*, *Bodhisattva-caryā-nirdeśa* and the *Sapta-daśabhūmi-śāstra-yogācārya* have been named as the prominent old works of the system.¹

THE *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* (ABOUT 300 A.D.).

29. The *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*² is a very sacred work as it is one of the *Nava Dharmas*. The exact date of it is unknown, beyond the fact that it was translated into Chinese in 443 A.D.³ The approximate date seems to be 300 A.D., for, it existed at or before the time of Ārya Deva who mentions it.⁴ This work speaks in a prophetic style of the *Naiyāyikas* (dialecticians) and *Tārkikas* (logicians). Thus in chapter II of the work Mahāmātī asks Buddha —

"Say how in the time to come *Naiyāyikas* will flourish?"⁵

¹ *Vide* Section Mdo of the Tangyur, Lama Tārānātha's *Gesluchte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 111 f., Bunyiu Nanjo's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, Appendix I, No. 1, Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. I, p. 226, vol. II, pp. 220, 275, and Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. I, p. 371.

² The Sanskrit original of this work is being published by the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta under the editorship of Rai Sarat Chandra Das, C.I.E., and Dr. Satya Chandra Vidyanbhushana. The work also exists in Chinese and Tibetan. Huen-thsang mentions the *Lankāvatāra*, *vid.* Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Book XI, p. 251.

³ *Vide* an account of the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* by Satya Chandra Vidyanbhushana in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 1906.

⁴ *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjo's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, nos. 175, 176 and 177.

⁵ *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjo's *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka*, nos. 1259, 1260 and Appendix I, no. 4.

⁶ The Sanskrit original runs as follows:—

नेत्यादिषुः कथं ब्रूहि भविष्यन्ति अनागतान् ।

(*Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, Asiatic Society of Bengal's MSS., chapter II, leaf 11).

The Tibetan version runs thus:—

ཨྲི་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་ཇི་ལྟ་བུར།

མ་འོངས་དུས་ནང་བྱུང་བ་གསུངས།

(Kangyur, Mdo, vol. V, Asiatic Society of Bengal's xylograph).

"How is *tarka* (reasoning or argumentation) corrected, and how is it carried on?"¹

Again in chapter X of the work we read:—

"Whatever is produced is destructible—this is the conclusion of the *Tārkikas*."²

MAITREYA (ABOUT 400 A.D.).

30. The date of the *Mahāsamaya-sūtra*³ is not known. The *Bodhisattva-caryā-nirdeśa* was translated into Chinese during 414-421 A.D. and the *Sapta-daśa-bhūmi-sāstra-yogācārya* in 646-647 A.D. The author of these two works was Maitreya,⁴ (called in Chinese 'Mioh'), who lived 900 years after the nirvāṇa of Buddha, that is about 400 A.D.⁵ He is reported by Hwen-thsang to have communicated the materials of three Buddhist treatises to Ārya Asaṅga while the latter was residing in a monastery in Ayodhyā.⁶ In the *Sapta-daśa-bhūmi-sāstra-yogācārya*⁷ Maitreya has discussed certain topics of Logic, a

¹ कथं हि द्रष्टव्ये तर्कः कथं तर्कः प्रवर्तये ।

(*Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, chapter II, leaf 11, A S. B. MSS.)

རི་ལྟར་དོག་གི་རྣམ་དག་འགྱུར།

དོག་གི་ཅི་ཡི་སྒྲུབ་དུ་འགྱུར། ॥

(Kangyur, *Mdo*, vol. V.)

² जनकस्य विनाशः स्यात् तार्किकाणामयं नयः ।

(*Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, chapter X, leaf 143, A S. B. MSS.)

དུས་ན་རྣམ་པར་འཛིག་པར་འགྱུར། ॥

འདི་ནི་དོག་གི་ཅན་གྱི་ཚུལ། ॥

(Kangyur, *Mdo*, vol. V.)

³ Vide Dr Schlagintweit's Buddhism quoted in the Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, 1895, part II, Appendix IV, p. 16.

⁴ Vide Bunyū Nanjō's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No 1.

⁵ Vide "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan," by Dr. Sugiura, p. 30.

⁶ Vide Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," Vol I, pp 355-56. The three treatises are:—*Saptadaśabhūmi-sāstra-yogācārya*, *Sūtrālaṅkāraṭīkā* and *Madhyānta vibhāga śāstra*.

⁷ It is perhaps this work which is called *Yoga* by Dr. Sugiura, vide its Chinese version Yuka Ron, Book XV.

short account of which is given below from the researches of Dr. Sugiura.¹

31. Maitreya mainly discussed the practical questions of Logic as is evident from the titles of some of the chapters of his work, viz (1) Of Kinds of Debate, (2) Of Occasions of Debate, (3) Of the Attributes of the Debator, (4) Of Defeat, etc. But occasionally there was mixed in with the discussions some Pure Logic too. A thesis [*pratīṇā*], according to Maitreya, is to be supported by a reason [*hetu*] and two examples [*dṛṣṭānta*]. Validity of the reason and of the examples requires that they be based either (1) on fact [*pratyakṣa*], (2) on another inference [*anumāna*], or (3) on holy saying [*āgama*]. Analogy or Comparison [*upamāna*] is omitted. The form of reasoning is illustrated as follows :—

1. Sound is non-eternal,
2. Because it is a product,
3. Like a pot, but not like ether [*ākāśa*],
4. A product like a pot is non-eternal,
5. Whereas, an eternal thing like ether is not a product.

ĀRYA ASAṄGA (ABOUT 450 A D.).

32. Asaṅga, called in Chinese Mucak, was born in Gāndhāra (modern Peshwar). He was at first an adherent of the Mahīśāsaka² sect and followed the *Vaiśhāṣika* philosophy of the *Hīnayāna*. Later on he became a disciple of Maitreya and adopted the *Yogācāra* philosophy of the *Mahāyāna*. He is said to have lived for some years as a pandita in Nālandā³. He lived about 450 A.D.⁴ The latest date that can be assigned to him is 531 A.D.⁵ when one of his works, called the *Mahāyāna-samprati-graha-śāstra*, was translated into Chinese. Hwen-thsang in the 7th century A.D. saw the ruins of *Saṅghārāma*s in Kauśāmbi and Ayodhyā, where Asaṅga resided for some years⁷. He wrote 12 works, most of which still exist in Chinese and Tibetan versions⁸.

¹ Vide "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan," p. 30.

² Vide Hwen-thsang's Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World, Vol. I, pp. 98, 227 and 236.

³ Vide Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," Vol. I, p. 357.

⁴ Vide Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefelbusch, p. 122.

⁵ Asaṅga is approximately placed at 450 A.D. as he was the eldest brother of Vasubandhu (q.v.) who lived about 480 A.D.

⁶ Vide Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 5.

⁷ See Beal's Buddhist Records, Vol. I, pp. 98, 227, 236.

⁸ Vide Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, no. 5.

33. Dr. Sugiura¹ has ascertained from Chinese sources that Asanga treated Logic in the tenth volume of *Genyo*, in which he simply reproduced the conclusions of his master Maitreya, and also in the sixteen volumes of *Zaschuh*, in which he showed a slight originality. Asanga's form of reasoning, which is somewhat different from Maitreya's, is given below :—

1. Sound is non-eternal,
2. Because it is a product,
3. Like a pot (but not like ether) ;
4. Because a pot is a product it is non-eternal ; so is sound, as it is a product
5. Therefore we know sound is non-eternal.

Here we find that Asanga made some improvement on the form of syllogism adopted in the Logic of his master. The basis of Maitreya's inference, so far as it related to the connection between "produced-ness" and "non-eternality," was a mere analogy founded upon a single instance. This connection (between "produced-ness" and "non-eternality" in the case of the pot) might be accidental. Asanga emphasised the essential connection between "produced-ness" and "non-eternality" by saying "Because a pot is a product, it is non-eternal." In so doing he appealed not merely to an instance but to a law.

VASUBANDHU (ABOUT 480 A.D.)

34. Vasubandhu,² called in Chinese Seish, was born in Gāndhāra (modern Peshwar), where a tablet to his memory was seen by Hwen-thsang in the 7th century A.D. His father's name was Kauśika. He began his career as a *Vaiśhāṣika* philosopher of the Sarvāstivāda sect, but was later converted by his eldest brother Asanga to the *Yogācāra* school of the *Mahāyāna*. He passed many years of his life in Sākala, Kauśāmbī, and Ayodhyā, in the last of which places he died at the age of eighty years. He was a friend of Manoratha, a master of the *Vaiśhāṣika Sāstra*, who flourished in the middle of the thousand years after the *nirvāṇa* of Buddha, that is before 500 A.D. He was a contemporary of another *Vaiśhāṣika*

The original Sanskrit text of Asanga's *Vajracchedikā* has been published in the *Anecdota Oxoniensia* edited by Professor Max Müller.

¹ Vide "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan" by Dr. Sugiura, p. 31.

² Vide Hwen-thsang's *Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Vol. I, pp. 98, 105, 172, 193, 225, 236, and Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," Vol. I, p. 210.

teacher, named Sanghabhadra, who lived about 489 A.D.¹ So we may approximately fix the date of Vasubandhu at about 480 A.D. His biography² was translated from Sanskrit into Chinese during 557-569 A.D. Vasubandhu was the author of a large number of very valuable works³ including the *Tarka-sāstra*, which consists of three chapters and is perhaps the first regular Buddhist work on Logic. This work was translated into Chinese in 550 A.D. The Chinese version still exists, while the Sanskrit original has been long lost. The work appears to have been translated into Tibetan too, but my persistent efforts to discover the Tibetan version were unsuccessful.

35. Dr. Sugiura⁴ from Chinese sources has ascertained that in the 7th century A.D., while Hwen-thsang was in India, he saw three other books on Logic attributed to Vasubandhu, which are called in Chinese *Ronki*, *Ronshiki* and *Ronshin*, respectively. In the *Ronki*, quoted by Kwei-ke, Vasubandhu maintained that a thesis can be proved by two propositions only, and that, therefore, the necessary parts in a syllogistic inference are only three⁵ (i.e. *pakṣa* or minor term, *sādhya* or major term

¹ Sanghabhadra translated *Vibhāṣā-vinaya* into Chinese in 489 A.D. *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix II, No. 95.

Mr. Takakusu, in a very learned article on Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu and the date of Vasubandhu published in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1905, says that Sanghabhadra, contemporary of Vasubandhu, was the translator of the *Samantapāsādikā* of Buddhaghosa into Chinese in 488 A.D.

² *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 6. The statement that there was an older translation of the life of Vasubandhu by Kumārajīva A.D. 401-409 but that it was lost in 730 A.D., cannot be accepted without further testimony. Takakusu says that "some Catalogues mention by mistake that such a work was then in existence": *vide* Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1905, p. 39.

³ *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 6.

⁴ *Vide* Dr. Sugiura's "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan," p. 32.

⁵ The Jaina logician Siddhasena Divākara probably refers to Vasubandhu, when he says that according to some logicians *antarvyūpti* (internal inseparable connection) consisting of *pakṣa* or minor term, *sādhya* or major term and *hetu* or middle term is quite enough in establishing a thesis, and that *dṛṣṭānta* or example is altogether useless. Siddhasena Divākara writes:—

अन्तर्बन्धोप साध्यस्य सिद्धेर्विद्वदाहति ।

अर्थांश्चातद्वक्तृवैष्येण व्याचिह्नो विदुः ॥ १० ॥

(*Nyāyavārtā* of Siddhasena Divākara, edited by Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana and published by the Indian Research Society of Calcutta).

and *hetu* or middle term). But it is to be regretted that these three logical works are lost, and we cannot know how far the theory of syllogism was developed in them. The work in Chinese from which alone we can know anything of his Logic is his polemic against heresies (*Nyonts-ron*).¹ In this book he gives the following form of reasoning :—

1. Sound is non-eternal,
2. Because it is a product of a cause,
3. Things produced by a cause are non-eternal like a pot,
which is produced by a cause and is non-eternal ;
- 4 Sound is an instance of this (kind),
- 5 Therefore sound is non-eternal.

¹ Is this the same work as the *Tarka-sāstra* already referred to ?



CHAPTER II.

SYSTEMATIC BUDDHIST WRITERS ON LOGIC (500—1200 A D).

LOGIC DISTINGUISHED FROM PHILOSOPHY.

36. In the previous chapter we have seen that from the origin of Buddhism in the 6th century B C to its expansion into four philosophical schools in the 4th century A D, there were no systematic Buddhist works on Logic, but only a few stray references to that science in the works on philosophy and religion. During 400—500 A.D., Mātreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu handled Logic, but their treatment of it was merely incidental, being mixed up with the problems of the *Yogācāra* and *Vaiśhāṣika* schools of philosophy. Vasubandhu's three works¹ on Pure Logic mentioned by Hwen-thsang are now lost and consequently their merits cannot be judged. With 500 A D. began a period when Logic was completely differentiated from general philosophy, and a large number of Buddhist writers gave their undivided attention to that branch of learning. Dignāga is the earliest known writer of this period.

37. ĀCĀRYA DIGNĀGA—FATHER OF MEDIAEVAL LOGIC.

[Flourished in Andhra, modern Telingāna in the Madras Presidency,
about 500 A D.]

The likeness of Dignāga reproduced in the next page is taken from the Tibetan Tangyur (Mdo, C'e. folio 1) which was put in its present form by the celebrated Lama Bu-ston, who passed the last days of his life at the monastery of Shalu, twelve miles south-east of Tashu lhun-po Bu-ston, who lived early in the fourteenth century A D.² must have copied the likeness from some earlier specimen, which was taken to Tibet during her intercourse with India between 600 A D and 1200 A D.

A peculiarity of this likeness is its cap. In the early Buddhist Church monks were not allowed to wear any head dress (*vide* the Pātimokkha rules of the Vinaya Pitaka). With the introduction of Mahāyāna in the first century A D by Kāṁśka, a great change was effected in the dress of monks, and caps of various shapes were invented. The hat worn here is called Panchen-shwa-dmar³ or "Pandita's red cap," with a pointed

¹ *Vide* Book II, Chapter I, under the head "Vasubandhu."

² *Vide* Sarat Chandra Das's Tibetan Dictionary, p. 870.

³ *Vide* Waddell's Lamasism, pp. 194—196.

peak and long lappets. The lappets of the cap were lengthened in proportion to the rank of the wearer.

It is not known when the "Pandita's cap" was first introduced. It is said to have been taken to Tibet in 749 A.D. by Śānta Rakṣita. "Pandita" was a degree which was conferred by the Vikramasīlā University on its successful candidates. It is not known what title the Uni-



བུ་མཆོད་ལྷ་མོ་མཆོད་ཅི་གཅིག་།

སྤྱི་བ་དཔོན་ཕྱོགས་སྤྱང་ལ་ན་མོ་།

versity of Nālandā conferred on its distinguished students. Perhaps in that university, too, the title "Pandita" was recognised, and "Pandita's cap" was possibly a distinctive badge of the scholars of that famous university where Dignāga distinguished himself in philosophical controversies.

The woollen *shawl* worn here is indicative of the fact that after Bud-

dhism had spread into cold climes, monks like Brahmanic sages were allowed to put on suitable warm clothes. There is also in the palms of the image a thunderbolt called in Sanskrit *Vajra* and in Tibetan *Dorje*, which is a remover of all evils. The halo round the head of the image indicates that Dignāga was a saint.

LIFE OF DIGNĀGA (ABOUT 500 A.D.).

38. Dignāga or rather Ācārya Dignāga is called in Tibetan Phyogs-glan. He¹ was born in a Brāhmaṇa family in Śimhāvakra near Kāñci, modern Conjeevaram in the Madras Presidency. By Nāgadatta, a Paṇḍita of the Vātsīputriya sect, he was admitted to the religious system of that sect and attained erudition in the *Tripiṭaka* of the *Hīnayāna*. Afterwards he became a disciple of Ācārya Vasubandhu with whom he studied all the *Piṭakas* of the *Mahāyāna* and *Hīnayāna*. He miraculously saw the face of Mañjuśrī, the Buddhist god of learning, from whom he received inspiration in the Law (Dharma). A few years later he was invited to Nālandā (*Vide* appendix A) where he defeated Brāhmaṇa Sudurjaya and other Tirtha dialecticians and won them to the doctrine of Buddha. Since he had refuted chiefly the Tirtha controversialists he was called the "Bull in discussion" (Sanskrit: Tarkapungava, and Tibetan: Rtsod-paḥi-khyu-mchog). He travelled through Orissa and Mahārāṣṭra to the south, meeting the Tirtha controversialists in discussions. At Mahārāṣṭra he is said to have resided frequently in the Ācāra's Monastery.² At Orissa he converted Bhadra Pālita, Treasury-minister of the king of the country, to Buddhism. He was a man of vast learning and wisdom, and practised during his life-time twelve tested virtues. He is said to have died in a solitary wood in Orissa.

39. Dignāga must have lived before 557—569 A.D.³ when two of his works were translated into Chinese. The early limit

¹ This account of Dignāga is taken from Lama Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp 130—135. Lama Tārānātha also relates that Dignāga frequently resided in Orissa in a cavern of a mountain called Bhoraśilā where he used to give himself up to contemplation. He was specially versed in incantation formulas. It is stated that the stem of a myrobalan tree called Mu-tiharitaki in the garden of Bhadra Pālita in Orissa entirely withered, but it revived in seven days after Dignāga had uttered incantation for its restoration. For a fuller account of Dignāga *vide* Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Dignāga and his *Pratīyā-samuccaya*" in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*. Vol I, No. 9, 1905.

² *Vide* Watters' *On Yuan Chwang*, Vol II, p. 122.

³ *Vide* Bynriū Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, App. 1, No. 10, where Dignāga is called Jina. The Chinese name of Dignāga has been wrongly rendered as Jina by Japanese writers as well as Rev. Beal.

of his date in 480 A.D. when his teacher Vasubandhu lived Dignāga flourished possibly about 500 A.D. when the Buddhist kings of the Pallava¹ dynasty ruled the eastern coast of South-eastern India.

40. We have already seen that Dignāga travelled in Nālandā, Orissa, Mahārāstra and Dakṣiṇa (Madras) entering everywhere into disputes with controversialists. He attacked his opponents as frequently as he was attacked by them. His whole life was passed in giving blows and receiving counter-blows. On account of this love of discussion he was, during his life-time, called the "Bull in discussion" (*Tarka-puṅgava*).² Even his death did not terminate the great intellectual war in which he had been engaged though he could no longer offer any violence, his opponents continued to fall upon him with force. Mark the volleys on his dead body coming from no mean warriors! Kālidāsa,³ the prince of poets, warns his poem to avoid the "rugged hand" (*sthūla-hasta*) of Dignāga. Udyotakara,⁴ the eminent logician, calls Dignāga "a quibbler" (*Kutārṭhika*). Vācaspati Miśra⁵ describes him as "an erring one" (*bhrānta*) and speaks of his "blunders" (*bhrānti*). Mallinātha⁶ compares him with a "rock" (*adrikalpa*). Kumārla Bhaṭṭa and Pārtha-sārathi Miśra⁷ turn their arrows against him. The

¹ On the downfall of the Andhras in 436 A.D., the Pallavas rose to power. They were in their turn driven out of their northern possessions, the kingdom of Vengi, by Kubja Vi-nuvarḍhana of the Eastern Chalukya dynasty. During 552—580 A.D., Kāñci, the capital of the Pallava kings, was captured by Vikramāditya I of the Western Chalukya dynasty. Vide Sewell's *Lists of Antiquities, Madras, Vol. II*, pp. 141, 146, 148, 149 and 211, 212.

² Vide Lama Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 134.

³ Vide Meghadūta, Pūrva-megha, verse 14.

+ अद्वयपादः प्रवरो दुर्बौद्धः

समाय शार्ङ्गं जगती जगद् :

कुमारिकाश्वनिहिनितुः

करिष्यते तस्य मया निबन्धः ॥

Udyotakara = Nyāya-vārtika, Introductory stanza, p. 1, in the Bibliotheca Indica series. Compare also Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-4, pp. 43—44; 1-1-5, p. 52; 1-1-6, pp. 60—61, 1-1-7, p. 63, etc.

⁵ Vide Vācaspati Miśra's Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-tīkā, edited by Gaṅgaḍhara Sastrī, 1-1-1, pp. 1, 31; 1-1-4, pp. 76—77, 97—98, 102; 1-1-5, p. 102; 1-1-6, p. 135, etc.

⁶ Mallinātha's commentary on verse 14 of the Meghadūta, Pūrva-megha.

⁷ Vide Pārtha-sārathi's gloss on 59—60, Anumānapariccheda of Kumārla Bhaṭṭa's vārtika on the 5th Sūtra of Jaimini.

Vedāntins and Jainas¹ were not inactive in their hostility. Even Dharmakīrti² the Buddhist sage attempted to oppose him. Dignāga must have been a very strongly built man, both physically and mentally, otherwise he could hardly have lived for a single day under assaults from so many sides. Those of his works which still exist enable us somehow to measure his strength and his weakness.

DIGNĀGA'S *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*.³

41 The *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* is one of the grandest literary monuments of Dignāga. It is said to have been composed while he was residing on a solitary hill near Vengi in Andhra⁴ (modern Telengāna) in the Madras Presidency. Seeing

¹ Vide the works of Prabhācandra and Vidyānanda referred to in the J B B R. A S., Vol. XVIII, p. 229. The Digambara Jain logician Dharmabhūṣana, in controverting the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *Sāmānya*, generality, quotes in support of his own conclusion the following verse of Dignāga.—

न चानि न च तत्रास्ते न पश्चादस्ति निवृत्तः ।

अद्यापि पूर्वं आधारमसौ असमसन्नतिः ॥

इति दिग्गजकूटतटकूटचक्रप्रसरप्रसङ्गात्

(Quoted in Dharmabhūṣana's *Nyāya-dīpikā*, Chap. III)

The same verse has been quoted in a little altered form by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavā Śrīya as follows —

न चानि न च तत्रास्तीदस्ति पश्चाद्वचनवत् ।

अद्यापि पूर्वं आधारमसौ असमसन्नतिः ॥

(*Sarvadar-ana samgraha*, chapter on *Bauddhedar-ana*)

² Vide the head "Dharmakīrti" which follows.

³ The account of the composition of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* given here is taken from Lama Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 132, 133; and the Tibetan *Pag-sam-jon-zang* edited by Ras Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., pp. 62, 75, 100 and LXVII.

⁴ Vide Hwen-thsang's *Travel in Beal's Buddhist Records of the Western World*, Vol. II, pp. 218, 219 and 220 where the Chinese term for Dignāga is wrongly rendered as Jina. Hwen-thsang gives the following account of the composition of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* :—"When Dignāga began to compose a useful compendium [presumably the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*] for overcoming the difficulties of the *Hotuvidyā-śāstra*, the mountains and valleys shook and reverberated; the vapour and clouds changed their appearance, and the spirit of the mountain appeared before him, asking him to spread abroad the *śāstra* (*Hotuvidyā*). Then the Bodhisattva (Dignāga) caused a bright light to shine and illumine the dark places. Surprised at this wonder, the king of the country (Andhra) came near him and asked whether he was entering into *nirvāṇa*. When the king spoke of the infinite bliss of *nirvāṇa* Dignāga resolved to enter into it. Mañ-

that the Śāstras on Dialectics written earlier by him remained scattered about, he resolved to collect them. Accordingly, putting together fragments from particular works, he engaged himself in compiling in verse a compendium called the *Pramāna-samuccaya*. While he was writing the opening lines the earth

Dignāga and Īśvara-
kr̥ṣṇa

trembled and all the places were filled with light and a great tumult was audible. A Brāhmana named Īśvara-

kr̥ṣṇa¹ surprised at this wonder came to Ācārya Dignāga, and finding that he had gone out to collect alms, wiped out the words he had written. Dignāga came and rewrote the words and Īśvara-kr̥ṣṇa wiped them out again. Dignāga wrote them a third time and added: "Let no one wipe this out even in joke or sport, for none should wipe out what is of great importance; if the sense of the expression is not right, and one wishes to dispute on that account, let him appear before me in person." When after Dignāga had gone out to collect alms, the Brāhmana again came to wipe out the writings he saw what was added and paused. The Ācārya returning from his rounds for meal met the Brāhmana; they began controversy, either staking his own doctrine. When he had vanquished the Tīrtha (Brāhmana) several times and challenged him to accept the Buddhist doctrine, the Tīrtha scattered ashes pronouncing incantations on them, and burnt all the goods of the Ācārya that happened to be before him, and when the Ācārya was kept back by fire the Tīrtha ran away. Thereupon Dignāga reflected that since he could not work the salvation of this single individual, he would not be able to work that of others. So thinking he was on the point of giving up his purpose of compiling the *Pramāna-samuccaya* when the Bodhisattva Ārya Mañjuśrī miraculously appeared before him in person and said:—

"Son, refrain, refrain the intellect is infected by arguing with mean persons. Please know that when you have demonstrated it this Śāstra cannot be injured by the host of Tīrthas. I undertake to be your spiritual tutor till you have attained the

juṣṭi, the god of learning, knowing his purpose was moved with pity. He came to Dignāga and said: "Alas! how have you given up your great purpose, and only fixed your mind on your own personal profit, with narrow aims, giving up the purpose of saving all." Saying this he directed him to explain the *Yogācāryabhūmi-śāstra* and *Hetuvidyā-śāstra*. Dignāga receiving these directions, respectfully assented and saluted the saint. Then he gave himself to profound study and explained the *Hetuvidyā-śāstra* and the Yoga discipline.

¹ Īśvara-kr̥ṣṇa here referred to was very probably the author of the *Sāmkhya kārīkā*.

stage of perfection. In later times this śāstra will become the sole eye of all the śāstras." ¹

So saying Mañjuśrī disappeared and Dignāga resumed his work and completed the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*.

42. The *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* ² is a Sanskrit work written in *anustubh* metre. The Sanskrit original of it is lost but a Tibetan translation still exists. The translation was prepared by an Indian sage named Hema Varma (in Tibetan Gser-gyi-go-cha) and a Tibetan interpreter named Dad-paḥi-śes-rab in the monastery of *Seṣ-paḥi-dge-gnas*. It occupies folios 1—13 of the Tanyur, section Mdo, volume Ce ³. In Tibetan it is called *Tshad-maḥi-mdo-kun-lay-btuṣ-pa* (= *Pramāṇa-sūtra-samuccaya*) or briefly *Tshad-ma-kun-lay-btuṣ-pa* (= *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*) signifying a compilation of aphorisms on *Pramāṇa* valid knowledge. It begins thus — "Bowling down before Sugata—the teacher and protector—who is *Pramāṇa* incarnate and benefactor of the world, I, for the sake of expounding *Pramāṇa* (valid knowledge), put together here various scattered matters, compiled from my own works" ⁴. In the closing lines

བྱ་མ་བྱེད་མ་བྱེད་སྟེ་བོད་མན་དང་འབྲུད་ལས་ཁྱོ་གྱེས་ངན་སྟེ་མྱེ།

ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་བསྟན་ནས་འཆོས་འདི་ལ་སྤྱ་ཤེགས་ཆོག་སྤྱི་གནོད་མི་

ནུས་པར་ཤེས།

ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་ས་མ་ཐོབ་ཀྱི་བར་དུ་དག་བའི་བཤེས་སྤང་ང་འགྱར་གྱི།

ཕྱི་མའི་དུས་སྤྱ་བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀྱན་གྱི་མིག་གཅིག་དུ་ནི་འདི་འགྱར་རོ།།

Pag-sam-jon-zang, edited by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., p. 101

² Probably the same as "The Śāstra on the grouped inferences," vide Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. 167

³ The volume Ce of the Tanyur, section Mdo, was put at my disposal by the India Office, London, through Mr. Thomas

ཆད་མར་གྱར་བ་འགྲོ་ལ་པན་པར་བཞེད།

སྟེན་པ་བའི་གཤེགས་སྟོབ་ལ་བྱུག་འཆམ་ནས།

ཆད་མ་སྤྱོད་ཕྱིར་རང་གི་གཞུང་ཀྱན་ལས།

བདུས་དེ་སྤྱ་ཆོག་སྤྱི་འཐོར་ནས་འདིར་གཅིག་བྱ།།

(Tanyur. Mdo, Ce, folio 1)

it is stated that " Dignāga, the subduer of controversialists in all regions and the possessor of elephantine strength, compiled this from his own works " 1

43 It is divided into six chapters which are named respectively. (1) Perception (Sanskrit *Pratyakṣa*, Tibetan: Mnong-sum); (2) Inference for one's own self (Sanskrit *Svārthānumāna*, Tibetan Ran-don-gyi-rje-dpag), (3) Inference for the sake of others (Sanskrit *Parārthānumāna*, Tibetan Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-rje-dpag) (4) Three characteristics of the Middle Term (Sanskrit *Tri-rūpa-hetu*, Tibetan Tshul-sun-gtan-tshigs) and Rejection of Comparison (Sanskrit *Upamāna-khandana*, Tibetan Dpe-dan-dpe-ltar-snan-pa) (5) Rejection of Credible Word or Verbal Testimony (Sanskrit *Sabdānumānanirāsa*, Tibetan Sgra-nye-dpag-min), and (6) Parts of a syllogism (Sanskrit *Nyāyānaya*, Tibetan Rig-pahi-van lag)

44 Dignāga does not give any formal definition of Perception, which is well known as the knowledge of objects derived through the channels of the senses. But he describes Perception as that which is freed from illusory experiences and is unconnected with name, genus, etc. 2 Suppose a man in the twilight mistakes a rope for a snake. His experience of the snake is merely illusory

1 བྱེགས་ནམས་ཀུན་གྱི་པས་ཀྱི་རྟོལ་བ་ནམས་།
འཛིས་པར་བྱེད་ལ་ཁྱང་བོའི་སྟོབས་ཐུན་བ་།
བྱེགས་ཀྱི་ཁྱང་བོའི་གཞུང་ཀུན་ལས་བདུས་བ་།

(Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folio 13)

2 In chapter I of the *Pramāna-samuccaya*, Dignāga describes Perception as follows:—

སངོན་སྦྱང་དོག་པ་དང་བྱལ་བ་།
མིང་དང་རིགས་སོགས་མི་བསྐྱེས་པའོ།།

The Sanskrit equivalents for these two lines are as follows:—

प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापीडं
नामजात्यादिवशमयम् ॥

(*Pramāna-samuccaya*, chapter I).

The first of these lines has actually been quoted, and Dignāga's whole theory of Perception severely criticised, by the Hindu logician Udyotakara in his *Nyāya-vārtika*, 1-1-4.

and is not, according to Dignāga, an act of Perception. Dignāga contends that Perception is also not connected with name, genus, etc. Suppose I see a cow. This cow, which I see, is a peculiar one. Its infinite peculiarities can only be realised by me who have seen it. If I proceed to indicate this cow to other persons by saying that I saw a cow which is named *Dittha* or which is red, etc., I can only convey to those persons the idea of a cow of a certain class, that is, a cow possessing the common characteristics of a class of cows, but can never express to them the individual cow which I saw. Hence it follows that (a result of) Perception cannot be properly expressed by name, genus, etc. But very different is the case with inference. Knowledge derived through inference is general, and can be well expressed by name, genus, etc., whereas that derived through Perception is particular, and is incapable of being properly communicated to others by name, genus, etc.

45. In the chapter on Perception Dignāga has criticised the Hindu logician Vātsyāyana, who concluded that the mind

Dignāga criticises Vātsyāyana

(*manas*) was a sense-organ, because it was accepted as such in several systems of philosophy, and the view was not opposed in the Nyāya-sūtra according to the maxim "if I do not

oppose a theory of my opponent¹ it is to be understood I approve of it." Dignāga criticises this maxim of Vātsyāyana saying "if silence proved assent it was useless for the Nyāya-sūtra to mention other sense-organs."

¹ Vātsyāyana writes —

मनस इन्द्रियमाणा वाच्यं ज्ञानवस्तुमिति । तन्नाकारमाचारवैतत्
प्रत्यक्षमिति परममप्रतिविधिमनुमतिमिति च ननु दुर्लभः ।

(Nyāyabhāṣya, 1-1-4)

² Dignāga writes, —

वगमाचक्षेद्वैतत्वेन ।
द्वयं चोचक्षेद्वैतत्वेन ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter I)

The Sanskrit originals of the lines are as follows —

अविद्यादुपासं चेत्
अन्येन्द्रियवत् इत्याह ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter I).

These two lines have been quoted and criticised by the Hindu logician Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-tīkā. 1-1-4.

46. In chapter II of the *Pramāna-samuccaya*, Dignāga mentions the views of some logicians who

Inference.

infer *fire* which is inseparably connected with it, and also of others, who from smoke infer the connection between it and the hill which is the minor term. He argues against the first mentioned logicians saying that if they infer *fire* from smoke they gain no new knowledge from this inference, for it is already known that smoke is inseparably connected with fire. His argument against the other logicians is that they are not able to infer the *connection*, for connection implies two things, whereas here only one thing, *viz*, the hill, is visible, but the other, *viz*, fire, is not visible. What then do we really infer from smoke? Dignāga says it is not fire nor the connection between it and the hill, but it is the *fiery* hill that is inferred¹.

What Dignāga meant to say is —

The *Nyāya-sūtra* distinctly mentions the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch as sense-organs, but says nothing as to whether the mind (*manas*) is a sense-organ or not. The presumption from this silence is that the mind is not a sense-organ according to the *Nyāya-sūtra*.

But *Vātsyāyana*, the famous Hindu commentator on the *Nyāya-sūtra* interprets the silence in a quite different way, concluding therefrom that the mind (*manas*) is a sense-organ according to the *Nyāya-sūtra*.

Dignāga contends "if silence was a proof of assent why did the *Nyāya-sūtra* not remain silent regarding the other five sense-organs too?"

¹ Dignāga writes —

དགས་ནི་འབྲུལ་བ་མེད་པའི་བྱིར།
 ཁ་ཅིག་ཆོས་གཞན་དཔེག་ཅེས་རྟེན།
 ཆོས་དང་ཆོས་ཅན་གྲུབ་པའི་བྱིར།
 ཁ་ཅིག་འབྲེལ་བ་འདོད་པ་ཡིན།
 ཆོས་ལ་དགས་ནི་གྲུབ་ཅེན།
 གཞན་དེས་ཅི་ཞིག་དཔག་པར་བྱེད།
 ཅི་སྟེ་ཆོས་ཅན་ལ་དེ་ཉིད།
 ཅི་བྱིར་རྟེན་སྲུ་དཔེག་མི་བྱེད།
 འབྲེལ་བ་ལ་ཡང་གཞིས་པོ་མེད།

47. In chapter III, Dignāga says that an Inference for the

Comparison and Verbal
Testimony rejected

sake of others consists in making explicit a matter which was inferred by one's own self ¹ In chapter IV, he re-

jects Comparison as a separate source of knowledge. He says that when we recognise a thing through Perception of a similar thing, we really perform an act of Perception. Hence Comparison or Recognition of Similarity is not a separate source of knowledge, but is included in Perception. In chapter V, he rejects "Credible Word" or "Verbal Testimony" as a separate source of knowledge. He asks "what is the significance of a Credible Word?" Does it mean that the person who spoke the word is credible or the fact he averred is credible? "It the person," continues Dignāga, "is credible, it is a mere infer-

དེ་ལྟར་ལ་ནི་བྱ་བ་པ་ཐོས་།

བརྗོད་མིན་དོན་གྱིས་གཟུང་བར་འགྱུར་།

འདི་ལ་དགའ་དང་འབྲེལ་མ་ཡིན་།

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter II).

The Sanskrit originals of these lines are as follows:—

केचिद् धर्माकारं मेव लिङ्गस्यावधारितः ।

संबन्धं केचिदिच्छन्ति सिद्धत्वावधारयिष्यते ॥

लिङ्गं धर्मो प्रसिद्धं चेत् किमन्यत् तेन भोज्यते ।

अथ धर्माणि तस्यैव किमर्थं जानयेयता ॥

संबन्धेऽपि द्वयं नास्ति वस्तु भूयते तद्वति ।

अवाच्योऽमुष्मन्मोक्षलाभवाचो लिङ्गमंगतः ॥

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter II).

The Hindu logician Vācaspati Miśra has quoted and criticised these lines in the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-tīkā, 1-1-6

¹ Dignāga writes:—

གནས་གྱི་དོན་གྱི་རྗེས་དཔག་ནི་།

དང་གིས་མཐོང་དོན་གསལ་བྱེད་ཡིན་།

དེ་ལ་དཔག་བྱ་བ་ལྟན་པ་ནི་།

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, chapter III).

² Vide a very interesting discussion on it in the Nyāya-vārtika, 1-1-6, where the Hindu logician Udyotakara defends the Nyāya-sūtra and the Nyāya-bhāṣya from the attacks of Dignāga.

ence. On the other hand if the fact is credible, it is a case of Perception." Hence Dignāga concludes that Credible Word or Verbal Testimony is not a separate source of knowledge, but is included in Perception and Inference.¹

DIGNĀGA'S Nyāya-praveśa

48. The **Nyāya-praveśa**² or rather "Nyāya-praveśo-nāma pramāṇa-prakaraṇa" is another excellent work on Logic by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original is lost. There exists a Tibetan translation of it which extends over folios 183-188 of the Tangyur, section Mdo, volume Cc. The translation was prepared by the great Kāśmīrian Pandita Sarvajña-śrī Rakṣita and the Sākya monk Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan-dpal-b'ran, in the great Sa-skya monastery of Western Tibet. The work in Tibetan is called 'Tshad-ma-rigs-par-hjug-pahi-sgo' signifying the "Door of Entrance to Logic." It opens thus —

"Demonstration and refutation together with their fallacies are useful in arguing with others, and Perception and Inference together with their fallacies are useful for self-understanding; seeing these I compile this *Sāstra*."³

Parts of a Syllogism + 49. Some of the subjects discussed in the work are noticed below —

¹ Vide Uḷiyotakara's rejoinder in the Nyāya-vārtika 1-1-7.

² I consulted the Nyāya-praveśa from the volume Cc of the Tibetan Tangyur which was placed at my disposal by the India Office, London. I have also brought a copy of the Nyāya-praveśa from the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim which I visited in May 1907. This is probably the same as "Nyāya-dvāra-śāstra." Vide Takakusu's I-tsing, p. 186 and Bunyū Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Nos. 1223 and 1224. Cf. Dr. Sugiura's "Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan," pp. 36, 60, where Śaṅkara Svāmī's Nyāya-prāśaṅga-tarka-śāstra is noticed.

ཐུབ་བ་དང་ནི་སྤྲོད་ཀྱིན་ཉིད།
 ལྡན་སྣང་བཅས་པ་གཞན་དྲོགས་ཀྱིར།
 མངོན་སྤྲོད་དང་ནི་ཇེས་སྤྲོད་པལ།
 ལྡན་སྣང་བཅས་པ་བདག་རིག་ཀྱིར།
 ཇེས་པ་བསྟན་བཅོས་བསྐྱུས་བཞེ།

(Nyāya-praveśa).

+ In Tibetan: Rigs-pahi-yan-lag (རིགས་པའི་ཡན་ལག) and in Sanskrit: Nyāyāvayava (न्यायवयव)।

Reasoning, according to the Nyāya-praveśa, is carried on by means of a minor term, a major term, a middle term and two examples. The minor term is also called the subject (in Sanskrit: *pakṣa* or *dharmin*, and in Tibetan *phyogs* or *chos-can*). The major term is otherwise called the predicate (in Sanskrit: *sādhya* or *dharma*, in Tibetan: *ḥsgrub-par-bya* or *chos*). The middle term is also called the reason or mark (in Sanskrit: *hetu*, *liṅga* or *sādhana*, in Tibetan: *gtan-tshig* or *ḥsgrub-par-byed*). The example (called in Sanskrit: *dṛṣṭānta*, in Tibetan: *dpe-brjod*) is of two kinds, viz (1) homogeneous (in Sanskrit: *sādharmya*, in Tibetan: *chos-mthun-pa*) and (2) heterogeneous (in Sanskrit: *vaidharmya* in Tibetan: *chos-mi-mthun-pa*)

Form of a Syllogism 50 The form of reasoning is as follows —

- (1) This hill is fiery.
- (2) Because it has smoke,
- (3) All that has smoke is fiery like a kitchen and whatever is not fiery has no smoke like a lake.

Here 'hill' is the minor term, 'fiery' the major term, 'smoke' the middle term, 'kitchen' a homogeneous example and 'lake' a heterogeneous example

Thesis 51. A minor term and a major term linked together constitute a proposition, e.g.

The *hill* (minor term) is *fiery* (major term).

A proposition which is offered for proof is a Thesis

52. There are certain types of thesis which cannot stand the test of proof and are therefore fallacious.

The following theses are fallacious —

(1) A thesis incompatible with perception, such as: "sound is inaudible."

(2) A thesis incompatible with inference, such as: "A pot is eternal."

(Really "A pot is non-eternal because it is a product.")

(3) A thesis incompatible with the public opinion, such as "Man's head is pure, because it is the limb of an animate being." (Or money is an abominable thing. I or some men like me may say "money is an abominable thing," but the world does not say so)

1 In Tibetan: *phyogs-ltar-man* (ཉལ་མ་ལྟར་མཁའ་) . in Sanskrit *pak-
sābhāsa* (पक्षभाष) ।

(4) A thesis incompatible with one's own belief or doctrine, such as : A Vaiśeṣika philosopher saying " sound is eternal "

(5) A thesis incompatible with one's own statement such as : " My mother is barren "

(6) A thesis with an unfamiliar minor term, such as : The Buddhist speaking to the Sāṃkhya, " Sound is perishable." (Sound is a subject well known to the Mīmāṃsaka, but not to the Sāṃkhya)

(7) A thesis with an unfamiliar major term, such as . The Sāṃkhya speaking to the Buddhist, " The soul is animate "

(8) A thesis with both the terms unfamiliar, such as The Vaiśeṣika speaking to the Buddhist. " The soul has feelings as pleasurable etc."

(The Buddhist neither deals with the soul nor with its feelings)

(9) A thesis universally accepted, such as " Fire is warm " (This thesis cannot be offered for proof as it is accepted by all.

Three Characteristics of 53 The Middle Term (Hetu) must possess three characteristics, viz. —

(1) The whole of the minor term (pakṣa) must be connected with the middle term, *e g.*

Sound is non-eternal,

Because it is a product,

Like a pot but unlike ether

In this reasoning "product" which is the middle term includes the whole of " sound " which is the minor term.

(2) All things denoted by the middle term must be homogeneous with things denoted by the major term, *e g.*

All things produced are non-eternal as a pot

(3) None of the things heterogeneous from the major term must be a thing denoted by the middle term, *e g.*

No non-non-eternal (that is, no eternal) thing is a product, as ether

54. If we suppose the minor term or subject to be 'S,' the middle term or reason to be 'R,' and the major term or predicate to be 'P,' then the above-mentioned three characteristics of the middle term may be symbolically set forth as follows :—

(1) All S is R

(2) All R is P.

(3) No R is non-P

¹ Called in Tibetan གྲླེང་མཁོ་ལྟན་པའི་རྒྱུ་ (གཤམ་ཆོག་མཁོ་ལྟན་པའི་རྒྱུ་

གཤམ་ཆོག) and in Sanskrit: Lūgasya trarūpyam (लिङ्गस्य त्रारूप्यम्) ।

Now, the negative aspect of the middle term, viz., no R is non-P only confirms the truth conveyed by one of the positive aspects, viz., all R is P. Hence we may put aside the negative aspect, and exhibit the positive aspects as follows —

- (1) All S is R.
- (2) All R is P.

Again, in the above instance 'R' and 'P' may be taken in their whole extent or partially. So the two positive aspects mentioned above may be fully exhibited as follows —

- (1) (a) All S is all R.
(b) All S is some R
- (2) (a) All R is all P
(b) All R is some P

Combining aspect (1) and aspect (2) together we find that a syllogism may be of any one of the following forms —

- (1) All S is all P (conclusion):
Because All S is all R,
All R is all P.
- (2) All S is some P (conclusion)
Because All S is all R,
All R is some P
- (3) All S is some P (conclusion)
Because All S is some R,
All R is all P.
- (4) All S is some P (conclusion)
Because All S is some R,
All R is some P

Hence we find that Dignāga admits only two conclusions — viz.

- All S is all P, and
- All S is some P

55. The second and third of the characteristics mentioned above indicate the relative extension of the middle term and major term. They show that the middle term is universally or inseparably connected with the major term. This universal or inseparable connection between them is called in Sanskrit *Vyāpti* and in Tibetan *Khyab* which was, as far as I find, first discovered by Dignāga.

Supposing that the middle term or reason is R, and the major term or predicate is P, the connection between the two terms may be symbolically set forth as follows. —

- (1) All R is all P, and
- (2) All R is some P

56. Owing to the violation of one or more of the three characteristics, there occur Fallacies of the Middle Term.¹ the Middle Term which may be of fourteen kinds as follows :—

A The *unproved* (Sanskrit *Asiddha*, Tibetan . *Ma-grub*) which occurs

(1) When the lack of truth of the middle term is recognised by both the parties, *e g*

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is *visible*

(Neither of the parties admits that sound is visible)

(2) When the lack of truth of the middle term is recognised by one party only, *e g*

Sound is evolved,
Because it is a *product*

(The Mīmāṃsakas do not admit that sound is a product)

(3) When the truth of the middle term is questioned, *e g*

The hill is fiery.
Because there is *vapour*

(Vapour may or may not be an effect of fire and may or may not be connected with it otherwise)

(4) When it is questioned whether the minor term is predicable of the middle term, *e g*

Ether is a substance,
Because it has qualities.

(It is questioned whether ether has qualities)

B The *uncertain* (Sanskrit *Aniśita*, Tibetan . *Ma-neṣ-pa*) which occurs

(5) When the middle term is too general, abiding equally in the major term as well as in the opposite of it *e g*.

Sound is eternal,
Because it is *knowable*

(The 'knowable' is too general because it abides in the eternal as well as the non-eternal. This is a fallacy of being too general, called in Sanskrit *Sādhārana* and in Tibetan *Thun-mon*).

(6) When the middle term is not general enough, abiding neither in the major term nor in its opposite, *e.g.*

¹ In Tibetan . *Gtan-tehugs-ltar-nyan* (གནཏེ་མཁས་ལྟར་སྣང་) and in

Sanskrit *Hetvābhāsa* (हेतुभाष) ।

Sound is eternal,
Because it is audible

10 (This is a fallacy of being not general enough, called in Sanskrit : *Asādhāraṇa*, and in Tibetan : Thun-moñ-ma-yin).

10(7) When the middle term abides in some of the things homogeneous with, and in all things heterogeneous from, the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is not a product of effort,
Because it is *non-eternal*.

(The non-eternal abides in some of the things which are not products of effort, such as lightning, and abides in all things which are not non-products of effort).

(8) When the middle term abides in some of the things heterogeneous from, and in all things homogeneous with, the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is a product of effort,
Because it is non-eternal

(The non-eternal abides in some of the things which are not products of effort, as lightning, and abides in all things which are products of effort).

(9) When the middle term abides, in some of the things homogeneous with and in some heterogeneous from, the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal.

(Some incorporeal things are eternal as ether, but others are not as intelligence).

(10) When there is a non-erroneous contradiction, that is, when a thesis and its contradictory are both supported by what appear to be valid reasons, *e.g.*

The Vaiśeṣika speaking to the Mīmāṃsaka :

“ Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product. ”

The Mīmāṃsaka speaking to the Vaiśeṣika

“ Sound is eternal,
Because it is always audible ”

(Both of the reasonings are correct, but as they lead to contradictory conclusions they are classed as *uncertain*).

O. The contradictory (Sanskrit : *Viruddha*, Tibetan : *Hgal-wa*) which occurs :

- (11) When the middle term is contradictory to the major term,
e.g.

Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product

(Product is inconsistent with eternal).

- (12) When the middle term is contradictory to the implied major term, e.g.

The eyes, etc., are serviceable to some being.
Because they are made of particles,
Like a bed, seat, etc.¹

(Here the major term "serviceable to some being" is ambiguous, for, the apparent meaning of 'some being' is 'the body,' but the implied meaning of it is 'the soul.' Though things 'made of particles' are serviceable to the body, they are not, according to the Sāṃkhya, serviceable to the soul which is attributeless. Hence there is contradiction between the middle term and the implied major term)

- (13) When the middle term is inconsistent with the minor term, e.g.

Sāmānya (generality) is neither substance, quality, nor action,

Because it depends upon one substance and possesses quality and action

(*Sāmānya* or generality does not depend upon one substance, etc.)

- (14) When the middle term is inconsistent with the implied minor term, e.g.

Objects are stimuli of action,

Because they are apprehended by the senses.

("Objects" is ambiguous meaning (1) things and (2) purposes. The middle term is inconsistent with the minor term in the second meaning)

Dignāga's theory of examples. Examples converted to universal proposition.

57. An example before the time of Dignāga served as a mere familiar case which was cited to help the understanding of the listener, e.g.

The hill is fiery,
Because it has smoke,
Like a kitchen (example).

Asaṅga (q.v.) made the example more serviceable to reasoning, but Dignāga converted it into a universal proposition, that

¹ This example may lead us to presume that the author of Nyāya-praveśa knew Iśvara Kṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya-kārikā which is the oldest of the works on Sāṃkhya philosophy that have come down to us.

is a proposition¹ expressive of the universal or inseparable connection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

The hill is fiery ,
Because it has smoke ,
All that has smoke is fiery as a kitchen (homogeneous example).

The above example is homogeneous. A heterogeneous example is thus given —

Whatever is not fiery has no smoke as a lake.

58. Examples have already been stated to be of two kinds, *viz.*, 1. Homogeneous and 2. Heterogeneous. Each of these kinds becomes fallacious under certain circumstances. Fallacies of the homogeneous example are the following. —

(1) An example not homogeneous with the middle term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal
That which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms

(The atoms cannot serve as an example because they are not incorporeal. This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Middle Term)

(2) An example not homogeneous with the major term *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
That which is incorporeal is eternal as intelligence

(Intelligence cannot serve as an example because it is not eternal. This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Major Term).

(3) An example homogeneous with neither the middle term nor the major term, *e.g.*

¹ The universal proposition, that is, the proposition expressive of the universal relation between the middle term and the major term, serves as the major premise in a syllogism of the celebrated Greek logician Aristotle. It was long unknown in India. Dignāga's discovery of the universal proposition marks a new era in the history of Indian Logic and shows a great development of the principle of induction first apprehended by Asaṅga in India.

² Called in Tibetan *Chos-gthun-dpe-ltar-snan-wa* (ཆོས་སྤྱན་དཔེ་

ལྟར་སྤྱད་བྱེད་) and in Sanskrit. *Sādharmya-dṛṣṭāntābhāṣa* (साधर्म्य-
दृष्टान्ताभाष) :

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
That which is incorporeal is eternal, as a pot.

(The pot cannot serve as an example because it is neither incorporeal nor eternal. This is called a fallacy of the Excluded Middle and Major Terms)

(4) A homogeneous example showing a lack of universal connection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

This person is passionate,
Because he is a speaker,
Whoever is a speaker is passionate, as a certain man in Magadha

(Though a certain man in Magadha may be both speaker and passionate there is nevertheless no universal connection between being a speaker and being passionate. This is a fallacy of Absence of Connection called in Sanskrit *Ananvaya*, in Tibetan : *Rjes-su-hgro-wa-med*.)

(5) A homogeneous example showing an inverse connection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product of effort,
Whatever is non-eternal is a product of effort, as a pot

(The pot cannot serve as an example because though it is both non-eternal and a product of effort, the connection between the major term and the middle term has been inverted, *i.e.*, all products of effort are non-eternal, but all non-eternals are not products of effort. This is a fallacy of Inverse Connection called in Sanskrit *Viparītānvaya*, in Tibetan *Rjes-su-hgro-wa-phyun-ci-log-pa*.)

Fallacy of the heterogeneous example¹ 59. Fallacies of the heterogeneous example are the following —

(6) An example not heterogeneous from the opposite of the middle term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as intelligence

¹ Called in Tibetan . *Ches-mi-mthun-dpe-ltar-snan-wa* (ཇོས་མི་མཐུན་

དཔེ་ལྟར་སྒྲུབ་བ) and in Sanskrit : *Vaidharmya-dr̥stāntābhāsa* (वैधर्म्य-
दृष्टान्ताभास) ।

(Intelligence is non-eternal, yet incorporeal This is a fallacy of Included Middle Term in a heterogeneous example).

(7) An example not heterogeneous from the opposite of the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as atoms.

(The atoms are not incorporeal yet they are eternal This is a fallacy of Included Major Term in a heterogeneous example).

(8) An example heterogeneous from neither the opposite of the middle term nor the opposite of the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Whatever is non-eternal is not incorporeal, as a pot.

(A pot is neither eternal nor incorporeal. This is called a fallacy of Included Middle and Major Terms in a heterogeneous example).

(9) A heterogeneous example showing an absence of disconnection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

This person is passionate,
Because he is a speaker,
Whoever is non-passionate is not a speaker, as a piece of stone.

(This is called a fallacy of Absence of Disconnection of a heterogeneous example)

(10) A heterogeneous example showing an absence of inverse disconnection between the middle term and the major term, *e.g.*

Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Whatever is non-product is not non-eternal, as ether.

The example should be inverted as :

Whatever is non-non-eternal, *i.e.*, eternal, is not a product, as ether. This is called a fallacy of Inverted Negation of a heterogeneous example.

60. All the three kinds of fallacies—of the Thesis, Middle Term and Example—are fallacies of reasoning Refutation (called in Sanskrit *Dūṣaṇa* and in Tibetan: *Sun-ḥbyin*) consists in finding out in the reasoning of the opponent any one of the fallacies aforementioned. Fallacy of Refutation (called in

Sanskrit: *Dūṣaṇābhāsa* and in Tibetan: *Sun-hbyin-ltar-ṣnan-wa*) consists in alleging a fallacy where there is no fallacy at all.

61. Perception and Inference are the two kinds of valid knowledge for one's own self. Perception (called in Sanskrit: *Pratyakṣa*, and in Tibetan: *Mnon-sum*) is knowledge derived through the senses. It is free from illusory experiences and is not connected with name, genus, etc. Inference (called in Sanskrit: *Anumāna* and in Tibetan: *Rjes-su-lpag*) is the knowledge of objects derived through a mark (Tibetan: *Rtags*) or middle term which has three characteristics. There are Fallacies of Perception as well as of Inference (called respectively *Pratyakṣābhāsa* and *Anumānābhāsa* in Sanskrit, and *Mnon-sum-ltar-ṣnan* and *Rjes-su-lpag-ltar-ṣnan* in Tibetan).

DIGNĀGA'S Hetu-cakra-hamaru.

62. The *Hetu-cakra-hamaru*¹ is another small treatise on Logic by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original is lost, but a Tibetan translation is preserved in the *Tangyur*, section *Mdo*, folios 193-194. The Tibetan translation was prepared by the sage *Bodhisattva* of *Za-hor* and the *Bhikṣu Dharmāśoka*. The work in Tibetan is called *Gtan-tshug-kyi-lykhor-lo-gtan-la-dwab-pa*, signifying "the Wheel of Reasons put in order." It begins thus —

"Bowling down to the Omniscient One (Buddha), who has destroyed the net of errors I explain the system of three characteristics of the Reason (or Middle Term)."²

In this work Dignāga has analysed all nine possible relations between the middle and the major terms and has found that there

¹ I brought a copy of the Tibetan version of the *Hetu-cakra-hamaru* from the monastery of *Labrang* in *Sikkim* which I visited in June 1907. This work is probably the same as the *Hetu-dvāra-āstra*: vide *Takakusu's I-tsing*, p. 187.

² འབྲུག་པའི་དྲ་བ་འཛོམས་མཛད་པའི།

ཐབས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་ལ་བྱུག་འཛམ་མས།

གདན་ཚིགས་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཁོ་བོ་ཡི།

གདན་ལ་དབབ་བ་བཤད་བར་བྱ།

(*Hetu-chakra-hamaru*).

are among them two relations which conform to the three characteristics of the middle term already laid down, and the remaining seven relations are at variance with those characteristics. Accordingly he has concluded that only two relations are valid as will be evident from the annexed diagram

OTHER WORKS OF DIGNĀGA.

Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti.

65. The **Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti** is a commentary on the **Pramāṇa-samuccaya** by Dignāga himself. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ which extends over folios 13—96 of the Tangyur, section **Mdo**, volume **Ce**. The Tibetan translation was prepared, at the command of king **Rigs-ldan-rgyal-po**, by the famous Indian sage **Vasudhara Rakṣita**, who was as it were the crest-gem of logicians, and the Tibetan interpreter **Sha-ma-dge-bḥñen-sin-igyal**. In Tibetan it is called **Tshad-ma-kun-las-bṭus-paḥ-hgrel-wa**. It is divided into six chapters corresponding to those of the **Pramāṇa-samuccaya** itself. At the end of the work it is stated that “led on by the command of **Mañjunātha** (the god of learning), **Dignāga** the great dialectician of sharp intellect wrote this **sāstra** which is as deep as the ocean.”

66. There is another translation of the **Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti** in Tibetan extending over folios 96—180 of the Tangyur, section **Mdo**, volume **Ce**. It was prepared by the Indian sage **Hema Varma** (called in Tibetan **ḡser-gyi-go-cha**) and the Tibetan interpreter **Dad-pa-ḡez-rab** in the monastery of **Si-wah-dge-gnas**.

Pramāṇa-sāstra-praveśa.

67. **Pramāṇa-sāstra-praveśa**² is another work by Dignāga. It was translated into Chinese by the Chinese interpreter **Tha-sam-tsan**. The Chinese version was translated into Tibetan by the Chinese scholar **Dge-ḡes-sin-gyan** and the Tibetan monk **Ston-gshon** in the **Saṅkya** monastery of Western Tibet. The Sanskrit original of the work appears to be lost, but the Tibetan version still exists. It consists of folios 188—193 of the Tangyur, section **Mdo**, volume **Ce**. In Tibetan the work is called **Tshad-maḥi-bṭan-bcoḡ-rig-pa-la-hjug-pa** signifying “An Entrance to the Science of Logic.”

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work in the possession of the India Office, London.

² I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work in the possession of the India Office, London.

Ālambana-parīkṣā

68. The *Ālambana-parīkṣā*¹ is another work by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation which consists of one folio only (folio 180) of the Tangyur, section *Mdo*, volume *Ce*. The work in Tibetan is called *Dmigs-pa-brtag-pa* signifying "An Examination of the Objects of Thought". It begins with an invocation to Buddha and all Bodhisattvas.

Ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti.

69. The *Ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti*² is a commentary on the *Ālambana-parīkṣā* by Dignāga himself. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan version which is embodied in the Tangyur, section *Mdo*, volume *Ce*, folios 180—182. The work in Tibetan is called *Dmigs-pa-brtag-pa-h-grel*.

Trikāla-parīkṣā.

70. The *Trikāla-parīkṣā*³ is a work by Dignāga. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan version in the Tangyur, section *Mdo*, volume *Ce*, folios 182—183. This version was prepared by the great Paṇḍita Śāntakara Gupta and the interpreter-monk Tshul-hkhrims-gyal-mtshan. The work in Tibetan is called *Dus-gsum-brtag-pa* signifying "An Examination of Three Times".

ŚĀṆKARA SVĀMIN (ABOUT 550 A.D.).

71. Śāṅkara Svāmin,⁴ as it appears from Chinese records, was a pupil of Dignāga. He seems to have been a native of Southern India. Logic is said to have been handed down by Dignāga through Śāṅkara Svāmin and ten other masters to Śīlabhadra, who was the head of the Nālandā University, and the favourite teacher of the Chinese pilgrim Hwen-thsang in

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work as contained in the India Office, London. This is probably the same as "*Ālambana-pratya ya dhyāna śāstra*": vide Bunyiu Nanpo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, No. 1173, and Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. 188.

² I have consulted the xylograph of this work as contained in the India Office, London.

³ I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work as contained in the India Office, London. This work is probably the same that is called by Takakusu "*The Śāstra on the Meditation of the Three Worlds*", vide Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. 187. The "worlds" is evidently a mistake for "times".

⁴ Vide Dr. Suga's *Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan*, pp. 36, 37.

635 A.D. According to the Chinese Tripitaka Śāṅkara Svāmīn was the author of a work called *Nyāya-praveśa Tarka-sāstra*,¹ which was translated into Chinese by Hwen-thsang in 647 A.D. This work seems to be different² from the “*Nyāya-praveśa*” or more fully the “*Nyāya-praveśo nāma pramāṇa-prakaraṇa*” which, as we have seen, is ascribed by the Tibetans to Dignāga.

DHARMAPĀLA (ABOUT 600—635 A.D.)

72. Dharmapāla,³ a logician, was a native of Kāñcīpura in Drāvida (modern Conjeeveram in Madras). He was the eldest son of a great minister of the country. From his childhood he exhibited much cleverness, and as he was a young man the king and queen of the country condescended to entertain him at a feast. In the evening of that day his heart was oppressed with sorrow and assuming the robes of a Buddhist recluse he left home and applied himself with unflagging earnestness to learning. He was admitted into the University at Nālandā (*vide* Appendix A) in which he acquired great distinction. Subsequently he became the head of the University. He must have retired from Nālandā before 635 A.D., when Hwen-thsang visited it, and found that Śīlabhadra had succeeded him in the headship of the University. Dharmapāla conjointly with Bhartṛhari composed a *Bedā vṛtti* on Pāṇini's grammar.

73. He was a follower of the Yogācāra philosophy and was the author of several works such as (1) *Ālambana-pratyaya-dhyāna-sāstra-vyākhyā*, (2) *Vidvātmāna-siddhi-sāstra-vyākhyā*; and (3) *Sata-sāstra-vaipulya-vyākhyā* which was translated into Chinese in 650 A.D. Hwen-thsang, who visited India in 629 A.D., found in Kauśāmbī the ruins of a monastery where Dharmapāla had refuted the arguments of the heretics.

ĀCĀRYA ŚĪLABHADRA (635 A.D.)

74. Śīlabhadra⁴ belonged to the family of the king of Samatāṭa (Bengal), and was of the Brāhmaṇa caste. He was a pupil

¹ *Vide* Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, no. 1216, and Appendix I, No. 13.

² The Tibetans do not know Śāṅkara Svāmīn at all. The Chinese pilgrim I-tsing, who visited India during 671—695, speaks of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, but does not mention Śāṅkara Svāmīn. Even Hwen-thsang in his *Travel* does not mention him.

³ *Vide* Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. 1, p. 237, vol. 11, pp. 110—223, 229 and 230. *Vide* also Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. lvi, and Bunyiu Nanjo's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, Appendix I, No. 16.

⁴ *Vide* Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. 11, p. 110, and Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. 181.

of Dharmapāla at the Nālandā University (*vide* Appendix A) of which subsequently he became the head. The Chinese pilgrim Hwen-thsang was his pupil¹ in 635 A D. Śīlabhadra was a great logician and master of Śāstras.

ĀCĀRYA DHARMAKĪRTI (ABOUT 635—650 A.D.).

75. The excellent Dharmakīrti,² called in Tibetan Chog-grags, according to the accounts of all earlier sages, was born in the south in the kingdom of Cūdāmanī.³ Since, however, there is now no country by that name, and since on the other hand all the orthodox and heterodox alike name Trimalaya as the birth-place of Dharmakīrti, it is to be accepted that in olden times Trimalaya was called the kingdom of Cūdāmanī. His father was a Tirtha of the Brāhmana caste, Parivṛājaka Koru-nanda by name. Endowed from childhood up with a very keen intellect he attained to great skill in the fine arts, in the Vedas and Vedāṅgas, in the art of healing, in grammar, and in all the theories of the Tirthas. When only sixteen or eighteen years old, he was already deeply versed in the philosophy of the Tirthas. Occasionally he attended lectures of the Buddhists, and realised that the teachings of Buddha were without faults. There grew up in him a strong inclination towards Buddhism. He donned the dress of a Buddhist Upāsaka (devotee). When the Brāhmanas inquired the reason of this he praised the excellence of Buddhism for which he was out-casted. Thereupon he came to Madhyadeśa⁴ (Magadha), was received into the Saṅgha (priesthood) by Ācārya Dharmapāla, attained to great learning in the three Pitakas, and knew in all 500 sūtras and dhāraṇīs by heart.

76. Dharmakīrti desiring to become acquainted with the

¹ *Vide* Takakusu's I-tsing, p. xlv.

² This account is taken from Lama Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 175—185.

³ Cūdāmanī is probably the same as Coda or Chola country in the Eastern Deccan. As a fact Dharmakīrti was born in the Deccan. *Vide* article 82 under *Pramāṇa-vārtika kārīkā*.

⁴ In Tibetan literature *Madhya-deśa* signifies Magadha (Behar). But Manu defines *Madhya-deśa* as the country lying between the Himalayas on the north, the Vindhya mountains on the south, Prayāga in the east, and the river Sarasvatī on the west.

द्विसप्तद्विंशत्यनर्थं यत् प्राज्ञं विनश्यदादि ।

प्रत्यगेव प्रयामाच्च मध्यदेशः प्रकीर्तितः ॥

(*Manusamhitā* 2. 21).

In this connection *vide* a very learned article named "Note on the Middle Country of Ancient India" by Rhys Davids in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, January 1904.

secret doctrine of the Tirtha system, donned a slave-attire and went southward. On inquiring who was versed in the Tirtha system, he was informed that the Brāhmana Kumārila was an incomparable master of the same. The assertion that Kumārila was an uncle of Dharmakīrti is unsupported by Indian authority. Kumārila had received a large fortune from his king, owned many rice-fields, five hundred male slaves and five hundred female slaves and many hundred men. When Dharmakīrti after entering their service performed the work of fifty slaves indoors and outdoors, Kumārila and his wife were satisfied. They allowed him to hear the secret doctrines. Obtaining knowledge of the secret teaching from Kumārila, he left his house. With the wages which he received from Kumārila for his special services he gave a great feast to the Brāhmanas in the night of his departure.

77 Thereupon he challenged the followers of the system of Kanāda named Kanāda Gupta and other followers of the Tirtha system and entered upon debates with them. The debates lasted for three months, during which he withstood all his opponents and converted many of them to Buddhism. Upon this Kumārila was enraged and appeared with 500 Brāhmanas for debate. He proposed the condition that whoever was defeated should be killed. Dharmakīrti who did not desire the death of Kumārila induced the latter to enter upon the condition that whoever was defeated should accept the doctrine of the winner. Putting *Dharma* (doctrine) up as the prize they began the debate, and finally Dharmakīrti was victorious. Kumārila and his 500 followers became followers of Buddha.

78 Dharmakīrti further withstood the Nugranthas (Jamas), Rāhuvratin and others, who lived within the range of the Vindhya mountains. Returning to Dravah (Drāvida?) he challenged by criers those who were ready for debate. The majority of the Tirthas fled, and some actually confessed that they were not equal to the fight. Here established all the religious schools that had fallen into decay in that country, and lived in the loneliness of the forest given up to meditation.

79 Dharmakīrti towards the end of his life erected a vihāra in the land of Kaṅga, and after having converted many people to the Law (*Dharma*) passed away. Those of his pupils, who by their lives had become like Brahma, carried him to the cemetery for cremation. Then there fell a heavy rain of flowers, and for seven days the whole country was filled with fragrance and music.

80. This Ācārya (Dharmakīrti) and the Tibetan king Sroṅ-tsan-gam po are said to have been contemporaries, which statement might be accepted as authoritative.

81. From this account it is evident that Dharmakīrti was a pupil of Dharmapāla. As the latter lived in 635 A.D., Dharmakīrti must also have lived about that time. This date agrees well with the statement that Dharmakīrti was a contemporary of the Tibetan king Sron-tsan-gam-po who lived during 627—698 A.D.¹ It seems that in 635 A.D., Dharmakīrti was very young as Hwen-thsang does not mention him. On the other hand I-tsing, who travelled over India during 671—695 A.D., declares eloquently how “Dharmakīrti made further improvement in Logic”² after Dignāga. The Brāhmanic logician Udyotakara³ is attacked by Dharmakīrti. The Mīmāṃsaka Sureśvarācārya,⁴ author of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika*, and the Digambara Jaina Vidyānanda, author of the *Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā*,⁵ have on the contrary criticised the definition of perception (*Pratyakṣa*) as given by Dharmakīrti, who is some times designated by the shorter name Kīrti. Vācaspati Miśra⁶ too quotes Dharmakīrti to criticise him.

Pramāna-vārtika-kārikā.

82. Dharmakīrti is the author of numerous works on Logic. The *Pramāna-vārtika-kārikā* is one of them. A verse⁷ of this work was quoted by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in

¹ Vide Wassilief, p. 54, and Csoma de Koros's Tibetan Grammar, p. 183.

² Takakusa's I-tsing, p. lviu.

³ Vide K. B. Pathak's "Bhartṛhari and Kumārila," *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1892, vol. xviii, p. 229.

⁴ Cf. चिन्तेव लविनाभावादिनि यदर्थकोर्तिना ।

प्रत्यक्षाय प्रतिज्ञेय हीयेतासी न संशयः ॥

(Suresvara's *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika*, chap. vi.)

⁵ Vide *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. xix, 1896—97, p. 56.

⁶ Cf. यथाह यर्थकोर्तिः—

तस्मादर्थो न च ज्ञाने स्वाभासस्तदात्मनः ।

यस्य प्रतिबिम्बादुक्तव्यपि न संशयः ॥

(Vācaspati's *Bhāmātī* on *Vedānta-sūtra* 2-2-28)

⁷ The verse runs thus —

भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैः हृद्यतेन्द्राविवाहये ॥

(*Pramāna-vārtika-kārikā* quoted in Mādhavācārya's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, chapter on *Bauddha darśana*).

the 14th century A.D. The following story¹ is told regarding the composition of this work :—

It is said that Dharmakīrti studied many dialectic śāstras, but his spirit was not satisfied. Once at the house of one Īśvara Sena,² a pupil of Dignāga, he heard the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. Having heard it for the first time he at once became as proficient as Īśvara Sena who had minutely studied the work. When he heard it the second time, he became like Dignāga, the author of the work, and when he heard it the third time, he recognised several errors in the work. When he mentioned them to Īśvara Sena, the latter so far from being displeased, told him that he was at liberty to condemn all the mistakes of the work and to prepare a critical commentary on it. With the permission thus received he composed a metrical commentary on the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* called the *Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā*.

83 The Sanskrit original of the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ of it in the Tangyur, section Mdo, volume Cc, folios 194—258. This translation was prepared by the Indian sage Subhūti-kṛi-śānti and the Tibetan interpreter Dge-wah-blo-gros. The work in Tibetan is called Tshad-ma-rnam-igrel-gyi-tshig signifying "Memorial Verses explanatory of *Pramāṇa* or Sources of Knowledge." The work is divided into four chapters as follows :—(1) Inference for one's own self (in Tibetan *Rau-gi-don-lyes-su-dpag-pa*, in Sanskrit *Svārthanumāna*), (2) Establishment of *Pramāṇa* (in Tibetan *Tshad-ma-grub-pa*, in Sanskrit *Pramāṇa-siddhi*); (3) Perception (in Tibetan *Mon-sum*, in Sanskrit *Pratyakṣa*), and (4) Words for the sake of others (in Tibetan *Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-tshig*, in Sanskrit *Parārtha-vākya*). The work concludes by stating that "it was written by the great sage Śrī Dharmakīrti."

The Tibetan version of the verse runs as follows :—

ནམ་ཤེས་འབྱུང་བས་རྒྱ་བ་གཉིས་॥
མེད་པར་བྱ་དང་མཐོང་བ་བཞིན་॥

(*Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā* embodied in the Tangyur, Mdo, Cc, folio 239. Vide Louis de la Vallee Poussin's *Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques*, p. 34).

¹ Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 176.

² It seems that Īśvara Sena, in whose house Dharmakīrti heard the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, was not a direct pupil of Dignāga, for, while Dignāga lived about 500 A.D., Dharmakīrti lived about 635 A.D.

³ I have consulted the copy of this work embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office. London.

who was unrivalled and whose fame filled the entire earth.”¹ It is further stated that he was born in the Deccan (in Tibetan : Yul-lho-phyog).

Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti.

84. There was a sub-commentary on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika-kārikā* called *Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti* by Dharmakīrti himself. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost. There exists, however, a Tibetan translation² of it in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 421—535. In Tibetan the work is named Tsha-l-ma-rnam-hgrel-gv-hgrel-wa. In the concluding lines of the work Dharmakīrti is described as “a great teacher and dialectician, whose fame filled all quarters of the earth and who was, as it were, a lion, pressing down the head of elephant-like debaters.”³

Pramāṇa-viniścaya.

85. *Pramāṇa viniścaya* quoted⁴ by Mādhavācārya is another work on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original

‘སྒྲུབ་པ་ནི་གྲགས་པས་སའི་སྤྱང་མ་ལུས་པ་བྱུང་བ། འགྲན་ཆོས་པ་
པའི་མཁས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་དཔལ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པས་མཛད་པ་རྟོགས་སོ།།

(*Pramāṇa-vārtika kārikā*)

² I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London

“རིགས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་སའི་སྤྱང་མ་ལུས་པ་ན་སྒྲུབ་པའི་སྤྱང་པོ་ཆེན་སྤྱི་
པོ་གཞོན་པར་མཛད་པའི་སངས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པས་ལས་སྒྲུབ་པར་གྲགས་
པ་ཆན་དཔལ་སྤྱོད་དཔོན་ཆོས་གྲགས་སྤྱར་བ།

(*Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti*).

⁴ The following verses of *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* were quoted in the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, chapter on *Bauddha darśana*, by the Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in the 14th century A.D. —

नान्योऽनुभावा बुद्ध्याश्च तथा नानुभवोऽपरः ।
साक्षादाश्चर्यैर्भूयात् स्वयं येन प्रकाशते ॥ (क)
उद्योपलब्धनिवमाद् अभेदो नीलतद्विधोः ॥ (ख)
अविभातोऽपि बुद्ध्याद्या विपर्ययितद्वयैः ।
साक्षादाश्चर्यैर्विनिर्भेदवानिव ज्ञायते ॥ (ग)

(*Pramāṇa-viniścaya*, chap. I).

of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ of it in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 259—347. The translation was prepared by the Kāśmīrian Pandita Parahita Bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter Blo-lan-*ses-rab* in the matchless city of Kāśmīra. The work in Tibetan is called *Tshad-ma-rnan-par-nes-pa* signifying "Determination of *Pramāna* or Sources of Knowledge." The work is divided into three chapters as follows—(1) System of Perception (in Tibetan *Mnon-sum-gtan-la-dwab-pa*, in Sanskrit *Pratyakṣa-vyavasthā*); (2) Inference for one's own self (in Tibetan *Ran-gi-don-gvi-rjes-su-dpag-pa*, in Sanskrit *Svārthānumāna*); and (3) Inference for the sake of others (in Tibetan *Gshan-gyi-don-gvi-rjes-su-dpag-pa* in Sanskrit *Parārthānumāna*). In the concluding lines *Dharmakīrti* is described as a great sage of unrivalled fame born in Southern India.

Prof. Louis de la Vallée Poussin in his "Le Bouddhisme d'après les sources brahmaniques" pp. 32 and 34 identifies the above verses with their Tibetan versions as follows—

གློ་ཡིས་མཁས་སྤོང་བྱ་གཞན་པེད།
 དེ་ཡི་སྤོང་བ་གཞན་ཡིད་མིན།
 གཞུང་དང་འཛིན་པ་པེད་པའི་བྱིར།
 དེ་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་རང་ཉིད་བསལ། (༧)
 ལྟན་ཅིག་དམིགས་པ་ངེས་པའི་བྱིར།
 གློ་དང་དེ་གློ་གཞན་མ་ཡིན། (༨)
 གློ་བདག་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེར་མེད་ཀྱང་།
 མཐོང་བ་བྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་རྣམས་ཀྱིས།
 གཞུང་བ་འཛིན་པ་རིག་པ་རྣམས།
 ཐམས་ཅད་དང་བཅས་བཞིན་དོགས་འབྱུར། (༩)

(*Pramāna-viṃśaya*, chap. I, embodied in the Tibetan Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 272, 274 and 273 respectively)

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of this work embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London.

Nyāya-bindu.

86. **Nyāya-bindu** is another excellent work on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work was discovered among the palm leaf manuscripts preserved in the Jaina temple of Sāntinātha, Cambay, and has been published in the Bibliotheca Indica series of Calcutta by Professor Peterson. There exists a Tibetan translation¹ of the work in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 347—355. The work in Tibetan is called *Rigs-paḥi-thugs-pa* signifying "A Drop of Logic." It is divided into three chapters as follows: (1) Perception (in Tibetan: *Mnon-sum*, in Sanskrit *Pratyakṣa*), (2) Inference for one's own self (in Tibetan: *Bdag-gi-don-gyi-rjes-su-ḍpag-pa*, in Sanskrit *Svārthānumāna*), and (3) Inference for the sake of others (in Tibetan: *Gshan-gyi-don-rjes-su-ḍpag-pa*, in Sanskrit *Parārthānumāna*). Some of the subjects discussed in the work are noted below —

87. In chapter I, it is stated that all objects of man are accomplished by perfect or valid knowledge. Valid knowledge is of two kinds: (1) Perception (in Sanskrit *Pratyakṣa*) and (2) Inference (in Sanskrit *Anumāna*). Perception which is knowledge derived through the senses, etc., is described as that which is free from illusory experiences (*kalpanā*) and devoid of confusion (*abhrānta*). Illusory experiences are the experiences of false images which appear real as if they were capable of being addressed and touched, e.g., the shadow of a tree may appear as the tree itself or a rope may appear as a snake. Confusion is engendered by such causes as darkness, quick motion, journey by boat, shaking, etc., for instance, to a man journeying by boat, trees on both banks appear to move. Perception is of four kinds: (1) perception by the five senses; (2) perception by the mind; (3) self-consciousness, and (4) knowledge of a contemplative saint. An object of perception is like itself (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) while an object of inference is like any one of its class (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), for instance, a cow which I see is a peculiar one possessing an infinite number of qualities which distinguish it from all cows, whereas a cow which I infer is a general one possessing certain qualities in common with other cows; that is, perception is individual knowledge while inference is general knowledge. According to the proximity or remoteness of an object, perception of it varies. This is the peculiar characteristic of an object of perception, and this characteristic proves the object to be absolutely real (*paramārtha-sat*), as it

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan xylograph of the *Nyāya-bindu* embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London, as also the excellent edition of F. J. Sher-batski.

shows that it possesses some practical efficiency, and this characteristic also shows that perception is a source of valid knowledge for it exactly corresponds to the object perceived.

88 In chapter II, Inference for one's own self (Svārthānumāna) is defined as the knowledge of the inferrible derived through the reason or middle term with its three forms or characteristics. In the instance 'this hill has fire, because it has smoke,' the knowledge of the hill as having fire is derived through smoke which is the reason or middle term. The three forms or characteristics of the reason or middle term are the following —

(1) The middle term must be connected with the minor term, *e.g.*

The hill has fire,
Because it has smoke,
Like a kitchen but unlike a lake

In this reasoning there must be 'smoke' on the 'hill.'

(2) The middle term must abide only in cases which are homogeneous with the major term, *e.g.* in the above reasoning 'smoke' abides in a kitchen which is homogeneous with things that contain fire.

(3) The middle term must never abide in cases which are heterogeneous from the major term, *e.g.* in the above reasoning 'smoke' does not abide in a lake which is heterogeneous from things that contain fire.

89. The middle term is of three kinds according to the relation which it bears to the major term, thus —

(1) Identity (in Tibetan *Ran-bshin*, in Sanskrit *Svabhāva*), *e.g.*

This is a tree,
Because it is śūśāpā.

(2) Effect (in Tibetan *Hbras-bu*, in Sanskrit *Kārya*), *e.g.*
Here there is fire, because there is smoke.

(3) Non-perception (in Tibetan: *Mi-dmigs-pa*, in Sanskrit *Anupalabdhi*), which is of 11 kinds as follows —

i. Non-perception of identity (*Svabhāvānupalabdhi*), *e.g.*
Here is no smoke, because it is not perceived (though smoke is of a nature as to be perceived if existent).

ii. Non-perception of effect (*Kāryānupalabdhi*), *e.g.*
Here there are no causes of smoke of unobstructed capacity, because there is no smoke here.

iii. Non-perception of the pervader or container (Vyāpakānupalabdhi), *e.g.*

Here there is no Śimśapā, because there is no tree at all.

iv. Perception contrary to identity (Svabhāva-viruddhopalabdhi), *e.g.*

There is no cold sensation here because there is fire.

v. Perception of the opposite effect (Viruddha-kāryopalabdhi), *e.g.*

Here there is no cold sensation because there is smoke.

vi. Perception of contrary connection (Viruddha-vyāptopalabdhi), *e.g.*

Even the destruction of the past entity is not certain, because it is dependent on other causes.

vii. Perception contrary to the effect (Kārya-viruddhopalabdhi), *e.g.*

Here there are no causes of cold of unobstructed capacity, because there is fire.

viii. Perception contrary to the container (vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi), *e.g.*

Here there is no icy sensation, because there is fire.

ix. Non-perception of the cause (Kāraṇānupalabdhi), *e.g.*

There is no smoke, because there is no fire.

x. Perception contrary to the cause (Kāraṇa-viruddhopalabdhi), *e.g.*

Hair on his body does not stand erect, because he sits near a fire.

xi. Perception of effect contrary to its cause (Kāraṇa-viruddha-kāryopalabdhi), *e.g.*

This place does not contain any person on whose body hair stands erect, because there is smoke here.

90. In chapter III Inference for the sake of others (Parārthānumāna) is defined as the

Inference for the sake of others. declaration of the three-formed middle term in words, that is, when the reason is set forth in words with a view to producing a conviction in others, it is said to be an inference for the sake of others.

Inference is a kind of knowledge; and words are here called inference by the attributing of effect to cause, for, though they

are not themselves knowledge, they produce it. Inference for the sake of others is of two kinds (1) direct or homogeneous (in Sanskrit *Sādharmyavat*), and (2) indirect or heterogeneous (in Sanskrit *Vaidharmyavat*), as follows —

(a) Sound is non-eternal,

Because it is a product,

All products are non-eternal as a pot (direct).

(b) Sound is non-eternal,

Because it is a product,

No non-non-eternal *i.e.* eternal (thing) is a product as ether (indirect).

91. The minor term (*Pakṣa*) is that to which the relation of the major term is to be proved, as—This hill has fire, because it has smoke. In this reasoning ‘hill’ is the minor term which is to be proved as having ‘fire’ which is the major term. A minor term and its corresponding major term combined together, constitute a proposition which, when offered for proof, is called a thesis.

Fallacies of thesis or *Pakṣābhāsa* 92. There are four fallacies of the thesis (*Pakṣābhāsa*)

A thesis is fallacious if it is incompatible with—

(1) Perception, *e.g.* Sound is inaudible,

(2) Inference, *e.g.* Sound is eternal,

(3) Conception, *e.g.* The moon is not *luna* (*Sāśi a-candra*);
or (4) One's own statement, *e.g.* Inference is not a source of knowledge

93. It has already been stated that the middle term must possess three characteristics. Fallacies of the middle term (*Hetvābhāsa*) occur even if one of the characteristics is unproved, uncertain or contradictory, thus—

A. Unproved (*asiddha*)

(1) Sound is eternal, because it is visible

(Visibility of sound is admitted by neither party).

(2) Trees are conscious, because they die if their barks are taken off

(This peculiar kind of death of trees is not admitted by the opponent)

(3) The hill has fire, because it has vapour

(Vapour as an effect of fire is questioned)

(4) The soul is all-pervading, because it is perceived everywhere

(It is a matter of doubt whether the soul is perceived everywhere)

B. Uncertain (*anaikāntika*).

(5) Sound is non-eternal
Because it is knowable

(The knowable is too general, because it includes the eternal as well as the non-eternal)

(6) A certain man is omniscient,
Because he is a speaker

(The reason is not general enough, for speakers are not necessarily either omniscient or non-omniscient)

C. Contradictory (*viruddha*)

(7) Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product

(Here 'product' is not homogeneous with 'eternal,' that is, the middle term is opposed to the major term)

(8) Sound is eternal,
Because it is a product

(Here 'product' is not heterogeneous from 'non-eternal').

94 The opposition of the middle term to the major term is a kind of contradiction which is admitted by both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Opposition of the middle term to the implied major term (in the event of the major term being ambiguous) is noted by Dignāga in his *Nvāya-praveśa*¹ as another kind of contradiction (*Viruddha*). Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* rejects this view saying that this second contradiction is included in the first kind². Dignāga has in his *Nyāya-praveśa* treated another kind of fallacy called "non-

¹ Vide *Nyāya-praveśa*, Fallacies of the Middle Term, No. 12. This contradiction, *viz.*, the opposition of the middle term to the implied major term (*रहविधानकद्वय विषय*) is called in Tibetan. རྩོམ་ཅན་གྱི་ཐུང་

ཤར་རྩིན་ཅི་ཡོན་དུ་བསྐྱུབ་པར་བྱིད་པ། (*Nyāya-praveśa*)

² तत्र च द्वितीयोऽपि रहविधानकद्वय विषयः । ... य एव कलाज्ञोक्तः अलघोरेव अलघावात् । (*Nyāya-bindu*, Peterson's edition, *Bibliotheca Indica series*, chapter III, p. 113)

अथ च विषय आचार्य दिङ्नामेन उक्तः । य कलादु वार्तिककारेण सप्तमया शीलः । (*Nyāyabindu-tikā*, Peterson's edition, *Bibliotheca Indica series*, chapter III, p. 78)

erroneous contradiction”¹ (Viruddhāvyabhicāri), which it rejected by Dharmakīrti in his Nyāyabindu, on the ground that it does not arise in the case of inference, but is based on the scriptures of the two parties engaged in disputation.

95. In opposition to Dignāga, Dharmakīrti maintains that ‘example’ is not a part of a syllogism,² as it is included in the middle term, *e.g.*

The hill is fiery,
Because it is smoky,
Like a kitchen.

In this reasoning the term ‘smoky’ includes a ‘kitchen’ as well as other similar things, hence it is almost unnecessary to cite the example ‘kitchen’

Compare K. B. Pathak’s “On the authorship of the Nyāyabindu” in the *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. XIX, p. 51.

¹ *Vide* Nyāya-praveśa, Fallacies of the Middle Term, No. 10. This fallacy of ‘non-erroneous contradiction’ is called in Sanskrit विवक्षा-
बन्धितौ and in Tibetan. འགལ་བ་ལ་མི་འབྲུག་པ་ (Nyāya-praveśa)

विवक्षाबन्धितौपि संभवहेतुवत्तः । स ह ह कक्षाबन्धितः अनुमानविषये
अवयवत् । (Nyāyabindu, p. 115)

ननु आचार्यैश्च विवक्षाबन्धितौपि संभवहेतुवत्तः । स तर्हि आचार्यै-
श्चिन्तयेत् अथ हेतुदोष उक्तः इत्याह । ... तस्मादात्मनापचयमनुमानमाश्रित्य विवक्षा-
बन्धितौपि । (Nyāyabindu-tīkā, p. 84)

Compare also B B R A S, vol. XIX, p. 49

² विवक्षो हेतुवत्तः । तावतीव अर्थप्रतीतिरिति न प्रथम् इष्टान्तो नाम साधना-
वयवः कश्चित् । तेनाह्य कथं प्रथम् [न] अन्तरे मतार्थत्वात् ।

(Nyāyabindu, Peterson’s edition, Bibliotheca Indica series, pp. 115—116). Peterson has omitted न wrongly as will appear from the Tibetan version which runs as follows —

གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་སྟེ་ས་པ་དེ་ཙམ་གྱིས་དོན་དོགས་པས།
དཔེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྐྱབ་པ་དེ་ཡན་ལག་ནི་ལོགས་ཤིག་ཏུ་ཅི་ཡང་མེད་དོ།
དེས་ན་དེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ལོགས་ཤིག་ཏུ་མ་བཟོད་དེ་དོན་གོ་བའི་ཕྱིར། ॥ १२१ ॥

(Nyāyabindu, Sherbatski’s edition, St. Petersburg, p. 193)

Nevertheless, says Dharmakīrti,¹ the example has this much value that it points out in a particular way what has been expressed in a general form by the middle term : thus, the general expression "all smoky things are fiery" is made more impressive by the particular example 'kitchen' which is smoky as well as fiery.

96. Example is of two kinds (1) homogeneous and (2) heterogeneous. Fallacies of the homogeneous example occur as follows :--

- (1) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like action.

(Action cannot serve as an example, because it is not eternal, that is, because it is excluded from the major term).

- (2) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like atoms.

(Atoms cannot serve as an example, because they are not incorporeal, that is, because they are excluded from the middle term)

- (3) Sound is eternal,
Because it is incorporeal,
Like a pot

(Pot cannot serve as an example, because it is neither eternal nor incorporeal, that is, because it is excluded from both major and middle terms).

- (4) This man is passionate,
Because he is a speaker,
Like a person in the street.

(The person in the street cannot serve as an example, as it is questionable whether he is passionate, that is, it involves doubt as to the validity of the major term).

- (5) This man is mortal,
Because he is passionate,
Like a person in the street

(This example involves doubt as to the validity of the middle term, that is, it is questionable whether the person in the street is passionate).

.....उत्तरम् अमेदिन,.....

प्रमर्शयेत् दम्भोपाधुक् । (Nyāyabindu, p 116).

- (6) This man is non-omniscient,
Because he is passionate,
Like a person in the street.

(This example involves doubt as to the validity of both the major and middle terms, that is, it is questionable whether the person in the street is passionate and non-omniscient).

- (7) This man is passionate,
Because he is a speaker,
Like a certain person.

(This example is unconnected (*ananyaya*), for there is no inseparable connection between being 'passionate' and being a 'speaker')

- (8) Sound is non-eternal,
Because it is a product,
Like a pot.

(This example involves the fallacy of 'connection unshown,' *apradarśitānyaya* the connection should be shown as follows: All products are non-eternal like a pot)

- (9) Sound is a product,
Because it is non-eternal,
All non-eternal things are products like a pot

(The example involves the fallacy of inverted connection, *viparīṭānyaya*, the real connection should be shown as follows: All products are non-eternal like a pot)

97. Similarly there are nine fallacies of the heterogeneous example

98. *Refutation (Dūṣaṇa)* consists in pointing out in the reasoning of an opponent any one of the fallacies mentioned above. The fallacies or semblances of refutation are the futilities called in Sanskrit *Jāti*.¹

99. In the concluding lines of the *Nyāyabindu* it is stated that "Dharmakīrti vanquished the entire Tīrthikas as Śākya-muni had subdued the large army of Māra; and as the sun dispels darkness, the *Nyāyabindu* has exterminated the Ātmaka theory (that is, the Tīrthika doctrine)—wonderful!"²

¹ For *Jāti* vide *Nyāya-sūtra*, Book I, aphorism 58.

² ཤྲཱུ་ཐུབ་པས་བདེན་གྱི་མྱོ་བོ་ཆེ།
རྩོམ་གྱི་གྲགས་པས་བྱ་ཐྱེགས་མ་ལུས་པ།

Hetu-bindu-vivarāṇa.

100. The **Hetu-bindu-vivarāṇa** is another excellent work on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the Tangyur, *Mdo*, Ce, folios 355—375. The work in Tibetan is called *Gtan-tshugs-kyi-thugs-pa* signifying "A Drop of Reason". The work is divided into three chapters as follows:—

(1) Relation of identity between the middle term and the major term (in Tibetan: *Rao-b'kun-gyi-gtan-tshugs*, in Sanskrit: *Svabhāva-hetu*); (2) Relation of effect and cause between the middle term and the major term (in Tibetan: *Hbras-buḥi-gtan-tshigs*, in Sanskrit: *Kārya-hetu*); and (3) Relation of negation between the middle term and the heterogeneous major term (in Tibetan: *Mi-dmigs-paḥi-gtan-tshigs*, in Sanskrit: *Anupalabdhi-hetu*).

Tarka nyāya or Vāda-nyāya.

101. The **Tarka nyāya** or **Vāda-nyāya** is another treatise on Logic by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, *Mdo*, Ce, folios 384—416. The work in Tibetan is called *Rtso l-paḥi-ngs-pa* signifying the "Method of Discussion." The Tibetan translation was prepared by the great Indian sage *Jñāna-sri-bhadra* and the Tibetan interpreter-monk *Dge-waḥi-blo-gros*. Subsequently the translation was retouched by the great Pandita *Dipaṅkara* (of *Vikramanīpura* in Bengal, born in 980 A.D.) and the interpreter-monk *Dar-ma-gags*.

Santānāntara-siddhi.

102. The **Santānāntara-siddhi** is a philosophical treatise by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan version² in the Tangyur, *Mdo*, Ce, folios

ཉི་མས་སྒྲུབ་ཅུ་མ་རིགས་པ་ནི་ཐེགས་པ་ཡིས།།

བདག་གི་ལྷ་བ་དུངས་ལུང་མཚན་ཉིད།།

(Nyāyabindu)

¹ I have consulted the copy embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London.

² I have consulted the work embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London.

³ I have consulted the Tibetan version embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London.

416—420. The work in Tibetan is called *Rgyud-gshan-grub-pa* signifying “Proof of the Continuity of Succession.”

Sambandha-parikṣā

103. The *Sambandha-parikṣā* is another philosophical treatise by Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 375—377. The work in Tibetan is called *Hbrel-wa-brtag-pa* signifying “Examination of Connection.” The Tibetan translation was prepared by the Indian teacher Jñānagarbha and the interpreter Vande-nam-mkhas.

Sambandha-parikṣā-vṛtti.

104. The *Sambandha-parikṣā-vṛtti*² is a commentary on the *Sambandha-parikṣā* by Dharmakīrti himself. The Sanskrit original of the work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 377—384. The work in Tibetan is called *Hbrel-wa-brtag-paḥi hḡrel-wa*.

DEVENDRABODHI (ABOUT 650 A.D.).

105. Devendrabodhi, called in Tibetan *Lha-dwan-blo*, was a contemporary of Dharmakīrti,³ and so lived about 650 A.D. He wrote the following work on Logic:—

106. The *Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā*, called in Tibetan, *Tshad-ma-rnam-hḡrel-gyi-dkaḥ-hḡrel*, signifying “An Explanation of Difficulties in the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of Dharmakīrti.” The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁴ in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ce, folios 1—380. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Subhūti-śrī and the Tibetan interpreter-monk *Dge-waḥi-blo-gros*.

107. This story⁵ is told regarding the composition of the *Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā*:—

Dharmakīrti chose Devendrabodhi to write a commentary on his *Pramāṇa-vārtika*. After Devendrabodhi had finished the

¹ I have consulted the copy embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London.

² I have consulted the copy of this work embodied in the Tangyur of the India Office, London.

³ Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 186—187.

⁴ I have consulted the work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim in 1907.

⁵ Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 186—187.

commentary for the time and shown it to Dharmakīrti, the latter erased it with water. After he had compiled it a second time, Dharmakīrti burnt it in fire. He then compiled it a third time and gave it to Dharmakīrti with the observation: "Since the majority of men are incompetent and time is fleeting, I have written this commentary for the people of lighter understanding." This time Dharmakīrti allowed the work to exist.

SĀKYABODHI (ABOUT 675 A.D.).

108. Sākyabodhi¹ is stated to have been a pupil of Devendrabodhi. He seems to have lived about 675 A.D. He was the author of the following work:—

109. The *Pramāṇa-vārtika* (-pañjikā)-tikā, called in Tibetan. *Tshad-ma-rnam-hgrel-gyi-hgrel-bśad*, which is an annotation on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika-pañjikā* of Devendrabodhi. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation² which covers volumes Je and Ne of the *Tangyur*, Mdo. The translation was prepared by the interpreter *Dge-waḥ-blo gros*.

VINĪTA DEVA (ABOUT 700 A.D.).

110. Vinīta Deva,³ called in Tibetan *Dul-lha*, lived in Nālanda during the time of king Lalita Candra, son of Govi Candra, and Dharmakīrti died during the time of Govi Candra. Vimala Candra, the father of Govi Candra, was married to the sister of Bhartṛhari, who sprang from the ancient royal family of Malwa. Supposing this Bhartṛhari to be identical with the famous grammarian of that name who died in 651—652 A.D.,⁴ we may place his contemporary Govi Candra in the middle of the 7th century A.D. This is exactly the time when Dharmakīrti died. Hence we may conclude that Lalita Candra, son of Govi Candra, flourished towards the end of the 7th century A.D. Vinīta Deva, contemporary of Lalita Candra, must also have lived about this time, a view which harmonises with the date of Dharmakīrti on whose works Vinīta Deva wrote commentaries.

Vinīta Deva, who was the famous author of the *Samayabhedoparacana-cakra*, wrote the following works on Logic:—

¹ Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, p. 187.

² I have consulted this work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim in 1907.

³ Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, pp. 195—198, 272; *Pag-sam-jon-zang* edited by Sarat Chandra Das, pp. xlviii, 108.

⁴ Vide Takakusu's *I-tsing*, p. lvii.

111. **Nyāya-bindu-tikā**, called in Tibetan : **Rigs-paḥi-thigs-pa-rgya-cher-hgrel-wa**, which is a detailed commentary on the **Nyāyabindu** of **Dharmakīrti**. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but a Tibetan translation¹ of it exists in the **Tangyur**, **Mdo**, **She**, folios 1—43. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage **Jina Mitra** and the interpreter of **Shu-chen** named **Vande-ye-ḥes sde**.

112. **Hetu-bindu-tikā**, called in Tibetan **Gtan-tshigs-kyi-thigs-pa-rgya-cher-hgrel-wa**, which is a detailed commentary on the **Hetu-bindu** of **Dharmakīrti**. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation² in the **Tangyur**, **Mdo**, **She**, folios 116—205. The translation was prepared by the Indian teacher **Prajñā Varma** and the interpreter-monk of **Shu-chen** named **Dpal-bītsegs-rakṣita**.

113. **Vāda-nyāya-vyākhyā**, called in Tibetan **Rtsod-paḥi-rigs-paḥi-hgrel-wa**, which is a commentary on the **Vāda-nyāya** (otherwise called **Tarka-nyāya**) of **Dharmakīrti**. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ in the **Tangyur**, **Mdo**, **Ze**, folios 39—65. The work opens thus :—“Who is self-perfected in sweet logical discussion, supreme in patience, affection, charity and self-restraint, and who is the most excellent of logicians—to him (Buddha) bowing down I compose a commentary on the text of **Vāda-nyāya**”

114. **Sambandha-parīkṣā-tikā**, called in Tibetan **Hbrel-pa-brtag-paḥi-rgya-cher-bḥad-pa**, which is a copious commentary on the **Sambandhaparīkṣā** of **Dharmakīrti**. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost but there exists a Tibetan translation⁴ in the **Tangyur**, **Mdo**, **Ze**, folios 1—24. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage **Jñāna-garbha** and the Tibetan interpreter **Vande-nam-mkhas**. The work opens thus :—

“Who is entirely unconnected with the world, and is yet designated as the supreme teacher of it—to him bowing down fully I explain the **Sambandha-parīkṣā**”

115. **Ālambana-parīkṣā-tikā**, called in Tibetan **Dmigs-pa-brtag-paḥi-hgrel-bḥad**, is an annotation on the **Ālambana-parīkṣā** of **Dignāga**. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁵ in the

¹ This work was brought down to Calcutta by the British Mission to Tibet during 1904. I examined it by permission of the Government of India. It is now deposited in the British Museum, London.

² I examined this work by permission of the Government of India when it was brought down to Calcutta by the British Mission to Tibet, 1904.

³ I have consulted the India Office copy.

⁴ I have consulted the India Office copy.

⁵ I have consulted the India Office copy.

Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, folios 186—200. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Sākya-simha and the interpreter Vande-dpal-brtsegs of Shu-chen. The work opens thus:—

“Meditating on the merciful Omniscient One, and saluting him by my head, I compose the Ālambana-parikṣā-tikā”

It ends thus —

“Here is finished the Ālambana-parikṣā-tikā, which is a clean work of the teacher Vinīta Deva who weighed all sorts of ālambana (objects of thought), and is a lion of speakers confounding the brains of the Tirthuka-elephants.”

116. **Santānāntara-siddhi-tikā**, called in Tibetan: Rgyud-gshan-grub-pahi-bgral-b'ad, being a commentary on the Santānāntara-siddhi of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the Tangyur, Mdo, Tshe, folios 1—21. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Viśuddha-simha and the interpreter of Shu-chen named Dpal-brtsegs-rakṣita

CANDRA GOMIN (ABOUT 700 A D.).

117. Candra Gomin,² called in Tibetan Zla-wa-dga-byñen, was born in a Ksatriya family in the east at Vārendra (modern Rajshahye in Bengal). He was endowed with a very keen intellect and acquired distinction in literature, grammar, logic, astronomy, music, fine arts and the science of medicine. Under Ācārya Sthiramati he learnt the Sūtra and Abhidharma Pitakas of the Buddhist scripture, and was converted to Buddhism by the Vidyādhara Ācārya Aśoka.³ He had an ardent faith in the Buddhist god Avalokiteśvara and the goddess Tārā.⁴ He was offered in marriage a daughter of the king of Nālendra. Being told that she was named Tārā, which was the name of his tutelary deity, he thinking it improper to accept her hands shrank from her with fear. Upon this the king of Vārendra became angry and put Candra Gomin into a chest which was thrown into the Ganges. The chest was carried down until it stopped at an island at the place where the Ganges flows into the ocean. Candra Gomin with deep reverence offered a prayer to goddess Tārā by whose blessing he got out of the chest. He

¹ I have consulted the India Office xylograph of the Tibetan version.

² Vide Tārānātha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, pp 145—146, 148—158, and Pag-sam-jon-zang edited in the original Tibetan by Sarat Chandra Das, Calcutta, pp 95-96

³ Ācārya Aśoka was the author of a logical treatise called **Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dīkprakāśikā** a short treatise on the refutation of generality, lately recovered from Nepal.

⁴ For Candra Gomin's "Ārya-Tārā-antarbhāvi-vidhi" vide Satishchandra Vidyabhusana's Sragdharā-stotra Introduction, pp xx, xxi

resided in the island which was in course of time named Candra-dvīpa¹ or the island of Candra. He as a Buddhist devotee (*upāsaka*) established there stone-images of Avalokiteśvara and Tārā. At first only fishermen settled in the island, but afterwards other people came to live there. Gradually the island became a town.

118. Candra Gomin thereupon went to Ceylon and on his way back found in Southern India in the house of Vararuci, Nāga-Sesa's (Patañjali's) Bhāṣya on Pāṇini's grammar. Finding that it contained "many words but few thoughts," he himself composed a commentary on Pāṇini, which was named Candra-vyākaraṇa.² Afterwards he came to Nālandā—the store-house of knowledge—and met there Candra-kīrti, the famous commentator on the Mādhyamika Philosophy of Ārya Nāgārjuna. Candra Gomin himself was a follower of the Yogācāra system expounded by Ārya Asaṅga. While Candra Kīrti and Candra Gomin entered upon philosophical discussions people used to observe³: "Alas! the text of Ārya Nāgārjuna is medicine to some but poison to others, whereas the text of invincible Ārya Asaṅga is very ambrosia to all men." It is further stated that into a well at Nālandā Candra Gomin threw the original manuscript of his grammar, thinking that it was not better than the one which Candra Kīrti had written. At that time Tārā and Avalokiteśvara appeared before him saying. "Though Candra Kīrti is overwhelmed with pride as a sage, your work is more useful than all others and will do immense good to the world." They raised the manuscript from the well, which was

¹ Candra dvīpa is situated in the district of Barisal in South-eastern Bengal at a place where the Padmā, which is a main outlet of the Ganges, falls into the ocean. Vārendra in which Candra Gomin was born is identical with the Rajshahye division in North-eastern Bengal through which the Padmā flows.

² For Candra vyākaraṇa vide Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Sanskrit works on Literature, Grammar, Rhetoric and Lexicography," as preserved in Tibet," in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, new series, Vol. III, No. 2, 1907. The Candra-vyākaraṇa in the original Sanskrit has been printed in Germany.

³ ཀྱི་མ་འཕགས་པ་ཁྱུ་ཕྱེད་གཞུང་།

ལ་ལའི་སྒྲན་ལ་ལ་ལའི་དུག།

མི་ཕམ་འཕགས་པ་གྲོགས་མེད་གཞུང་།

སྒྲེ་བོ་ཀུན་ལ་བདུད་ཅི་ཅིང་། (Pag-sam-jon-zang, p. 96).

thence reputed as "Candra's well" (in Sanskrit : Candra-kūpa and in Tibetan : Tsandrahi-khron-pa), the water of which was wont to be drunk by people in the belief that thereby their intellect would become sharp. Candra Kīrti was, however, a great admirer of Candra Gomin. When the latter arrived at Nālandā the monks refused to give him a reception, saying that it was not proper for priests to welcome a mere devotee (*upāsaka*). Hearing this Candra Kīrti brought three chariots, two of which were occupied by himself and Candra Gomin respectively, while in the third was placed an image of Mañjuśrī, the Buddhist god of learning. The chariots passed through the town in a great procession attended by the whole body of priests who came really to recite hymns to Mañjuśrī, but apparently to accord a fitting welcome to Candra Gomin.¹

119. Candra Gomin lived at a time when Śīla, son of Harṣa, reigned. During this time king Śiṃha of the Licchavi dynasty reigned in Vārendra. The famous poet Ravi Gupta was a contemporary of Bharṣa, son of Śiṃha. Śrī Harṣa seems to be the same as king Harṣa Vardhana who was a contemporary of Hwen-thsang and reigned in 647 A.D. His son Śīla seems, on a rough calculation, to have reigned in 700 A.D., when his contemporary Candra Gomin must also have lived. Jaina Hema Candra Sūri who lived during 1088—1172 A.D., refers to Candra Gomin while Jayāditya,² the famous author of the *Kāśikā vṛtti*, who died in 661—662 A.D.,³ does not mention him. This may be explained on the supposition that Candra Gomin lived after Jayāditya, but preceded Hema Candra.

120. Candra Gomin was the author of the following work on Logic : *Nyāyāloka-siddhi*, called in Tibetan. *Riḡs-pa-grub-paḡi-sgron-ma*, signifying "a lamp of logical reasoning". The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁴ in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, folios 200—201. The translation was prepared by Pandita Śrī Sita-prabha and the interpreter-monk Vairocana.

RAVI GUPTA (ABOUT 725 A.D.).

121. Ravi Gupta,⁵ called in Tibetan. *Ñi-ma-sbag*, was born in Kāśmīra. He was a great poet, dialectician and Tāntric

¹ Vide *Pag sam-jon-zang*, pp. 95-96

² Vide Professor F. Kielhorn's "Indra Gomin and other grammarians" in the *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. xv, June 1886, pp. 181, 184

³ Vide Takakusu's *I-tsang*, p. lvi

⁴ I have used the India Office copy

⁵ Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 146, 147, 243; and *Pag sam-jon-zang*, part 1, pp. 90, 101, 118, xxxvii.

teacher, who established 12 great religious schools in his native country and Magadha. He was a contemporary of king Bhārṣa of Vārendra, and flourished a little later than Candra Gomin, who had lived during the time of Bhārṣa's father Śiṃha. Ravi Gupta must have lived in the first quarter of the eighth century A.D., for his disciple the famous Tāntric monk Sarvajña Mitra¹ lived in the middle of that century. Ravi Gupta was the author² of the following work on Logic.—

122. *Pramāṇa-vārtika-vṛtti*, called in Tibetan: *Tshad-ma-nam-hgrel-gyi-hgrel-pa*, which is an annotation on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ in the Tangyur, *Mdo*, *Tshe*, folios 132-252.

JINENDRABODHI (ABOUT 725 A.D.).

123. In the Tangyur, *Mdo*, *Re*, there is the Tibetan version of a work called *Viśālāmala-vatī-nāma-pramāṇa-samuccaya-ṭīkā*. This version was prepared by the Tibetan interpreter *Ṛdo-rje-rgyal-mtshan* with the assistance of *Dpal-ldan-blo-gros*.

124. The author of the original work was Jinendrabodhi, called in Tibetan *Rgyal-ldan-blo-gros*, who was a venerable countryman of the Bodhisattva (*Dignāga*⁴). He is perhaps the same person who wrote the well-known *Nyāsa* on the grammar of Pāṇini in the eighth century A.D.

SĀNTA RAKṢITA (749 A.D.)

125. *Sānta Rakṣita*,⁵ called in Tibetan *Shi-wa-htsho*, was born in the royal family of *Za-hoi* [in Bengal⁶]. The exact date of his birth is unknown, but it is stated that he was born at the time of *Go Pāla* who reigned up to 705 A.D. (*vide* Appendix B) and died at the time of *Dharma Pāla* who became king in 765 A.D. He followed the Svatantra Mādhyamika school, and was a Professor at Nālandā (*vide* Appendix A). He visited Tibet at the invitation of King *Khri-sron-deu-tsan* who was born in 728 A.D., and died in 864 A.D. The king, with the assistance of *Sānta Rakṣita*, built in 749 A.D. the monastery of *Sam-ye*⁷ in

¹ *Vide* Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's *Sragdharā Stotra*, Introduction, p. xxx, printed in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series of Calcutta.

² For Ravi Gupta's *Ārya-kosa* see Rockhill's *Buddha*, p. 228, and for his works on Tantra, see Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's *Sragdharā Stotra*, Introduction, pp. v-vii.

³ I have consulted the copy of the India Office, London.

⁴ *Vide* *Pag-sam-jon-zang* edited by Sarat Chandra Das, C.I.E., Calcutta, p. 112.

⁵ *Vide* Osoma de Koros's *Tibetan Grammar*, p. 183. Sarat Chandra Das in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1881, Part I, p. 226. and Waddell's *Lamajam*, p. 28.

Tibet, modelled after the Odantapura Vihāra of Magadha. Sam-ye was the first Buddhist monastery in Tibet and Sānta Rakṣita was its first abbot. He worked in Tibet for 13 years, that is, until 762 A.D. He was known there under the name of Ācārya Bodhisattva, and was the author of the following works on Logic:—

126. *Vāda-nyāya-vṛtti-vipaṇcītārtha*, called in Tibetan : *Rtsod-paḥ-rigs-paḥ hbreḥ-pa-don-rnam-par-hbye-l-pa*, an elaborate commentary on the *Vāda-nyāya* of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, folios 65—186, and in the Tangyur, Mdo, Tahe, folios 21—131. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Kumāra-śrī-bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter-monks venerable Seṣ-rah and Hbro-sen-dkar (who was a native of the province of Hbro or Do) in the holy monastery of *Bsam-yaṣ* (Sam-ye). The work opens thus —

“Who constantly dispersing darkness by the ray of the heap of various pure precious qualities, exerted himself for the sake of obtaining the fruits of desire of various sentient beings and rejoiced to do good to the entire world—to that Mañju-śrī bowing down in reverence, I compose this concise and stainless *Vāda-nyāya-vṛtti-vipaṇcītārtha*.”

127. *Tattva-saṃgraha-kārikā*, called in Tibetan : *De-kho-na-ñid-bṣud-s-paḥ-tshig-leḥur-byas-pa*, a work containing memorial verses on a summary of the *Tattvas*. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation² in the Tangyur, Mdo, He, folios 1—146. The translation was prepared by the Indian Pandita Guṇākara-śrī-bhadra (belonging to the religious circle first instituted by the great king Laṭāḍitya in the incomparable city of Kāśmīra) and the great Tibetan interpreter the Śākya monk Lha-bla-ma-shi-wa-ḥod in the province of Guge (S-W. Tibet). The work reviews various systems of philosophy such as the Sāṃkhya, Jaina, etc.³

¹ I have consulted the xylograph of this work contained in the India Office, London.

² I have consulted the work in the monastery of Labrang, Sikkim, which I visited in June 1907. For a detailed account of this work *vide* my “Sāṃkhya Philosophy in the Land of the Lamas” in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, new series, Vol. III, No. 8.

³ The *Tattvasaṃgraha* herein noticed is quite different from the *Tattvasamāsa*, a Brāhmaṇic work on the Sāṃkhya philosophy, a manuscript of which is contained in the library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.

Dr George Buhler, during his explorations of the *Bṛhat-jñāna-koṣa* in the temple of *Parśva-nātha* at Jesalmir, found in 1873 a *Poṭhi*, consisting of 189 ancient palm leaves showing the characters of the 12th or 13th century, and bearing on the outside corner the title *Kamala-śloka-tarka*.

The work is divided into 31 chapters, viz. : (1) examination of nature (in Sanskrit : Svabhāva-parīkṣā, in Tibetan : Rañ-ḥshin-brtag-pa) ; (2) examination of the sense-organs (in Sanskrit : Indriya-parīkṣā, in Tibetan : Dwan-phyug-brtag-pa) ; (3) examination of both (in Sanskrit : Ūbhaya-parīkṣā, in Tibetan : Gñis-ka-brtag-pa) ; (4) examination of the theory that the world is self-existent (in Sanskrit : Jagat-svabhāva-vāda-parīkṣā, in Tibetan : Hgro-wa-ran-ḥshin-du-gmra wa-brtag-pa) ; (5) examination of Brahma, the presiding deity of sound (in Sanskrit : Śabda-Brahma-parīkṣā, in Tibetan : Sgrañi-tshañs-pa-brtag-pa) ; (6) examination of the soul (in Sanskrit : Puruṣa-parīkṣā, in Tibetan : Skyes-bu-brtag-pa) ; (7) examination of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines of the soul (in Sanskrit : Nyāya-vaiśeṣika-parikalpita-puruṣa-parīkṣā, in Tibetan : Rig-pa-can-dan-bye-brag-paḥ-kun-tu-brtag-paḥi-skyes-bu-brtag-pa) ; (8) examination of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit : Mīmāṃsaka-kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, in Tibetan : Spyod-pa-paḥ-brtag-paḥi-bdag-brtag-pa) ; (9) examination of Kapila's doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit : Kapila-parikalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, in Tibetan : Ser-skye-paḥ-kun-tu-brtag-paḥi-bdag-brtag-pa) ; (10) examination of the Digambara Jaina doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit : Digambara-parikalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, in Tibetan : Nam-mkhañi-gos-can-gyis-kun-tu-brtag-paḥi-bdag-brtag-pa) ; (11) examination of the Upaniṣad-doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit : Upaniṣad-kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, in Tibetan :

མཚན་ཉིད་གསལ་དང་ལྡན་པ་ཡི།།

ཚད་ལ་གཉིས་གྱིས་གཏན་ལ་དབབ།།

ཆ་གསལ་ཤིན་དུ་བྱ་བས་ཀྱང་།།

འདིས་པ་གཞན་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་མིན།།

མི་འབྲེ་ཐོག་མཐའ་མེད་པ་ཙན།།

གཟུགས་བརྒྱན་ལ་སོགས་དག་དང་འདྲ།།

སྒྲིམ་པ་ཀུན་གྱི་ཚོགས་དང་བྲལ།།

གཞན་གྱི་དོགས་པ་མཛོད་བཞིད་པ།།

U-pa-ni-sa-di-kaṣ-hṛtagg-paḥi-bdag-hṛtag-pa); (12) examination of the Vātsīputra doctrine of the soul (in Sanskrit: Vātsīputra-kalpita-ātma-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Gnas-maḥi-buṣ-bdag-hṛtag-pa); (13) examination of the permanence of entities (in Sanskrit: Sthira-padārtha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Brtan-paḥi-dnoḡ-po-hṛtag-pa); (14) examination of the relation between *Karma* and its effect (in Sanskrit: Karma-phala-sambandha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Las-dan-hbras-buḥi-hbrel-pa-hṛtag-pa); (15) examination of the meaning of the word 'substance' (in Sanskrit: Dravya-padārtha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Rdsas-kyi-tshig gi-don-hṛtag-pa), (16) examination of the meaning of the word 'quality' (in Sanskrit: Guṇa-śabdārtha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Yon-tan-gyi-tshig-gi-don-hṛtag-pa); (17) examination of the meaning of the word *Karma* (in Sanskrit: Karma-śabdārtha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Las-kyi-tshig gi-don-hṛtag-pa), (18) examination of the meaning of the word generality or genus (in Sanskrit: Sāmānya-śabdārtha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Spyih-tshig-gi-don-hṛtag-pa); (19) examination of the meaning of the words 'generality' and 'particularity' (in Sanskrit: Sāmānya-viśeṣa-śabdārtha-parīkṣā, in Tibetan: Spyi-dan-bye-brag-gi-tshig-gi-don-hṛtag-pa), (20) examination of the meaning of the

བསྐྱེལ་བ་གྲངས་མེད་སྤྱི་ཉུང་བས།

ཐུགས་རྗེ་ཆེན་པོའི་བདག་གྲུང་བ།

དེས་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་བར་འབྲུང་བའི།

གང་གིས་གསུངས་པ་སྣེ་བའི་མཆོག།

ཀུན་མཁྱེན་དེ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཆམ་ནས།

དེ་ཉིད་རྣམས་ནི་བསྟུ་བར་བྱ།

Dr Buhler further observes that the first section of the Tattvasaṅgraha contains རྡོ་མཁའ་པའི་མཁའ་ (examination of God), ཀའི་པའི་མཁའ་པའི་མཁའ་ (examination of Kapila's doctrine of the soul), ལྟོ་པའི་མཁའ་པའི་མཁའ་ (examination of the soul according to the Upani-sads), རྡོ་མཁའ་པའི་མཁའ་ (examination of permanent entity), etc. The last colophon appears to him to be རྡོ་མཁའ་པའི་མཁའ་ (examination of the doctrine of self-evidence). These are the very subjects treated in the Tattvasaṅgraha. So the two works are identical.

word 'co-existent cause' (in Sanskrit *Samavāya-sābdārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Hūu-wahī-tshig-don-brtag-pa*); (21) examination of the meaning of the word 'sound' (in Sanskrit *Sābdārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Sgra-yi-don-brtag-pa*); (22) examination of the definition of perception (in Sanskrit: *Pratyakṣa-lakṣana-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Mnon-sum-gyi-mtshan-ñid-brtag-pa*), (23) examination of inference (in Sanskrit: *Anumānaparīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Rjes-su-dpag-pa-brtag-pa*); (24) examination of other kinds of valid knowledge (in Sanskrit: *Pramāṇāntara-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Tsha-l-ma-shan brtag-pa*); (25) examination of the doctrine of evolution (in Sanskrit: *Vivartavāda-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Hgyur-war-sunra-wa-brtag-pa*) (26) examination of the three times (in Sanskrit *Kāla-traya-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Dus-gsum-brtag-pa*), (27) examination of continuity of the world (in Sanskrit *Samsāra-santati-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Hug-iten-igyu-l-pa-brtag-pa*), (28) examination of external objects (in Sanskrit *Vāhyārtha-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Phyi-tol-gyi-don-brtag-pa*); (29) examination of *Śruti* or *Scripture* (in Sanskrit *Śruti-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan: *Thos-pa-brtag-pa*), (30) examination of self-evidence (in Sanskrit *Śvitat-prāmāṇya-parīkṣā*, in Tibetan *Ran-las-tsha-d-ma-drtag-pa*), and (31) examination of the soul which sees things beyond the range of senses (in Sanskrit *Ayendriyātītārtha-parīkṣā* in Tibetan *Gshan-gyi-dwan-po-las-hdas-pa-lu-don-mthun-wa-can-gyi-skyes-bu-brtag-pa*)

KAMALA ŚĪLA (ABOUT 750 A.D.).

129. Kamala Śīla,¹ also called Kamala Śrīla, was a follower of Śānta Raksita. He was for some time a Professor of Tantras in Nālandā whence he was (*vide* Appendix A) invited to Tibet by king Khri-sron-deu-tsan (728—736 A.D.). While in Tibet he vindicated the religious views of Guru Padma-sambhava and Śānta Raksita by defeating and expelling a Chinese monk named Mahāyāna Hoshang. He was of wide fame and the author of the following works —

130. *Nyāya-bindu pūrva-pakṣe-saṁkṣipta*, called in Tibetan *Rigs-pa-lu-thigs-pa-lu phyogs-sua-ma-mdor-bu-dus-pa*, a summary of criticisms on the *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, She, Folios 106—115. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage

¹ *Vide* *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, part 1, p. 112, edited by Sarat Chandra Das, and also the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta*, vol. i, part 1, p. 10, and Waddell's *Lamaism*, p. 31.

² I have consulted the copy brought down by the British Mission to Tibet in 1904.

Viśuddha Śiṃha and the interpreter monk of Shu-chen named Dpal-rtsegs-raksita.

131. Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjikā, called in Tibetan De-kho-na-ñid-badus-paṅ-ḍkaḥ-grel, a commentary on the Tattva-saṃgraha of Sānta Raksita. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ of part I of this work in the Tangyur, Mdo, He, Fohos 146—400, and part II of it in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ye, Fohos 1—385. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Devendra Bhadra and the interpreter monk Grags-hbyor-se-tab.

KALYĀNA RAKSITA (ABOUT 829 A.D.).

132. Kalyāna Raksita,² called in Tibetan Dge-bśruñ, was a great dialectician and teacher of Dharmottarācārya. He flourished during the reign of Mahārāja Dharmapāla who died in 829 A.D. (*Vide* Appendix B). He was the author of the undermentioned works³ —

133. Vāhyārtha-siddhi-kārikā, called in Tibetan phyi-rol-gyi-don-giub-pa-ceg-bya-waḥ-tshig-lehur, which signifies memorial verses on the reality of external things. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Fohos 202—210. The translation was prepared by the Vaibhāṣika teacher Jina Mitra of Kāśmīra and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Dpal-brtsegs-raksita.

134. Śruti-parīksā, called in Tibetan Thog-pa-bṛtag-paḥ-tshig-lehur-byag-pa, which signifies 'memorial verses on the examination of Śruti or verbal testimony.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Fohos 210—211.

135. Anyāpoha-vicāra-kārikā, called in Tibetan Gshan-la-bṛtag-paḥ-tshig-lehur-byag-pa, which signifies 'memorial verses on the determination of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites.' The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Fohos 211—213.

136. Īśvara-bhaṅga-kārikā, called in Tibetan Dwan-phyug-hjig-paḥ-tshig-lehur-byag-pa, which signifies 'memorial verses

¹ I have consulted this work in the monastery of Labrang, Sikkim, which I visited in June 1907.

² *Vide* Taranatha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 216—219, and *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, p. 114. The particle 'tsun' signifies "protected" and is an equivalent for Sanskrit "Rakṣita." But Schiefner has taken it as an equivalent for "Gupta." This does not seem to be correct, for the Tibetan equivalent for Gupta is "sag."

³ I have consulted Kalyāna Raksita's works in volume Ze of the Tangyur lent to me by the India Office, London.

on the refutation of God'. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, *Mdo, Ze*, Fohos 214—215.

DHARMOTTARĀCĀRYA (ABOUT 847 A.D.).

137. Dharmottara¹ (Ācārya Dharmottara or Dharmottarācārya) called in Tibetan 'chos-mchog, was a pupil of Kalyāna Rakeṣita and of Dharmākara Datta of Kāśmīra. He appears to have flourished in Kāśmīra while Vanapāla was reigning in Bengal about 847 A.D. (*vide* Appendix B), and is mentioned by the Jaina philosopher Mallavādin the author of *Dharmottara-tippanaka* about 932 A.D. and Ratnaprabha Sūri² the famous author of *Syādvāda-ratnāvatārikā* dated 1181 A.D. Dharmottara was the author of the following works —

138. *Nyāya-bindu-tīkā*, called in Tibetan *Rigs-pahi-thugs-pahi-gya-cher-hgre'-wa*, a detailed commentary on the *Nyāya-bindu* of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work was preserved in the Jaina temple of Sāntinātha, Cambay, and has been published by Professor Peterson in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series of Calcutta. There exists a Tibetan translation⁴ in the Tangyur, *Mdo She*, Fohos 43—106. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Jñāna-garbha and an interpreter-monk of Shu-chen named Dharmāloka, and afterwards recast by the Indian sage Sumati-kīrti and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Blo-dan-seg-rab. *Nyāya-bindu-tīkā* begins thus — "Sugata, the conqueror of lust, etc., has overcome this world, the source of series of evils beginning with birth, may his words dispelling the darkness of our mind attain glory"⁵.

¹ *Vide* Taranatha's, *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 225; and Pag-sam-ron-zang, p. 114.

² The Jaina logician Mallavādin (q. v.) wrote a gloss called *Dharmottara-tippanaka* on *Dharmottarācārya's* *Nyāya-bindu-tīkā*. The year 884 in which Mallavādin flourished corresponds to 827 A.D. or 962 A.D. according as we take it to refer to Vikrama-samvat or Śaka-samvat. On one supposition Mallavādin was a contemporary of Dharmottara and on the other he flourished a century later.

³ *अथ धर्मोत्तरानसारी प्राज्ञः प्रयोजनमादिवाक्येन साक्षादाध्यायते इति न शनैः।* (*Syādvāda-ratnāvatārikā*, p. 10, Jaina ya-ovijaya series of Benares).

⁴ I have consulted the copy brought down by the British Mission to Tibet during 1904. The Tibetan version has also been edited by F. J. Sherbatski and printed in Russia.

⁵ *जयन्ति जातिवसनप्रबन्ध प्रकृतिहेमीर्जगती विजितुः।*

रामायणतः सुगतस्य वाचो मनसाम्बोधमावसाधनाम्॥

(*Nyāya-bindu-tīkā*, Chap. I).

139. **Pramāṇa-parīkṣā**, called in Tibetan *Tshad-ma-brtag-pa*, signifying 'an examination of *Pramāṇa* or the sources of valid knowledge'. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the *Tangyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, Fohos 215—237, as well as Fohos 238—253. The translation was prepared by monk *Blo-ldan-śeṣ-rab*.

140. **Apoha-nāma-prakarana**, called in Tibetan *Gzhan-sel-wa*, signifying 'a treatise on the determination of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites'. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation² in the *Tangyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, Fohos 254—266. The translation was prepared by the Kāśmīrian Pandita Bhāgyarāja and the interpreter-monk *Blo-ldan-śeṣ-rab*, in the incomparable city of Kāśmīra.

141. **Pāra-loka-siddhi**, called in Tibetan *Hjug-iten-pha-rol-grub-pa*, signifying 'proof of the world beyond.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ in the *Tangyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, Fohos 266—270. The translation was prepared by the great Pandita Bhāgyarāja and the interpreter-monk *Tshab-ñi-ma grags* during the lifetime of Śīl Harsa Deva (king of Kāśmīra, 1089—1101 A.D.) in the great incomparable city of Kāśmīra.

The work begins thus —

"Some say that the world beyond is possessed of the characteristics of a complete separation from the link of consciousness which began from before birth and continued after death etc."

142. **Kṣana bhanga-siddhi**, called in Tibetan *Ṣka-l-cig-ma-hjug-pa-grub-pa*, signifying 'proof of the momentariness of things.' The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁴ in the *Tangyur*, *Mdo*, Ze, Fohos 270—282. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Bhāgyarāja and the interpreter-monk *Blo-ldan-śeṣ-rab*.

143. **Pramāṇa-viniścaya-tīkā**, called in Tibetan *Tshad-ma-rnam-neṣ-kyi-tīkā*, which is a commentary on the *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁵ in the *Tangyur*, *Mdo*, Dse, folio 346 f, and *We*, Fohos 1—188. The translation was prepared by the Kāśmīrian Pandita Parahita Bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter *Blo-ldan-śeṣ-rab* in the model city of Kāśmīra. In the concluding lines of the work

¹ I have consulted the India Office copy.

² I have consulted the India Office copy.

³ I have consulted the India Office copy.

⁴ I have consulted the India Office copy.

⁵ I have consulted the India Office copy.

JINA MITRA (ABOUT 899 A.D.).

150 Jina Mitra¹ was a native of Kāśmīra who, together with Sarvajña Deva, Dāna-sīla and others, visited Tibet and helped the Tibetans in the work of translating Sanskrit books into Tibetan. Jina Mitra lived about 899 A.D.,² when his contemporary kings Khri-tal (or Ral-pa-can) of Tibet and Mahi Pala of Bengal, died. He wrote the undermentioned work on Logic :—

151 *Nyāya-bindu-pindārtha*, called in Tibetan *Rigs-paḥi-thigs-paḥi-don-ḥs-dus-pa* which contains the purport of *Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu*. The Sanskrit original of this work is lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ in the *Tangyur*, *Mdo*, *She* Folios 115–116. The translation was prepared by the Indian teacher *Saṃ-ḥa-ba-lu*, and the interpreter of *Shueh-n*, named *Vandey-se-sa-sde*.

PRAJÑĀKARA GUPTA (ABOUT 940 A.D.).

152. *Prajñākara Gupta*,⁴ called in Tibetan *Seṣ-rab-ḥbyun-gnas-shas*, lived at the time of *Maha Pala*, who died in 940 A.D. He was a lay devotee and quite different from *Prajñākara Maṭi*, who was a monk and keeper of the southern gate of the university of *Vikrama-śīlā* during the reign of *Canaka* in 983 A.D. (*Vide* Appendix C). *Prajñākara Gupta* was the author of the following works :—

153 *Pramāṇa-vārtikā-lankāra*, called in Tibetan *Tshaj-ma-ḥnam-ḥgrel-gyi-igyan*, which is a commentary on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of *Dharmakīrti*. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁵ which is divided into two parts. The first part extends over Folios 1–352 of volume *Tc*, and the second part Folios 1–328 of volume *She* of the *Tangyur*, section *Mdo*. The translation was prepared by the great Kāśmīran Pandita *Bhāgya-rāja*, and the Tibetan interpreter *Blo-ldan-seṣ-rab*. Subsequently, it was looked through by *Sumatī* and the interpreter *Blo-ldan-seṣ-rab*. The translation has the advantage of having been assisted by numerous sages of the great monastery of *Vikrama-śīlā* in Middle India,

¹ *Vide* Taranatha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 226; and *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, pp. xevi, 115.

² *Vide* *Caṃsa de Koros's Tibetan Grammar*, p. 183.

³ I have consulted the India Office copy.

⁴ *Vide* Taranatha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 230, 235 and *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, p. 116.

⁵ I have consulted this work in the monastery of *Labrang* in *Sikkim*, which I visited in June, 1907.

under the supervision of the great wise Paṇḍita Śrī Sunaya Śrī Mitra and also of the wise Paṇḍita Kumāraśrī of the model city of Kāśmīra.

154. *Sahāvalambha-niścaya*, called in Tibetan *Lhan-cig-dmigs-pa-nes-pa*, signifying "the ascertainment of objects and their knowledge arising together." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Fohos 301—308. The translation was prepared by the Nepalese Paṇḍita Śānti Bhadra and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Śākya-ho-l of the village of Sen-ḍkar in the province of Hbro (Do).

ĀCĀRYA JETĀRI (940—980 A.D.).

155. *Jetāri*² or *Ācārya Jetāri*, called in Tibetan *Dgra-las-ggyal-wa*, was born of a Brāhmaṇa family. His father, Garbhā-pāda, lived in Vārendra at the court of Rājā Samātana, who was a vassal to the Pala kings of Magadha. Being expelled by his kinsmen, Jetāri became a Buddhist devotee and worshipped Mañjuśrī, by whose grace he became a perfect master of sciences. He received from king Maha Pala the royal diploma of Paṇḍita of the university of Vikramaśilā.

156. The famous Dipankara or Śrīpūṇa Atisa is said, when very young, to have learnt five minor sciences from Jetāri. Maha Pala reigned up to 940 A.D. (*vide* Appendix B), and Dipankara was born in 980 A.D.³ Their contemporary, Jetāri, must have lived between those dates.

He was the author of the following works⁴ on Logic —

157. *Hetu-tattva-upadeśa*, called in Tibetan *Gtan-tshigs-kyi-de-kho-na-ñid-bstan-pa*, signifying "instruction on the real nature of the middle term in a syllogism." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Fohos 344—354. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Paṇḍita Kumāra-kalasa and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Śākya-ho-l.

158. *Dharma-dharmī-niścaya*, called in Tibetan *Chos-dañ-choḥ-can-gtan-la-dwab-pa*, signifying "determination of the minor and major terms." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Fohos 354—359.

¹ I have consulted the India Office copy.

² *Vide* Taranatha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* von Schiefner, pp 230—233, and *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, p. 116.

³ *Vide* the "Journal" of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, vol 1, part 1, p. 8.

⁴ The Volume Ze, of the Tangyur, Mdo, containing Jetāri's works, was lent to me by the India Office, London.

159. *Bālāvatāra-tarka*, called in Tibetan *Bis wa-hjug-pahitog-ge*, signifying "children's introduction to Logic." The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the *Tangyur*, *Mdo*, *Ze*, Folios 359—372. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage *Nāga Raksita* and the Tibetan interpreter of the province of *Sum-pa* (in *Amdo*) named *Dpal-mchog-dan-pohi-rdo-rje*. The work begins thus—

"Who by the lustre of his sermon has completely dispersed and cleared the veil of the gloom of ignorance, who is a single lamp to three worlds—may that Bhagavān long remain victorious!" It consists of three chapters named respectively, (1) Perception; (2) Inference for one's own self; and (3) Inference for the sake of others

JINA (ABOUT 983 A.D.).

160 Jina, called in Tibetan *Rgyal-wa-can*, was the author of the following work—

Pramana-vārtikālankāra-tikā, called in Tibetan *Tshad-ma-rganam-hgrel gvi-rgyan-gvi-hgrel-b-saḍ*, a voluminous work, the Tibetan version of which occupies volumes De and Ne of the *Tangyur*, section *Mdo*. This version was prepared by Pandita *Dīpaṅkara* of *Vikramasīlā* (who arrived in Tibet in 1040 A.D.) and the Tibetan interpreter, *Byan-chub-śes-rab* of *Shan-shuu*.

161 Jina, the author of the original work, is probably the same as Jina Bhadra of *Konkana*² who was a contemporary of *Vāgīśvarakīrti*, about 983 A.D. (*Vide* Appendix C).

JÑĀNA-ŚRĪ (ABOUT 983 A.D.).

162 *Jñāna-śrī*, or rather *Jñāna-śrī Mitra*³ (probably the same as *Jñāna-śrī Bhadra*, who worked in *Kāśmīra*), was born in *Gauda*. He was at first admitted into the *Srāvaka* school of

གང་གིས་གསུང་བཤེས་ཐེང་གཏི་སྤྱག་གིས།

སྤྱན་པའི་རབ་རིབ་དུས་པར་གྲོལ་མཛོད་གསལ།

ས་གསུམ་བཞུགས་ན་སྦྱོར་མ་གཏོག་བྱ་ཡི།

བཞེས་པའི་ལོ་ལྷན་རིང་ལྷན་གཏོང་ཏིག།

(*Tangyur*, *Mdo*, *Ze*, folio 359)

² *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p. 235

³ *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 235—242, and *Pagsam jon-zang*, pp. 117—120

Buddhism, but afterwards imbibed faith in the Mahāvāna. Dīpaṅkara or Śrī-jñāna Atiśa (born in 980 A.D.) is said to have been much indebted to him. Jñāna-śrī Mitra was appointed a gate-keeper of the university of Vikramaśilā by Canaka who reigned in Magadha up to 983 A.D. (*Vide* Appendices B and C). The Hindu philosopher Mādhavācārya in the 14th century quotes ¹ Jñāna-śrī, who is perhaps the same as Jñāna-śrī Mitra. He was the author of the following works on Logic —

163. *Pramāṇa-viniścaya-tikā*,² called in Tibetan *Tsha]-ma-nam-par-neg pañi-hgre]-hān]*, which is a commentary on the *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, *Mdo, Dse*, Fohos 1—346, and *Wc*, Fohos 188—322. The translation was prepared by the author³ himself with the co-operation of the interpreter-monk Chos-kyi-brtson-hgrus.

164. *Kārya-kāraṇa bhāva-siddhi*,⁴ called in Tibetan *Rgyu-dan-hbras-buñi-no-wo-grub-pa*, signifying 'establishment of the relation of cause and effect'. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁵ in the Tangyur, *Mdo Ze*, Fohos 413—418. The translation was prepared by the great Indian sage Kumāra Kalasa and the interpreter-monk Śākya-hoḍ. Subsequently, it was re-touched and published by the Nepalese Paṇḍita Ananta-śrī and the interpreter-monk aforementioned.

165. *Tarka-bhāṣā*, called in Tibetan *Rtog-geñi-skad*, signifying 'technicalities of logic'. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁶ in

¹ *Vide* the *Sarvadharma-saṃgraha* chapter on Buddhist-darsana —

तदुक्तं ज्ञानश्रिया

यत् सत् तत् कथं यथा जगत् सत्यं भावाश्चमो ।

सनात्क्रिद्विद्यार्थकस्य मित्रेः सिद्धे मित्रा ज मा ॥

नाथकेव विधानाया परकृत्यापि क्रियादिर्भवेत् ।

इदमपि त्वमङ्गनानिरतः साधे च विशास्यति ॥

² I have consulted the Tibetan version of this work in the monastery of Labrang in Sikkim.

³ The author of the *Pramāṇa-viniścaya-tikā* is called Jñāna-śrī Bhadra and also simply Jñāna-śrī. He is stated in the Colophon of the work to have been a native of Kāśmīra. *Vide* Satya Chandra Vidyabhusana's "Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet, No 3" in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, New Series, vol. III, No 7, 1907. Jñāna-śrī Mitra, of Gauda, seems to be the same as Jñāna-śrī Bhadra, of Kāśmīra, who may have left Gauda to live in Kāśmīra.

⁴ The author of this work is named Jñāna-śrī Mitra.

⁵ I have consulted the India Office copy.

⁶ I have consulted the India Office copy.

the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 373—413. The translation was prepared by the interpreter-monk Dpal-ldan-blo-gros-hītan-pa. The work is divided into three chapters named respectively: (1) Perception; (2) Inference for one's own self; and (3) Inference for the sake of others. It begins thus —“ Bowing down to the teacher, the lord of the world, I elucidate Tarkabhāṣā (the technicalities of logic) for the sake of introducing children of small intellect to the system of Dharmakīrti ”¹

RATNA VAJRA (ABOUT 983 A D).

166 Ratnavajra, called in Tibetan Rin-chen-īdo-īje, was born in a Brāhmana family in Kāśmīra. His ancestors were deeply versed in the sāstra of the Tīrthikas. His father, Hari Bhadrā, was the first convert to Buddhism in his family. Ratnavajra who was an upāsaka (lay devotee), studied by himself up to the 36th year of his life all the Buddhist sūtras, mantras, and sciences. After this he came to Magadha and Vajrāsana (Buddha-Gaṇḍa) where he beheld the face of Cakra-saṃvara, Vajravārāhī and many other deities, by whose grace he completely mastered the Buddhist sāstras. He received the royal diploma of the university of Vikramaśīlā and was appointed a gate-keeper of the university (*vide* Appendix C). Afterwards he came back to Kāśmīra, whence he went through Udyāna (Kabul) to Tibet where he was known by the name of Ācārya. He flourished during the reign of Canaka about 983 A D. (*Vide* Appendices B and C). He was the author of the following work:—

167. Yukti-prayoga, called in Tibetan Rigs-paḥi-shyor-wa, signifying “ application of reasoning ”. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur Mdo Ze, Folios 372—373. The

ཐཱ་ས་འཛིན་རིན་པོ་ལ་བཤད་ནས།

བྱིས་ར་འོ་ད་གཞུང་ས་རྒྱུང་བ་ནས།

ཆོས་བྱི་བྲགས་བའི་བྲགས་མཉན་ཕྱིར།

རྟོག་གཞི་སྒྲན་ནི་རབ་གསལ་བྱ།

(Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, folio 373)

¹ *Vide* Taranatha's Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner, p. 240

² I have consulted the Tibetan version in the possession of the India Office, London

translation was prepared by the Indian sage Śrī Subhūti-śānta and the interpreter-monk of Shu-chen, named Tin-ñe-hsün-bzan-po.

RATNĀKARA ŚĀNTI (ABOUT 983 A D).

168. Ratnākara Śānti¹ was known to the Tibetans as Ācārya Śānti or simply Śāntipa. He was ordained in the order of the Sarvāstivāda school of Odantapura, and learnt the Sūtra and Tantra at Vikramaśilā from Jetāri, Ratna-kīrti² and others. Thereafter he was appointed by king Canaka (who died in 983 A.D.) to be a gate-keeper of the University of Vikramaśilā (*vide* Appendix C), where he defeated the Tīrthika disputants. At the invitation of the king of Ceylon he visited that island where he spread the Buddhist doctrine. He was the author of a work on *Chanda* (prosody) called *Chando-ratnākara*³ and of the following works⁴ on Logic —

169. *Vijñapti-mātra siddhi*, called in Tibetan *Rnam-par-rig-pa-tsam-ñid-du-grub-pa*, signifying 'establishment of a mere communication of knowledge'. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation in the Tangyur, *Mdo, Ze*, Folios 335—338. The translation was prepared by the Nepalese Pandita Śānti Bhadrā, and the Tibetan interpreter-monk Sākya-ho-l of the province of Hbro (Do). Subsequently, it was published by the same Pandita and Klog-skyā-śes-rab-brtsegs.

170. *Antar vyāpti*,⁵ called in Tibetan *Nam-gi-khyab-pa*,

¹ *Vide* Taranatha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schuetter*, pp. 234, 235 and Pag sam-jon-zang, pp. 117, cx. The Tibetan equivalent for the name Ratnākara Śānti is རིན་རྒྱལ་ཤ་ཤེན་པོ།

རིན་རྒྱལ་ཤ་ཤེན་པོ།

² This Ratnakīrti is different from the sage of that name who was patronised by King Vimāla Candra about 650 A.D. (*vide* Tārānūtha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schuetter*, pp. 172-174, and my discussion in art. 108 under the head Vinīta Deva in the *Buddhist Logic*). This earlier Ratnakīrti, known through a commentary on the *Madhyama-kāvyaśāstra*, wrote *Kalyāṇa-kāṇḍa* and *Dharmavinivṛtya* embodied in the Tangyur *Mdo, Ku*. The same Ratnakīrti was perhaps the author of *Apohasiddhi* and *Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi* which are being published in the *Bibliotheca Indica* series of Calcutta under the editorship of M. M. Hara Prasād Śāstri. Two other works called *Sthūla-dūṣaṇa* and *Victrādvaitsiddhi* are ascribed to him.

³ For an account of the *Chandro-ratnākara* see Satishchandra Vidyabhusana's "Sanskrit works on Literature, Grammar, Rhetoric and Lexicography as preserved in Tibet" in *J. A. S. B.*, new series, vol. III, no. 2, 1907.

⁴ The volume *Ze* of the Tangyur, section *Mdo*, containing Ratnākara Śānti's works, was lent to me by the India Office, London.

⁵ The Sanskrit original of 'Antarvyāpti' or more fully 'Antarvyāpti-

signifying 'internal inseparable connection'. It is embodied in the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 338—344. The translation was prepared by the Indian sage Kumāra Kalasa and the interpreter-monk Sākya-ho!

VĀK-PRAJA (ABOUT 983 A.D.).

171 In the Tangyur, Mdo, Ze, Folios 201—202 there is the Tibetan version¹ of the *Sarvajña-siddhi-kārikā*, called in Tibetan *Thamg-cag-ukhyen-pa-giub-pa-hi-tshig-lehur-byas-pa*, signifying 'memorial verses on the attainment of omniscience.' The author of this work is named in Tibetan *Ṣaḡ-hbanṣ* which may be restored in Sanskrit as Vāk-praja. If he is the same as Vāgīśvara-kīrti he must have lived about 983 A.D. (*vide* Appendix C).

YAMĀRI (ABOUT 1050 A.D.).

172 Yamāri was specially versed in Grammar and Logic. But he was very poor. Once, being unable to support his family and children, he came to Vajrāsana (Buddha-Gayā). There he related his poverty to a Yogin, who replied "You Paṇḍits despise Yogins and do not solicit dharma from them, hence this has come to pass." Saying this, he uttered the Vasudhara benediction in virtue of which Yamāri rose to opulence. He afterwards received the royal diploma of the university of Vikramaśilā². He lived during the time of Naya Pāla who died in 1050 A.D. (*vide* Appendix B). He was the author of the following work —

173 *Pramāṇa-vartikālankāra tīkā*, called in Tibetan *Tshad-ma-inam-hgetel-gyan-gyi-hgetel-bcad*, which is an annotation on the *Pramāṇa-vārtikālankāra* of Prajñākara Gupta. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a very voluminous Tibetan translation which covers volumes Be, Me, and Tse of the Tangyur, Mdo. The translation was prepared by Pandita Sumati and the interpreter Blo-

samarthana' has recently been recovered from Nepal by M. M. Hara Prasad Sastri, M.A., of Calcutta, and is deposited in the Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. It begins thus —

इह सम्प्रत्यक्षक्रियाकारित्वं तद्वि-
तरक्षकशक्त्यात् । तच्च क्रमयोगपद्याभ्यां ज्ञानं परस्परव्यवच्छेदकत्वत्वादनयोः ।
प्रकारान्तरेण करवाचकत्वात् । It ends thus — अन्तर्भावप्रतिपत्तिरयं समाप्तमिति ।
कतिरिधं रत्नाकरमणिपादानाम् ॥

¹ I have consulted the copy belonging to the India Office, London.

² *Vide* Taranatius's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 247, 253.

ldan-śeṣ-rab in the monastery of Śñe-than near Lhasa. The volume Be ends thus —“ From the immeasurable merit acquired by me by composing this regular annotation, may the world, subduing its adversary death, obtain the indestructible and perfected Nirvāṇa.”¹

SAṆKARĀNANDA (ABOUT 1050 A.D.).

174. Sankarānanda,² called in Tibetan Bde-byed-dgaḥ-wa, was born in a Brāhmana family in Kāśmīra. He was learned in all sciences, and was above all an expert in Logic. He intended to write an original work on Logic refuting Dharmakīrti, but in a dream he was told by Mañj ūrī . ‘ Since Dharmakīrti is an Ārya (a Buddhist monk), one cannot refute him, and if thou seest mistake in him it is the mistake of thine own understanding.’ Thereupon Sankarānanda repented and composed a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇa-vārtika* in seven chapters. He flourished³ during the time of Naya Pāla, who reigned until 1050 A.D. He was the author of the following works on Logic .—

175. *Pramāṇa-vārtika-tika*, called in Tibetan Tsha-l-ma-rgnam-lhgrel-gyi-lhgrel-bṣa-l, being an annotation on the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation⁴ which covers volumes Pe and Phe of the *Tangyur*, Mdo.

176. *Sambandha-pariksānusāra*, called in Tibetan Hbrel-pa-brtag-paḥi-ljes-su-hbian-wa, which is a commentary on the

¹ ལྷུང་བཞིན་ཏེ་ཀུ་འདི་ནི་བྱས་བ་ལས།
བསོད་ནམས་ཚད་མེད་བསམགས་བ་གང་ཡིན་པ།
ངས་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་གཤིན་རྗེའི་དགྲ་འཇོམས་ནི།
མི་ཟད་རབ་བསྐྱབ་གཉིས་མེད་ཐོབ་པར་ཤོག།

(Tangyur, Mdo, Bo, folio 303).

² Vide Taranatha’s *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp 247, 349, and *Pa-sam-jon-rang*, pp 107, 120

³ Some maintain that Sankarānanda was a personal pupil of Dharmakīrti. On this point Lama Taranatha observes —“ The Brāhmana Sankarānanda appeared at a much later time, and to call him a personal pupil of Dharmakīrti would be a great confusion.”—Taranatha’s *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, p 188

⁴ I have consulted this work in the monastery of Labrang, in Sikkim, in 1907.

Sambandha-parīkṣā of Dharmakīrti. The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the Tangyur, *Mdo, Ze*, Fohos 24—39. The translation was prepared by the great Indian Pandita Parahita, and the Tibetan interpreter-monk *Dgaḥ wahi rdo-rje*.

The work begins thus:—

“By whom connection with the world has been renounced, in whom there are no “I” and “mine,” who is called free from concerns—to that Omniscient One I bow down.”²

177 *Apoḥasiddhi*, called in Tibetan *Sel-wa-grub-pa*, signifying ‘establishment of a thing by the exclusion of its opposites.’ The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation³ in the Tangyur, *Mdo, Ze*, Fohos 308—334. The translation was prepared by the Kāśmīran Pandita Manoratha and the Tibetan interpreter *Blo-dan-śeg-rab* in the incomparable city of Kāśmīra.

The work opens thus:—

“The Omniscient One who is free from all mistakes and who looks to the interests of living beings in all times, saluting him and relying on his mercy, I elucidate the puzzle of ‘self’ and ‘others’ connected with the doctrine of *Apoḥa*.”⁴

¹ I have consulted the Tibetan version in the possession of India Office, London.

² བཤམ་གྱིས་འབྲེལ་བ་སྦྱངས་གུང་བ།
 འབྲེལ་བ་བདག་དང་བདག་གི་མི།
 བརྒྱུད་འཛིན་མེད་པ་ཅན་གསུངས་པ།
 ཀུན་མཁྱེན་དེ་ལ་བྱུག་འཆལ་ལོ།

(Tangyur, *Mdo, Ze*, folio 24)

³ I have consulted the India Office copy

⁴ ཀུན་མཁྱེན་འཕྲུལ་བཤམ་དུས་གསུམ་གནས་པ་ཡི།
 རོན་ནམས་ཇི་གཞིན་གཞིགས་པ་ལ་བདྱད་དེ།
 བརྟེ་ལ་གནས་ནས་སེལ་བ་ལ་བདེན་པའི།
 བདག་གཞན་རབ་དུས་འདི་འཕྲུལ་བསལ་བྱས།

(Tangyur, *Mdo, Ze*, folio 30)

178. *Pratibandha-siddhi*, called in Tibetan *Hbrel-pa-grub-pa*, signifying “establishment of the causal connection.” The Sanskrit original of this work appears to be lost, but there exists a Tibetan translation¹ in the *Tangyur*, *Mdo*, *Ze*, Folios 334—335. The translation was prepared by Pandita Bhāgyarāja and the interpreter *Blo-ldan-śeṣ-rab*.

¹ I have consulted the India Office copy

APPENDIX A.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NĀLANDA.

(*About 300—850 A.D.*).

Nālandā was a village which is identified with modern Bara-gaon,¹ 7 miles north of Rajgir, in Behar. Though occasionally mentioned in the Pāli literature, Nālandā was not of great importance before the rise of the Mahāyāna at the beginning of the Christian era. Nāgārjuna, about 300 A.D., and Ārya Deva, about 320 A.D., were the earliest scholars to take interest in the educational institution at that village. A Brāhmaṇa named Suviṣṇu, a contemporary of Nāgārjuna, is said to have established 108 temples there in order that the Abhidharma of the Mahāyāna might not decline.² About 400 A.D., the Chinese pilgrim, Fa-huan,³ visited this place, which he calls "the village of Nalo." He saw there a tower which had been erected on the spot where Sāriputra, the right-hand disciple of Buddha, had entered Nirvāṇa. Early in the 7th century A.D., another Chinese pilgrim, the famous Hwen-thsang, visited Nālandā and halted⁴ there 15 months to study the Sanskrit language under Śīlabhadra. According to him⁵ the site of Nālandā was originally a mango garden which was bought by 500 merchants at a cost of ten crores of gold pieces and given to Buddha.⁶ After the Nirvāṇa of Buddha, five kings, named Śakrāditya Buddha Gupta, Tathāgata Gupta, Bālāditya, and Vajra, built five Saṅghārāma or monasteries at Nālandā. A king of Central India established another magnificent monastery, and began to build round these edifices a high wall with one gate. A long succession of kings continued the work of building, using all the skill of the sculptor, till at the time of Hwen-thsang in 637 A.D. the whole was "truly marvellous to behold." In the estab-

¹ Vide Cunningham's *Ancient Geography of India*, p. 468

² Vide Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 70—86.

³ Vide Beal's *Fa-huan*, p. 111

⁴ Vide Cunningham's *Ancient Geography of India*, p. x.

⁵ Vide Beal's *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, vol. ii, pp. 168—170.

⁶ It must have been given to a Buddhist saint of a later age and not to Buddha himself.

lishment were some thousands of monks, all men of great ability and learning. They were very strict in observing the rules of Vinaya, and were looked up to as models by all India. Learning and discussing they found the day too short, day and night they admonished each other, juniors and seniors mutually helping to perfection. Learned men from different cities came to Nālandā to acquire renown, and some persons even usurped the name of Nālandā students in order that they might be received everywhere with honour. "Of those from abroad who wished to enter the schools of discussion, the majority, beaten by the difficulties of the problems, withdrew; and those who were deeply versed in old and modern learning were admitted, only two or three out of ten succeeding."¹ Hwen-thsang mentions some celebrated men of Nālandā, such as Dharmapāla and Candrapāla, Guṇamati and Sthiramati,² Prabhāmītra and Jinamītra, and Jñānacandra and Śīlabhadra.

Another Chinese pilgrim named I-tsing, who resided in Nālandā for ten years (probably 675—685 A.D.), says that there were eight halls and 300 apartments in the monastery of Nālandā with more than 3,000 resident monks. The lands in its possession contained more than 200 villages which had been bestowed upon the monastery by kings of different generations.³

Nālandā assumed the character of a university from about 450 A.D. Bālāditya, king of Magadha, who built a monastery at Nālandā, was a contemporary of the Hun king Mihirakula, who reigned first in Śākala and afterwards in Kāśmīra. Now Mihirakula⁴ began his reign in 515 A.D., and his contemporary, Bālāditya, must also have lived about that time. There were three predecessors of Bālāditya who built monasteries at Nālandā. Of them, the earliest, named Śakrāditya, must have reigned about 450 A.D. if we suppose 25 years as the average duration of the reign of each of them. The year 450 A.D. is then the earliest limit which we can roughly assign to the royal recognition of Nālandā. The latest limit which we know with certainty is 750 A.D., when Kamalaśīla (*q. v.*) was the professor of Tantras at Nālandā. But as we read in the accounts of Vikramāśīla that there was for some time an intercourse between that university

¹ Vide Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. II, pp. 164—165.

² Thus Sthiramati seemed to be the one mentioned by I-tsing (vide Takakusu, p. 181). He flourished after Asanga and Vasubandhu.

³ Vide Takakusu's I-tsing, pp. xxxiii, 65 and 154.

⁴ Vide Watters' "On Yuan Chwang," vol. I, p. 289.

Takakusu, in his "Paramārtha's Life of Vasubandhu," published in the "Journal" of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, January 1905, maintains that Bālāditya came to the throne in 481 A.D., but this statement is by no means final. The date (452—480 A.D.) of Vikramāditya, Bālāditya's father, is also open to dispute.

and Nālandā, we may suppose that the latter continued to exist approximately until 850 A.D.

According to Tibetan accounts¹ the quarter in which the Nālandā University, with its grand library, was located, was called Dharmagañja (Piety Mart). It consisted of three grand buildings called Ratnasāgara, Ratnodadhī, and Ratnarañjaka, respectively. In Ratnodadhī, which was nine-storeyed, there were the sacred scripts called Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra, and Tāntrik works such as Samāja-guhyā, etc. After the Turuska raiders had made incursions in Nālandā, the temples and *Cāityas* there were repaired by a sage named Mudita Bhadra. Soon after this, Kukutasiddha, minister of the king of Magadha, erected a temple at Nālandā, and while a religious sermon was being delivered there, two very indigent Tīrthika mendicants appeared. Some naughty young novice-monks in disdain threw washing-water on them. This made them very angry. After propitiating the sun for 12 years, they performed a *yajña*, fire-sacrifice and threw living embers and ashes from the sacrificial pit into the Buddhist temples, etc. This produced a great conflagration which consumed Ratnodadhī. It is, however, said that many of the Buddhist scriptures were saved by water which leaked through the sacred volumes of Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra and Tantra.

¹ Vide Pag-sam jon-zang, edited in the original Tibetan by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C I E, at Calcutta, p 92.

APPENDIX B.

A LIST OF KINGS OF THE PĀLA DYNASTY OF BENGAL AND BEHAR.

(*From Tibetan sources*).

In the Tibetan books,¹ such as *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, *Lama Tārānātha's Chos-byun*, etc., we find a short account of the kings of the Pāla dynasty of Bengal. Go Pāla, the founder of the dynasty, lived principally in Pundra-*vardhana*. His successor, Deva Pāla, annexed Vārendra to his kingdom. Deva Pāla's grandson, Dharma Pāla, conquered Magadha and annexed it to Bengal. Dharma Pāla's power is said to have extended in the east to the ocean, in the west to Delhi, in the north to Jālandhara, and in the south to the Vindhya ranges. It is stated that during his reign Sānta Rakṣita died. Now Sānta Rakṣita visited Tibet during the reign of *Thi-srong-deu-tsan* in 749 A.D., and worked there for 13 years, that is, till 762 A.D. His death must therefore have taken place after 762 A.D. Dipankara Śrījñāna, *alias* Atiśa, High-priest of Vikramaśīlā, who was a contemporary of king Naya Pāla of Magadha, visited Tibet in company with Nag-tsho-lotsava in 1040 A.D. during the reign of Lha-tsun-byan-chub, son of Lha-lama-ye-*śes-hod*, who held his court at Tholing in Nāri. These facts throw a good deal of light on the dates of the Pāla kings.² It is further stated that the death of Mahī Pāla is exactly synchronous with that of the Tibetan king Khri-ral. Now Khri-ral (or Ral-pa-can) died in 899 A.D.³ This fixes the date of the death of Mahī Pāla. As the period of reign of each of the kings that preceded and succeeded Mahī Pāla is definitely stated by Lama Tārānātha, and also by the author of the *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, there is no difficulty in ascertaining the dates of the Pāla kings. Proceeding in this way, we can fix the dates as follows:—

1. Go Pāla	..	660—705 A.D.
2. Deva Pāla	..	705—753 A.D.

¹ *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 202—252, and *Pag-sam-jon-zang*, edited by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, *Bahadur*, C.I.E., pp. 112—121.

² *Vide* the 16th volume of *Klon-rdol-gsun-ḥbum*, and Sarat Chandra Das's "Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow," pp. 50—76.

³ *Vide* the Chronological Table extracted from the *Vaiduryakarpo* in Csoma de Koros's *Tibetan Grammar*, p. 183.

3.	Rasa Pāla	753—765	A.D.
4.	Dharma Pāla	765—829	A.D.
5.	Masu Rakṣita	829—837	A.D.
6.	Vana Pāla	837—847	A.D.
7.	Mahī Pāla	847—899	A.D.
8.	Mahā Pāla	899—940	A.D.
9.	Sāmu Pāla ¹	940—952	A.D.
10.	Sreṣṭha Pāla or Praistha Pāla	952—955	A.D.
11.	Canaka	955—983	A.D.
12.	Bhaya Pāla	983—1015	A.D.
13.	Naya Pāla	1015—1050	A.D.
14.	Āmra Pāla	1050—1063	A.D.
15.	Hasti Pāla	1063—1078	A.D.
16.	Kṣānti Pāla	1078—1092	A.D.
17.	Rāma Pāla	1092—1138	A.D.
18.	Yakṣa Pāla	1138—1139	A.D.

The researches on the Pāla kings, by the late Dr Rājendra Lāl Mitra arrived at a conclusion which is somewhat different from mine. Dr. Mitra's list of Pāla kings² is given below :—

1.	Go Pāla	855—875	A.D.
2.	Dharma Pāla	875—895	A.D.
3.	Deva Pāla	895—915	A.D.
4.	Vigraha Pāla I	915—935	A.D.
5.	Nārāyaṇa Pāla	935—955	A.D.
6.	Rāja Pāla	955—975	A.D.
7.	.. . Pāla	975—995	A.D.
8.	Vigraha Pāla II	995—1015	A.D.
9.	Mahī Pāla	1015—1040	A.D.
10.	Naya Pāla	1040—1060	A.D.
11.	Vigraha Pāla III	1060—1080	A.D.

¹ Probably the same as Nārāyaṇa Pāla who, in the Bhagalpur plate, is styled "the lord of Anga."

² Vide Dr Rājendra Lāl Mitra's "Indo-Aryans," vol II, p. 232.

APPENDIX C.

THE ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF VIKRAMASILĀ.

(About 800—1200 A D.)

Vikramasīlā,¹ mentioned in Sanskrit *Stagdhārāstotra-tīkā*,² *Vṛhat-svayambhū-purāṇa*,³ Tibetan *Tangyur*,⁴ etc., was a great collegiate monastery, or rather University, founded by king Dharma Pāla at the close of the 8th century A.D. It was situated on a precipitous hill⁵ in Behar at the right bank of the Ganges, possibly at *Silā-saṃgama*, now called *Pātharghātā*, near Colgong in the Bhagalpur district. *Dharmapāla* endowed

¹ *Vide* Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 234-242, 259-261, *Pag-sam jon zang*, pp. 113, 117, 118, and Sarat Chandra Das's article in the "Journal" of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta, vol. 1, part 1, pp. 10—12; and his "Indian Pandits in the Land of Snow," pp. 50—76.

² The colophon of the *Stagdhārāstotra-tīkā* runs as follows —

वीरमहोदयस्य विहारो राजगृहपश्चित्तमिषु श्रीजिनरत्नसङ्गता वासार्थ-
स्तुतिर्लोका परिचमात्रा (*Stagdhārāstotra*, edited in the *Bibliotheca Indica*
series by Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana, p. 50)

१ वाराणस्यां नगरीयां च विहारो यत्र स्थापितः ।

तदा विक्रमशीलस्य विहारो वसद्गुप्तः ॥

धर्मकीर्तिनी नामोऽयं भिक्षुः पश्चित्तकथुकाः ।

अग्रे दिग्दशमास नामसङ्कीर्ति च कथायाम् ॥ (*Vṛhat-svayambhū-*

purāṇa, edited by M. M. Hara Prasad Sastri, chap. vi, pp. 320—321)

⁴ Numerous Sanskrit works such as *नारैकविंशतिकाङ्कने संक्षेप, तारा चित्रम-*
खोमम् etc., were translated into Tibetan in the monastery of Vikrama-
sīlā, as is evident from the *Tangyur*, *Rgyud*, *La*, *Fohos* 11—26, 54, etc.

⁵ At the distance of a day's sail below Sultanganj there is a steep hill called *Pātharghātā* overhanging the Ganges, which here is *uttaravāhīni* (or flows towards the north). This corresponds exactly with the account of Vikramasīlā given in Tibetan books. There are also ruins of Buddhist images at *Pātharghātā*. For its old name *Silāsaṃgama* vide Francklin's "Site of Ancient Palibothra," pp. 54—55, Appendix p. xiii. General Cunningham identifies Vikramasīlā with modern Silao, which is a small village three miles to the south of Bargaon (ancient *Nālandā*) and six miles to the north of Rajn in the subdivision of Behar (*vide* Report of the Archaeological Survey, vol. viii, p. 83). But this identification does not tally with the description found in Tibetan books, for the Ganges never passed by Silao, nor is there any hill near to it.

the university with rich grants sufficing for the maintenance of 108 resident monks besides numerous non-resident monks and pilgrims. At the head of the university was always a most learned and pious sage. Thus at the time of Dharma Pāla, Ācārya Buddha-jñāna-pāda directed the affairs of the university, and during 1034—1038 A.D. Dīpankara or Śrījñāna Atiśa was at its head, and Sthavira Ratnākara was the superior of the monastery. The famous Tibetan scholar Nag-tshul-khrimg-rgyal-wa, better known as Nag-tsho Lotsava, who came to take Dīpankara Śrījñāna *alias* Atiśa to Tibet, resided in the monastery of Vikramaśīlā for three years, 1035—1038 A.D.¹ Kamalakulśa, Narendra-śrī-jñāna, Dāna Rakṣita, Abhayakara Gupta, Subhakara Gupta, Sunāyakaśrī, Dharmākara Śānti and Śākya-śrī Pandita also belonged to the university of Vikramaśīlā. Provision was made specially for the study of grammar, metaphysics (including logic) and ritualistic books. On the walls of the university were painted images of panditas eminent for their learning and character. The distinguished scholars of the university received a diploma of "Pandita" from the kings themselves. For instance, the distinguished logicians, Ācārya Jetāri of Vārendra and Ratnavajra of Kāśmīra, were granted such a diploma. The most erudite sages were appointed to guard the gates of the university. These were six in number, each of which had to be guarded by scholars designated "Gate-keepers" (called in Tibetan Go-srun, corresponding, perhaps, to our Dvāra-pandita). During the reign of Canaka (955—983 A.D.) the undermentioned eminent logicians acted as gate-keepers:—

(i)—At the eastern gate	Ācārya Ratnākara Śānti.
(ii)—At the western gate	Vāgīśvarakīrti, of Benares.
(iii)—At the northern gate	The famous Naropa.
(iv)—At the southern gate	Prajñākaramati.
(v)—At the first central gate	Ratnavajra of Kāśmīra.
(vi)—At the second central gate	Jñāna-śrī-mitra of Gauḍa.

The university of Vikramaśīlā is said to have been destroyed by the Mahomedan invader Bakhtiar Khilji,² about 1203 A.D. when Śākya-śrī-pandita, of Kāśmīra, was at its head.

¹ Vide *Klon-ṛdol-gsun ḥbum*, vol. xvi.

² Vide the Tibetan-English Dictionary compiled by Rai Sarat Chandra Das, p. 869, Waddell's "Lamaism," p. 16.

The Turuṣkas or Mahomedans attacked Magadha several times. Thus Tārānātha, speaking of Ācārya Kamala Rakṣita who was at the head of the Vikramaśīlā university at the end of the 10th century A.D., observes:— "A minister of the Turuṣka king, out of the Karna land in the west, together with 500 Turuṣkas, drew to Magadha to plunder. They plundered

the sacrificial materials, but when they began to walk all in a body to the Ācārya (Kamala Rakṣita) the Ācārya got into a rage and walked up along, throwing a jug, filled with water, over which he had spoken the mantras. On the spot a great and indomitable storm collected, out of the wind came forth many black men armed with swords who fell upon the Turuskas, the minister himself perished spitting blood, and various contagious illnesses repulsed the others in such a way that none of them could reach their native country, and a great terror came over the Tirthas and Turuskas—Tārānātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus von Schiefner*, pp. 266, 261.

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